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Introduction
Spring is in the air in the rolling hills of Bucks County,
Pennsylvania, as the cars pull into the parking lot of a suburban office
park just a few miles from the Washington Crossing State Historic
Site. Ten men, with the nondescript business suits, radios, and
haircuts which make them easily identifiable as government agents,
pale beside the bright rhododendron blooms lining the walkway as
they parade to the door of the offices of a small importer/exporter of
machine tools a little after lunch. The IPT Company, Inc., a New
York corporation, had been in business for over twenty-five years
when the U.S Treasury Agents arrived without warning to close the
business down. The thirteen employees at the Warminster office and
warehouse were told to collect their personal belongings, as the
premises were to be vacated immediately, the locks changed, and the
business closed. One of the agents affixed a new sign to the door,
which read:
U.S. Persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with the
entity occupying this space. All assets owned or controlled by it are
blocked .... Criminal penalties for violation of this notice may
include up to 10 years imprisonment, $500,000 in corporate and
$250,000 in individual fines.'
Neither the company nor its employees or principals were
accused of any wrongdoing. Rather, IFT was "blocked" by the
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC)
because of U.S. foreign policy concerns regarding the identity of
IPT's overseas stockholders. By virtue of its foreign ownership, this
New York corporation had become caught up in one of the U.S.
government's economic sanctions programs - in this case, the then
newly-announced sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.2
The notice served on IPT stated:
1. Barbara Demick, Bosnia Fallout Scars a Company in Bucks: Clinton's Anti-
Yugoslav Sanctions Hit Home, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 24 1993, at Al, available
in 1993 WL, PHILINQ database.
2. See id; see also infra notes 91, 120-129, 258-266 and accompanying text. More than
400 individuals, firms, and vessels have been blacklisted under the Yugoslav sanctions.
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All entities located in or organized under the laws of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and any entities
owned or controlled by the foregoing, are presumed to be
controlled by the Government of the Federal Republic of
Serbia.... For this reason the U.S. Department of Treasury
considers IPT Company, Inc. to be an entity blocked by [the
Executive Orders imposing economic sanctions on the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia]. U.S. Persons (including IPT employees)
are, therefore, prohibited from engaging in transactions with IPT,
unless licensed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and all
assets within U.S. jurisdiction which are owned or controlled by
IPT are required to be treated as blocked. You are hereby ordered
to close the IPT premises immediately and to post the enclosed
notice on the outside of the door. No property is to be removed
without the express permission of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control. All accounts of IPT and accounts in which IPT has an
interest in the United States or in foreign branches of U.S. banks
are blocked. 3
Thus, IPT was effectively considered to be a Yugoslavian agent
by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controls
(OFAC), and dealings with this U.S. machine tool exporter became
subject to the same prohibitions and regulations applied to dealing
with Slobodan Milosovic or his Government. 4 Why? Because the
3. IPT Co. v. United States Dep't of Treas., No. 92 Civ. 5542 (JFK), 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12796, at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24,1992).
The text truncates the events which led to the closing of IPT. The economic sanctions
imposed following the breakup of Yugoslavia were actually implemented in several steps.
The notice quoted above was served on IPT in July of 1992 as a result of the initial
announcement of sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro). See Exec. Order No. 12,808, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,299 (1992); Exec. Order No.
12,810,57 Fed. Reg. 24,347 (1992). Following the initial shutdown of the company, OFAC
issued licenses which permitted IPT to resume operating as long as they did not do
business with the affected areas of Yugoslavia. IPT complied with OFAC's conditions.
However, these licenses were revoked in 1993 when the initial sanctions were tightened as
the situation in the former Yugoslavia continued to deteriorate. The unannounced
revocation of the licenses and shutdown of the Warminster IPT offices described in the
text accompanying note 1, supra, occurred in 1993 following the issuance of Executive
Order 12,846. See Exec. Order No. 12,846, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,771 (1993); IPT Co. v. United
States Dep't of Treas., No. 92 Civ. 5542 (JFK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6304, at *2-*3
(S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1993); No. 92 Civ. 5542 (JFK), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *1-*2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1992). The sanctions were then further tightened in 1994. See Exec.
Order No. 12,934,59 Fed. Reg. 54,117 (1994).
The sanctions and blocking measures directed at Serbia and Montenegro were
prospectively lifted in January of 1996 as a result of the Dayton Peace Accords, see 61
Fed. Reg. 1,284 (1996); 31 C.F.R. § 585.525 (1999), but were not similarly lifted for the
Serbian controlled areas of Bosnia until the following May. See 61 Fed. Reg. 24,697
(1996); 31 C.F.R. § 585.527 (1999). Sanctions were then reimposed on the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in June of 1998 as a result of Serbian actions in Kosovo. See 63
Fed. Reg. 54,575 (1998).
4. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Sanctions Regulations (FRYSR) impose a
November 1999] BLACKLISTING AND DUE PROCESS
shares of this New York corporation were owned by two commercial
companies established in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
As a consequence, IPT's name was added to one of OFAC's
"blacklists" and no person 6 or company subject to U.S. jurisdiction
could engage in any sort of transaction with IPT, without
variety of restrictions on dealing with the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). See 31 C.F.R. § 585.201 (1999). The Government
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is defined in the regulations to include:
(a) The state and Government of the FRY (8&M)... including their respective
agencies or instrumentalities... ;
(b) Any entity owned or controlled by the foregoing. For purposes of the
prohibitions of this part, all entities located in or organized under the laws of any
jurisdiction within the FRY (S&M) are presumed to be controlled by the
Government of the FRY (S&M) unless proven otherwise;
(c) Any person... acting or purporting to act, directly or indirectly, on behalf of
any of the foregoing; and
(d) Any person or organization determined by the Director of the Office of
Foreign Assets Control to be included within this section, or owned or controlled
by such a person or organization.
31 C.F.R. § 585.311 (1999) (emphasis added).
5. The two Serbian companies that owned IPT were Invest-Import, an importer and
exporter of industrial products, and LZTK (Livnica Zeljeza I Tempera-Kikinda), a tool
and grinding machine manufacturer. The U.S. government successfully asserted that
Invest-Import and LZTK must be presumed to be controlled by the government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because of their being located in Serbia. IPT had argued
that its shareholders were not government instrumentalities, but rather "Workers'
Organizations" - companies owned by the workers - considered to be "socially owned" by
the government only because privatization was not yet complete at the time Yugoslavia
broke apart. See IPT Co. v. United States Dep't of Treas., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388,
at *3 n. 1. See also Milena Ship Management Co., Ltd. v. Newcomb, 995 F.2d 620, 623-24
(5th Cir. 1993) (discussing "Social Capital" in Yugoslavian law); 804 F. Supp 859, 863
(E.D. La. 1992); and 804 F. Supp 846, 853-54 (E.D. La. 1992). In response to IPT's
arguments, when the sanctions relating to Kosovo were reimposed in 1998, new language
was included in the Executive Order specifically including "socially owned
entities... located in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)"
within the definition of the "Government" targeted by the controls. Exec. Order No.
13,088 § 5(e), 63 Fed. Reg. 32,109, 32,110 (1998). Additionally, a new, broadened,
definition was also included in the Kosovo Sanctions Regulations (KSR) which reads:
The term Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) means the Government of the FRY (S&M), its agencies,
instrumentalities, and controlled entities, including all financial institutions and
state-owned and socially-owned entities organized or located in the FRY (S&M)
as of June 9, 1998, any successors to such entities, and their respective
subsidiaries and branches, wherever located, and any persons acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of any of the foregoing.
31 C.F.R. § 586.306 (1999). Compare this new provision with the more convoluted
language of the FRYSR. See id. § 585.311, supra note 4.
6. These prohibitions also extended to IPT's employees. The President of IPT, Melita
Jaric, was prevented from seeing the company's mail, and was even unable to access
company records in order to obtain the telephone numbers of IPT's customers. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
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authorization from the U.S. government.7 After twenty five years of
operations as a U.S. company, producing annual revenues of up to
$50 million dollars,8 IPT was out of business.9 "We didn't expect that
something like this could happen in a country with such strong
democratic inclinations," said Melita Jaric, the Croatian-born
President of IPT, "[i]t is one of the worst horrors imaginable to any
business person. If property rights were treated like human rights,
they could never get away with this."' 0
I. Blacklists In U.S. Economic Sanctions
A. The Sanctions on The Former Yugoslavia
IPT's difficulties with the Yugoslav sanctions provide a good
example of how the "blacklisting" of specific individuals and
companies is used as an important adjunct to the various U.S.
economic sanctions or embargo programs."
When the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
12
established by Marshall Tito broke apart into six republics in the
early 1990's,13 the governments of Serbia' 4 and Montenegro 15
declared themselves to be the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY).16 The FRY became subject to both a U.S.17 and a U.N. 8
7. See 31 CF.R. §§ 585.201-218, 586.201-.206 (1999). See also infra notes 17-21 and
accompanying text (detailing how the U.S. sanctions were phased in between 1992 and
1994, and then reimposed in 1998).
8. See DEMICK, supra note 1.
9. As the court noted during one of IPT's legal challenges to this process, "[b]eing
closed down is the ultimate harm that a business can suffer." IPT Co. v. United States
Dep't of Treas., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6304, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 13,1993).
10. See DEMICK, supra note 1.
11. See infra notes 62-103 and accompanying text, for an overview of the U.S.
Government's economic sanctions programs.
12. See 31 C.F.R. § 585.312 (1999) (defining "Government of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia" as it is used in this section).
13. After the collapse of communism, the six republics which comprised the former
Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and
Slovenia) split apart in a bloody civil war. See generally HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA 1948-
1998 JANE'S SENTINEL, (1999) available at http://www.janes.comldefence/features
/kosovo/history.html.
14. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 585.311,586.308 (1999).
15. See id. §§ 585311,586.307.
16. See id. §§ 585.313,586.304.
17. The initial U.S. sanctions were imposed on May 30, 1992. See Exec. Order No.
12,808,57 Fed. Reg. 23,299 (1992).
18. The initial U.N. sanctions were imposed, simultaneously with the U.S. sanctions,
on May 30, 1992, with U.N. Security Council Resolution Number 757. S.C. Res. 757, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg. at 4-9, U.N. Doe. S/RES/757 (1992). Over time, and as the
situation in Yugoslavia continued to worsen, the U.N. called for further sanctions through
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economic embargo 19 as a result of its attempts to seize territory and
conduct "ethnic cleansing" in the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and similar efforts more recently aimed at suppressing
ethnic Albanians within the Serbian province of Kosovo.20
1994. See S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg. at 9-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787
(1992); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. 3200th mtg. at 10-30, U.N. Doc. S/RES/820
(1993); S.C. Res. 942, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3428th mtg. at 7-22, S/RES/942 (1994). With
the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, the U.N. economic sanctions were suspended
and its arms embargo phased out over a period of months. See S.C. Res. 1022, U.N.
SCOR, 50th Sess., 3595th mtg. at 1-7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1022 (1995). However, when
fighting broke out in the Serbian province of Kosovo, the U.N. called for a renewed arms
embargo with Security Council Resolution Number 1160. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR,
53rd Sess., 3868th mtg. at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998). This was further augmented
by a call for U.N. members to prohibit fundraising in their territories from being used to
undermine the arms embargo. See S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg. at
11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998).
19. The initial sanctions ordered U.S. citizens, residents, or companies (including their
overseas branches) to "block" all property belonging to the FRY government, or in which
the FRY government had "any interest." See Exec. Order No. 12,808 §§ 1-2,57 Fed. Reg.
23,299 (1992). This was quickly expanded with Executive Order 12,810 on June 5, 1992 to
reflect U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 757 by adding an import/export ban, travel
restrictions, restrictions on sporting/cultural/scientific exchanges and, significantly, a
prohibition on any financial dealings with "commercial entities" located in the FRY. See
Exec. Order No. 12,810, 57 Fed. Reg. 24, 347 (1992). These measures were still further
tightened (particularly with regard to trans-shipments through Yugoslavia or dealings with
Yugoslav-controlled vessels) to align the U.S. sanctions with the additional measures
being called for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 787. See Exec. Order No. 12,831, 58
Fed. Reg. 5,253 (1993). As the situation deteriorated over the next several months, the
U.N. continued to tighten the embargo. See S.C. Res. 820, supra note 18; S.C. Res. 942,
supra note 18. Accordingly, President Clinton issued Executive Orders 12,846 and 12,934
on April 25, 1993, and October 25, 1994, respectively. Executive Order 12,846 built upon
steps taken under the earlier Orders by specifically extending the blocking measures to
commercial entities based in the FRY or controlled by the FRY. See Exec. Order No.
12,846, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,771 (1993). Executive Order 12,934 extended the sanctions to
include the Bosnian Serbs and entities based in the portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina which
they controlled. See Exec. Order No. 12,934,59 Fed. Reg. 54, 117 (1994).
Following the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Accords, the U.S. blocking measures
directed at the FRY itself (Le. Serbia and Montenegro) were prospectively lifted in
January 1996. See 31 C.F.R. § 585.525 (1999). The measures directed at the Serb-
controlled portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina were similarly lifted in May 1996, when the
Serb forces were withdrawn. See 31 C.F.R. § 585.527 (1999). FRY property which had
been frozen under the terms of the sanctions prior to December 27, 1995, however,
remained blocked, see 31 C.F.R. § 585.525(a) (1999), as did Bosnian Serb property
blocked prior to May 10,1996, see 31 C.F.R. § 585.527(a) (1999). New sanctions, however,
were imposed as a result of FRY actions with regard to the province of Kosovo. See infra
notes 20-36 and accompanying text.
20. With the issuance of Executive Order 13,121 on June 9, 1998, property and assets
of the governments of the FRY, Serbia, and Montenegro were again blocked, as are any
new investments, although purely domestic transactions within the FRY by U.S. citizens,
residents, or companies remain permissible along with barter transactions. See Exec.
Order No. 13,088,63 Fed. Reg. 32,109 (1998); Exec. Order No. 13,121, 64 Fed. Reg. 24,021
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Under the auspices of the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of
Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC), a wide range of sanctions were
imposed.21 Imports from 2 or exports to23 the FRY were prohibited,
absent Government approval, as were any dealings with regard to
property originating in or trans-shipped through the FRY.24 Services
relating to sea or air transportation to the FRY were also restricted2
It is the "blocking" measures, however, which were the most
significant and far reaching of the various sanctions which were
imposed. The U.S. Government "froze" or "blocked"2 6 all property
(1999). The Kosovo Sanctions Regulations (KSR), implement these new sanctions. See 31
C.F.R. § 586 et seq. (1999). Interestingly, as section 7 of Executive Order 13,088 directed
the Treasury Department to give "special consideration" to Montenegro in implementing
the new sanctions, see 63 Fed. Reg. 32,109, 32,110 (1998), OFAC issued a General License
on June 18, 1998, which excluded the government of Montenegro and entities located
within Montenegro from the scope of the new sanctions. Although not published in the
Federal Register at the time of its release, this General License is now reflected in the
Kosovo Sanctions Regulations. See 31 C.F.R. § 586.516 (1999).
The KSR, while a separate sanctions program, nevertheless overlaps with the original
Yugoslav Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 585 et seq. (1999), in that they are both
targeted at the FRY. With the reimposition of sanctions under the KSR, parties who were
"blacklisted" under the earlier sanctions are again blacklisted under these regulations.
That is, the blacklisted parties lose the benefit of the prospective lifting of sanctions
embodied in 31 C.F.R. §§ 585-525 and 585.527 of the older Yugoslav Sanctions
Regulations. See notes following the Regulations at 31 C.F.R. §§ 586.306 and 586.308
(1999). As the U.N. measures with regard to the renewed fighting in Kosovo simply call
for an arms embargo and a cease-fire, see supra note 18, the reimposition of the broader
FRY blocking measures means that the U.S. sanctions are arguably more onerous that
those called for by the U.N.
21. Although phased in over time with a series of different Executive Orders, see
supra notes 3 and 19, the sanctions eventually were embodied in the awkwardly captioned
"Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnian Serb-Controlled
Areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sanctions Regulations," more
commonly known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslav Sanctions Regulations (FRYSR),
31 C.F.R. § 585 et seq. (1999), and the more recent Kosovo Sanctions Regulations (KSR),
id. § 586 et seq. Interestingly, OFAC administered the Yugoslav sanctions program for
eight months without any regulations at all: from May 30, 1992, when Executive Order
12808 was signed, until March 10, 1993, when the FRYSR were first published. 58 Fed.
Reg. 13,199 (1993).
22. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 585.204,586.201 (1999).
23. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 585.205, 586.201 (1999).
24. See 31 C.F.R §§ 585.206, 586.201 (1999).
25. This would cover, for example, ground, port, refueling, bunkering, clearance or
freight forwarding services, ticketing or insuring of ships or aircraft destined for or
stopping in the FRY, or which are owned or controlled by the FRY. See 31 C.F.R. §
585.207 (1999). Overflying the U.S. was also prohibited, if the route included a stop in the
FRY, see 31 C.F.R. § 585.208 (1999), and vessels registered in the U.S., or owned or
controlled by U.S. parties, were prohibited from entering FRY waters or ports, see 31
C.F.R. § 585.217 (1999).
26. The act of "blocking," or another similar and frequently used term, "freezing," of
the property of a sanctions target is not actually described or defined in the regulations,
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and "interests in property" of the Government of the FRY (Serbia
and Montenegro) whether in the United States, or within the
possession or control of any U.S. residents, citizens, or firms outside
of the United States.27 This was accomplished through a broadly-
worded prohibition on virtually any transfer, payment, withdrawal, or
"other dealing" in such property without U.S. Government
approval.28 Similar blocking measures were aimed at the property or
"interests in property" of "commercial, industrial, or public...
despite the common use of such terms by both practitioners in the area and by OFAC
itself. The FRYSR do contain, however, a definition of a "blocked account" or of
"blocked property." See 31 C.F.R. § 585.302 (1999). The KSR follow a similar structure.
See id. § 586301 (1999). See also infra notes 106, 138-49 and accompanying text.
27. Only "U.S. persons" are obligated to comply with the terms of the U.S. sanctions
on dealings with the FRY. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 585.201, 586.201 (1999). This includes foreign
branches of U.S. juridical entities, but not foreign-incorporated subsidiaries.
Thus, FRYSR and KSR are examples of sanctions programs which the U.S.
Government established with "limited" extraterritorial application to U.S.-affiliated
parties abroad. This approach reflects the fact that other nations would be taking similar
steps in their own laws in compliance with the U.N. call for a multilateral embargo of the
FRY. At other times, U.S. economic sanctions programs have been given greater
extraterritorial application, particularly when the U.S. is acting "unilaterally" and it is not
expected that other nations will impose similar restrictions. The terms of the U.S.
embargo of Cuba, for example, apply more broadly to "all persons subject to U.S.
jurisdiction" and therefore obligate foreign juridical persons which are owned or
controlled by U.S. residents, citizens, or firms to comply with the U.S. embargo. See 31
C.F.R. § 515.329(d) (1999). Imposing legal obligations on foreign juridical entities in this
manner is generally opposed by the international community as an unreasonable assertion
of jurisdiction under international law and an infringement of other nations' sovereignty.
See, e.g., Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in
U.S. Trade Policy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 36-41 (1998).
28. The FRYSR reads:
Except as authorized by regulations, orders, directives, rulings, instructions,
licenses, or otherwise, and notwithstanding the existence of any rights or
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract
or any license or permit... no property or interest in property of the
Government of the FRY (S&M), or that is held in the name of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia or the former Government of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, that is in the United States, that hereafter comes within
the possession or control of U.S. persons, including their overseas branches, may
be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.
31 C.F.R. § 585.201(a) (1999).
The analogous provision in the KSR is similarly worded:
Except as authorized by regulations, orders, directives, rulings, instructions,
licenses, or otherwise, no property or interests in property of the Governments of
the FRY (S&M),the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Montenegro that
are in the United States,... or that are or hereafter come within the possession
or control of U.S. persons, including their overseas branches, may be transferred,
paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.
Id. § 586.201(a) (1999).
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undertakings or entities organized or located" in the FRY.29 The
Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary forces were also covered,
along with the portions of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina which
were under their control, and the various entities located within that
territory.3 0 Any transfers or dealings contrary to these provisions are
rendered null and void.31
29. The FRYSR reads:
Except as otherwise authorized, and notwithstanding the existence of any rights
or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any
contract entered into or any license or permit granted ... no property or interest
in property of any commercial, industrial, or public utility undertakings or
entities organized or located in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) including, without limitation, the property and all interests in
property of entities (wherever organized or located) owned or controlled by such
undertakings or entities, that are in the United States, that hereafter come
within... the possession or control of United States persons, including their
overseas branches, may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise
dealt in.
31 C.F.R. §585.201(b) (1999).
The KSR reach the same result by defining the term "government" to include any
entities located within that government's particular jurisdiction:
The term Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) means the Government of the FRY (S&M), its agencies,
instrumentalities, and controlled entities, including all financial institutions and
state-owned or socially-owned entities organized or located in the FRY
(S&M) ... any successors to such entities, and their respective subsidiaries and
branches, wherever located, and any persons acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of any of the foregoing.
Id. § 586.306 (1999).
Virtually the same language is found in the KSR provisions defining the
"Government of the Republic of Serbia," see id. § 586.308 (1999), and the "Government of
the Republic of Montenegro," see id. § 586.307.
30. The FRYSR reads:
Except as otherwise authorized, and notwithstanding the existence of any rights
or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any
contract entered into or any license or permit granted... no property or interest
in property of the following persons that is in the United States, or that is or
hereafter comes within the possession or control of United States persons,
including their overseas branches, may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn,
or otherwise dealt in:
(1) The Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary forces and the authorities in
those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of
those forces;
(2) Any entity, including any commercial, industrial, or public utility
undertaking, organized or located in those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces ....
Id. § 585.201(c).
The sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs have not been reinstituted under the KSR,
although property which was blocked prior to the withdrawal of the Serb forces from
Bosnia in May of 1996 remains frozen. See id. § 585.527.
31. See id. §§ 585.202,586.202.
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These three categories-the governments of the FRY (Serbia
and Montenegro), the Bosnian Serb forces, and the various entities
within their respective territories-taken together constituted the
primary "targets" of the U.S. and U.N. sanctions on the former
Yugoslavia. However, in an effort to make the sanctions more
effective, and more inclined to induce a change in behavior on the
part of the various targets of the embargo, other provisions were
included to reduce the possibility that the adverse effects of the
sanctions might be avoided. For example, performing any contractual
obligations outside of the FRY related to the support of projects
within the FRY was also prohibited.32 Moreover, the prohibitions on
direct dealings with the FRY included dealings with the sanctioned
targets conducted outside of Serbia or Montenegro.3 3 Even more
significantly, however, the controls also specifically included "without
limitation, the property and all interests in property of entities
(wherever organized or located) owned or controlled" by those
within the FRY?4 It is this provision of the Yugoslav sanctions which
ensnared IPT. Additionally, anyone could be brought within the
ambit of the controls, whether or not owned or controlled by one of
the sanctions targets, if they were "acting for or on behalf of" a
sanctioned party or entity.35 Finally, any transaction which had the
"purpose or effect" of evading or avoiding the controls was also
32. See id. §§ 585.209, 586.201, 586.407. The KSR also prohibit new investments in
Serbia. See id. § 586.204.
33. The FRYSR reads:
The prohibitions contained in §§ 585.201 and 585.206 apply to transactions by
U.S. persons in locations outside the United States with respect to property in
which the U.S. person knows or has reason to know that a person whose property
or interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 585.201 has or has had an
interest since the effective date specified in § 585.301, or that such property is
held in the name of a person whose property or interests in property are blocked
pursuant to § 585.201.
Id. § 585.408(a). See also id. § 585.201(c)(4).
The-KSR provision is analogous. See id. § 586.407.
34. Id. § 585.201(b) (1999) (emphasis added). A similar provision extended the reach
of the prohibitions on dealing with entities located in the Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. See id. § 585.201(c)(3) (1999). See also the analogous KSR provisions, id.
§§ 586.201, 586.407(c)(2) (1999).
35. See id. §§ 585.201(c)(4), 586.306-308. Interestingly this "agency" provision, as
included in the current FRYSR appears to only apply to the sanctions directed at the
Bosnian Serbs and not the sanctions directed at the FRY, because it only internally
references § 585.201(c) and there are no parallel paragraphs for § 585.201(a) or §
585.210(b). Such a reading would not comport with the wording of the underlying
Executive Orders, nor with OFAC practice, however. See, e.g., Exec. Order 12,808, at §
4(b), (c), 57 Fed.Reg. 23,299 (1992); Exec. Order No. 12,810 at § 5(c), 57 Fed. Reg. 24,347
(1992); General Notice No. 1, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,051 (1992).
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prohibited.3 6
B. The Blacklist
In order to further bolster these regulations on any dealings with
the FRY, the U.S. Government also established a list of those who
are "deemed" to be acting for, or on behalf of, the FRY. This builds
upon the prohibition against dealings with those "known or believed
to be" acting as agents of a sanctioned target in third countries, as
well as the similar prohibition against dealings with sanctioned parties
which might be operating outside of their home territory. By
affirmatively declaring that specific individuals and companies are to
be considered as agents, or deemed to be treated as nationals of a
sanctions target, the blacklisted parties become subject to the same
restrictions which apply to direct dealings with the target of the
controls.37 In this way OFAC expands its reach to ostensibly neutral
"fronts" or "cloak" organizations employed by a particular sanctions
target destination, such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In
blacklisting these parties in third countries, the U.S. Government
effectively brings indirect dealings through intermediaries within the
scope of its ban on direct dealings with the embargoed target itself.38
The parties named in OFAC's blacklist might be foreign, third-
country subsidiaries of firms or entities based in the sanctioned target;
entities which are simply subject to the "control" of the sanctioned
target; or actually entirely devoid of any ties of ownership or control
whatsoever to the sanctioned target. In each case, by including a
party on its blacklist, the U.S. Government will have declared that
they are irrebuttably presumed to be acting "for, or on behalf of," the
sanctioned target.39 In essence, OFAC expands upon the traditional
concepts of nationality under international law to create a new
category of "specially designated nationals" for its blacklists.40 As a
36. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 585.214, 586.205 (1999).
37. See id. §§ 585.201(c)(4), 585.408, (FRYSR); 586.306-308,586.407(a), (KSR) (1999).
38. In doing so, the U.S. Government is adopting a technique which is perhaps more
familiar as part of the blacklisting mechanism employed in the Arab League's boycott of
firms which do business with Israel. While the ability of two nations to employ trade
embargoes or "primary boycotts" in their direct dealing between themselves is recognized
under international law, the blacklisting of third parties for their connection or dealings
with one of the disputants (a "secondary boycott") is increasingly suspect under emerging
standards of international law, and is specifically condemned, at least in the Arab/Israeli
context, by the U.S. antiboycott laws. See Export Administration Act Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52,91 Stat. 235 (1977); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1994); Tax Reform Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1061-64, 1066-67, 90 Stat. 1649-50, 1654 (1976); Fitzgerald,
supra note 27, at 49-60, 87-96.
39. See, e.g., notes following 31 C.F.R. § 585.201(c)(4) (FRYSR); 63 Fed. Reg. 54,575,
54,579 (1998) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 586.306-308) (KSR).
40. See infra notes 104-196 and accompanying text; see also MICHAEL P. MALLOY,
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consequence, just as the sanctions would apply to either a natural orjuridical "national" of a sanctioned destination wherever they might
be found, the same sanctions apply to those parties who become
blacklisted as "specially designated nationals."
Accordingly, with the addition of IPT's name to the blacklist4' of
"Blocked" or "Specially Designated Nationals" (SDNs)42 of the
FRY, any dealings with IPT are deemed to be the same as dealings
with the government of the FRY,43 even though IPT is established as
ECONOMIC SANCrIONS AND U.S. TRADE 329-39 (1990) (discussing the specialized
treatment of "nationals" under the OFAC regulations).
41. See 31 C.F.R. ch. V, apps. A (Alphabetical Listing), B (Vessels) (1999).
42. The specific terminology associated with the OFAC blacklist (e.g., "blocked",
"controlled," "governmental," or "specially designated" entities) varies among the
different OFAC sanctions programs, and sometimes even among various documents
related to a single sanctions program. For example, when initially released, the blacklist
associated with the FRYSR was styled as a list of "Controlled Yugoslav Entities," but the
same document was also sub-captioned as a list of "Blocked Yugoslav Entities Currently
Identified." See General Notice No. 1, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,051, 32,052 (1992). This same
blacklist was then restyled as a list of "Blocked Persons and Specially Designated
Nationals" when it was updated to include "Bosnian Serb Civilian and Military
Authorities." See Notice of Blocking, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,448 (1995). There is little or no real
practical difference attributed to the various terms used. The variation in terminology is
largely due to historical reasons, and to the fact that each new sanctions program was
traditionally crafted as a stand-alone set of regulations without reference to other, similar
programs. See infra notes 104-199 and accompanying text.
In contrast with the terminology, however, the operation of the list is consistent
across all programs which utilize the blacklisting tool, in that blacklisting under whatever
designation is used defines the listed parties as being part of a particular sanctions target.
In 1996, OFAC began publishing a consolidated master blacklist, see 56 Fed. Reg. 44,459
(1996), which now appears as a series of appendices to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V (1999), with
the cumbersome title of "....Listing of Blocked Persons, Specially Designated Nationals,
Specially Designated Terrorists, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and Specially
Designated Narcotics Traffickers and Blocked Vessels." The short reference most
commonly used by practitioners referring to this blacklist, and which will be used in this
article, is the "Specially Designated Nationals" or "SDN" list.
43. The FRYSR defines the term "Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia & Montenegro)" to include:
Any person or organization determined by the Director of the Office of Foreign
Assets Control to be included within this section, or owned or controlled by such
a person or organization.
NOTE TO §585.311: Please refer to the appendices at the end of this chapter for
listings of persons designated pursuant to this part....
31 C.F.R. § 585.311(d) (1999)
The KSR defines the term "Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia &
Montenegro)" to mean:
The term Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) means the government of the FRY (S&M), its agencies,
instrumentalities, and controlled entities, including all financial institutions and
state-owned and socially-owned entities organized or located in the FRY (S&M)
as of June 9, 1998, any successors to such entities, and their respective
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a U.S. corporation and operating in the United States. This makes
even domestic dealings with IPT within the U.S. subject to the same
prohibitions applicable to any direct transaction with the FRY.44 All
those who are obligated to follow U.S. law, therefore, are subject to
the sanctions regulations' broad controls over virtually any dealings
with IPT, absent U.S. Government approval in the form of either a
regulatory authorization for the specific type of transaction involved
or an actual license issued by OFAC.45
Additionally, blacklisting means that all dealings with the
designated party are deemed to involve the sanctioned destination,
whether or not the blacklisted party is actually acting as an "agent" of
the sanctioned target for a particular transaction.46 Thus, IPT's long
established business operations in the United States may not directly
benefit the FRY in any manner, but are nonetheless subject to the
same controls as direct dealings with Slobodan Milosovec or his
government. While the blacklisting may be justified as an attempt to
stop foreign agents acting for a sanctioned destination, the
mechanism is nevertheless effectively one based upon a special
designation of "nationality." As such, for a blacklisted party such as
IPT to attempt to show that no actual agency relationship exists is
unavailing.47 The distinction between actually acting as an agent for
subsidiaries and branches, wherever located, and any persons acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of any of the foregoing.
NOTE TO §586.306: Please refer to the appendices at the end of this chapter for
listings of persons determined to fall within this definition who have been
designated pursuant to this part ...
Id. § 586.306.
The KSR also introduces a new definition of the "Government of Serbia" which is
virtually identical in wording to this provision, and which includes the same reference to
parties falling within the definition by virtue of their "designation" in the SDN list. See id.
§ 586.308.
44. See id. §§ 585.201,586.201.
45. See id.
46. See Paradissiotis v. Rubin, 171 F.3d 983, 987 (5th Cir. 1999). Additionally, parties
that are neither FRY nationals or entities, nor "deemed" to be such by virtue of an OFAC
"designation," can nevertheless still be brought within the terms of the embargo under
ordinary agency principles. However, any activities of these parties, who are not actually
blacklisted, which are outside the scope of their agency would not be subject to the
regulatory control. See 31 C.F.R. § 585.311(c) (1999) (bringing any person who is
reasonably believed to have acted directly or indirectly for the Government of the FRY
within the regulations ambit, but only "to the extent" of their representation or agency).
The KSR accomplishes the same result in its definitions of the "Government of the FRY
(S&M)," "Government of the Republic of Montenegro," and the "Government of the
Republic of Serbia," but omits the language found in the FRYSR which limits the controls
to the "extent" of the agency or representation. See id. 31 C.F.R. §§ 586.306-308.
47. See, e.g., Paradissiotis, 171 F.3d at 987; Milena Ship Management Co. v. Newcomb,
804 F. Supp 846 (E.D. La. 1992), aff'd 995 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1993), cert denied 510 U.S.
1071 (1994).
November 1999]
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or acting in some other capacity,
may well affect whether it is possible to obtain the U.S. government's
approval or authorization to proceed with a particular transaction,
but it does not affect the requirement to seek that approval.48 Once a
party is blacklisted (i.e. designated as an SDN) the regulatory
prohibitions are triggered by their status, and not by the application of
agency principles to the tasks the party may be performing for itself
or others at any given time.
Treating individuals and entities outside of an embargoed
destination, who nevertheless act on its behalf, the same as the target
itself simply reflects the U.S. Government's desire to make it more
difficult for those it targets with its sanctions to avoid the effect of the
controls. 49 Thus, one of the principal purposes for the blacklist is to
extend the reach of the U.S. controls. By affirmatively naming these
individuals and firms in its blacklists, the Government attempts to
influence the behavior of third parties beyond the reach of U.S.
jurisdiction by compelling those parties the Government can reach to
refrain from further dealings with the named parties.50 Often the
third party behavior which the U.S. Government seeks to influence is
entirely permissible, and sometimes even actively encouraged, in the
territory in which the actions actually occur.51 Thus, the OFAC
blacklists are not used to punish those who in some way violated U.S.
laws or regulations, but rather they are aimed simply at promoting a
48. See id Authorization to proceed is typically obtained by requesting a specific
"license" from OFAC for an otherwise embargoed transaction. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b)
(1999). However, the FRYSR and KSR also contain broader "general licenses" which
authorize certain categories of transactions without the need for issuing individual
approvals, although there may still be record keeping or reporting requirements associated
with the use of one of these "general licenses." See id. §§ 501.801(a), 585.501-528,586.501-
516. Additionally, OFAC may issue notices or provide individual interpretative guidance
concerning the applicability of the regulations which may indicate that the transaction is
entirely outside the scope of the embargo program particularly when dealing with third
party transactions outside of the embargoed destination itself.
49. OFAC's SDN lists have also sometimes been used to identify specific parties
within an embargoed target destination. For example, there are currently more than four
hundred "SDNs" of the FRY listed with addresses within the territory of the FRY (Serbia
& Montenegro) itself. See 31 C.F.R. ch. V, app. A (1999).
However, this practice is criticized as being largely redundant with the broader
geographic embargo, i.e., there is no need to specifically list the names of parties in
country X if all dealings with country X or its nationals or juridical entities are controlled.
Alternatively, however, listing SDNs with addresses within the target country may be
useful if the economic sanctions impose less than a complete embargo, as is the case with
OFAC's Narcotics Trafficking Regulations. See id. § 536. See also infra notes 96-100 and
accompanying text.
50. Thereby making the blacklisted parties the target of a "secondary boycott." See
generally Fitzgerald, supra note 27.
51. See id at 70-87.
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more complete and effective embargo of the sanctioned target
destination.52 This distinguishes the OFAC blacklists from other
major trade control blacklists, such as the Commerce Department's
Denied Parties List53 or the State Department's Debarred List,54
which tend to focus more on those who have violated the respective
agencies' trade controls.55
Given the purpose and the historical context in which many of
the U.S. economic sanctions polices were formulated, this approach
makes sense. Most embargoes, including the Yugoslav sanctions
programs, are intended to economically isolate their target as
completely as possible. The use of a blacklist to cut off dealings with
"corporate cloaks" is a direct outgrowth of the U.S. experience in
World War II, when President Roosevelt attempted to limit dealings
with front organizations for the Axis powers by issuing the
"Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals" in 1940.56 The
President declared that, "any person so long as his name appears in
such list shall be treated for all purposes under Executive Order 8389
[the directive freezing enemy assets] as though he were a national of
Germany or Italy. '57 The Treasury Department later elaborated
52. The use of this type of blacklisting to extend the reach of U.S. controls is being
imported into the other agencies' "trade control" regimes. It can be seen in the State
Department's announcement that various foreign parties are "weapons proliferators,"
triggering certain restrictions on exporting specified items or technology to "known"
proliferators. See Fitzgerald, supra note 27, at 28-35. It can also be seen in the "Entities
List" which the Commerce Department created in 1997 which similarly triggers certain
"knowledge" based controls under the Export Administration Regulations. See 15 C.F.R.
§ 744 Supp. No. 4 (1999). See also infra note 192.
53. See 15 C.F.R. § 764 Supp. No. 2 (1999). The principal use of this list is to identify
those parties who have lost their "export privileges" for some failure to comply with the
Export Administration Regulations. See id.
54. The State Department's debarment authority is set forth in 22 C.F.R. § 127.7
(1999).
55. See Fitzgerald, supra note 27, at 28-35. Parties that are either in the U.S. or
otherwise amenable to U.S. jurisdiction are already obligated to follow the U.S. controls
and may be punished for their failure to do so. Adding their names to one of the OFAC
blacklists would not further the reach of the list, nor enhance OFAC's enforcement
authority. That is not to say that parties in the U.S. never appear in an SDN list, apart
from those times when new sanctions programs are established. U.S.-based parties can be
named to the list, as a prelude or adjunct to imposing penalties for violating the controls.
This may be particularly likely if the U.S. entity to be added to the list is controlled by the
embargoed target country, and becomes a means to close down that particular business or
freeze any assets associated with that company or individual as part of the embargo
program.
56. See, MARTIN DOMKE, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN WORLD WAR II, Chs. X,
XI (1943), as supplemented by MARTIN DOMKE, CONTROL OF ALIEN PROPERTY, 105-
113 (1947); Exec. Order No. 8785 § 5E, 6 Fed. Reg. 2897,2898, (1941).
57. Proclamation No. 2497, 6 Fed. Reg. 3555 (1941). The President's Proclamation
continued to state that,
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upon this expansive notion of nationality stating that, "it was
recognized from the inception of the [WWII-era] freezing program
that a control which could reach only those who were actually citizens
of the Axis countries or of other countries under their domination
would be ineffective, and, indeed, naive in the light of Axis
practices. '58 The Proclaimed List of Blocked Nationals was designed,
"so that anyone entangled in the web of Nazi influence could be
subjected to the control."59 Thus, it is important to recall that the
these Treasury Department blacklists were, from their inception,
considered not so much tools of trade policy, but rather instruments
of economic warfare. This perspective carries over into current
practice, as the present Director of OFAC has stated that, "[t]his is
the other front .... [My staff members are] an elite category of
highly trained professional men and women devoted to waging
economic warfare. '60
C. Blacklisting in other U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs61
Economic sanctions increasingly became the Government's
policy tool of first resort in dealing with a variety of diplomatic and
foreign policy issues as the second half of the century progressed. 62 As
the unusual position of overwhelming dominance the United States
held in world affairs immediately after World War II abated, the
[a]ll the terms and provisions of Executive Order 8389.. .shall be applicable
to any person so long as his name appears in such list, and to any such
property in which any such person has or has had an interest, to the same
extent that such terms and provisions are applicable to nationals of
Germany or Italy and to property in which nationals of Germany or Italy
have or have had an interest.
Id.
58. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, ADMINISTRATION OF THE WARTIME FINANCIAL AND
PROPERTY CONTROLS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 32-33 (1942), cited in Carl
F. Goodman, "United States Government Foreign Property Controls," 52 GEO. LJ. 767,
782 (1964).
59. See id.
60. See Keith Kendrick, In Economic Battle, Soldiers Fight on Carpet, WASHINGTON
POST, September 19, 1990, at A21. This history also explains why OFAC often contends
that it is not a "trade control" agency like the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export
Administration or the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls. However,
from the perspective of businesses and others who must create procedures to comply with
all of the various Government requirements, the OFAC programs are very much like the
controls imposed by BXA and DTC.
61. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 27, at 14-35.
62. Additionally, it should also be noted that U.S. economic sanctions and trade
control programs are typically created to address particular economic, political, and
diplomatic objectives, rather than as part of a concerted overall trade policy. In fact many
of these measures have come to serve domestic political requirements as much as, if not
more than, any foreign policy objective. See MALLOY, supra note 40, at 19-31.
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Government sought alternately to lead, and then coerce, other
nations into following its policies with a wide range of economic
sanctions and trade control programs.63 Sometimes these programs
were created as part of a multilateral effort, often they were not.64
Moreover, unlike similar measures taken in earlier times as a prelude
or adjunct to hostilities, economic sanctions became ends in
themselves, used to demonstrate that the Government was "taking
action" to achieve diverse policy objectives65 ranging from combating
communism,66 fighting the international drug trade67 or terrorism,68 to
protecting democracy and human rights,69 and limiting the spread of
weapons of mass destruction,70 for example. It is estimated that in the
1990s alone the United States resorted to some form of economic
sanctions more than seventy times, affecting forty-two percent of the
world's population.71
63. Compare, for example, the U.S. approach to the Cuban embargo with the
multilateral actions taken with regard to Iraq or the former Yugoslavia. See infra notes 88,
91 and accompanying text.
64. Multilateral sanctions include those targeted at the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, South
Africa and to a lesser extent those aimed at Iran and Libya. See infra notes 82-84, 86, 88,
91 and accompanying text. Unilateral sanctions include the Cuban embargo and the
sanctions which were aimed at Vietnam, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and Panama. See infra
notes 77-79, 85, 87 and accompanying text.
65. Historically,
[m]ost of these episodes (the imposition of economic sanctions)
foreshadowed, or accompanied, warfare. Only after World War I was
extensive attention given to the notion that economic sanctions might
substitute for armed hostilities as a stand alone policy. Even through World
War II, the objectives sought with the use of sanctions retained a
distinctively martial flavor .... In the period following World War II, other
foreign policy motives became increasingly common....
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY
AND CURRENT POLICY 5 (2d. ed. 1990) [hereinafter "SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED"].
66. For example, the Chinese, Cuban, or North Korean sanctions. See infra notes 74-
76.
67. For example, the Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions Regulations program. See infra
note 96.
68. For example, the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, Terrorism List Governments
Sanctions Regulations, and Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations
programs. See infra notes 97-99.
69. For example, the South African or Burmese sanctions. See infra note 83-84, 93.
70. For example, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Trade Control Regulations. See
infra note 100.
71. These 70 different uses of economic sanctions have been connected with a variety
of policy objectives and programs, including anti-narcotics (8), anti-terrorism (14),
environmental protection (3), human rights/democratization (22), nuclear non-
proliferation (9), political stability (8), and worker rights or the use of prison labor (6).
They also involved 61 separate laws, targeting 35 different countries. See NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACrURERS, A CATALOG OF NEW U.S. UNILATERAL
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES, 1993-1996 1-2 (1997). See also
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No other country on Earth opts for sanctions as often
as America. Pick any hot spot on the globe, and U.S.
sanctions... which can vary from a minor cutback in
U.S. aid to a crippling embargo on all trade.., are
almost certainly in place.... The allure of sanctions is
easy to understand: They offer a way of doing
something, short of using military force, about
troublesome issues from human rights abuses in
Burma to drift-net fishing on the high seas....
Whether they work or not, sanctions are good
politics.7
2
(1) A Growing Number of Programs
Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. has imposed
economic sanctions under the authority of the Trading With the
Enemy Act (TWEA)73 targeted at China (1950-1971),74 North Korea
(1950-present), 75 Cuba (1963-present), 76 North (1964-1994)77 and
E. Iritani, U.S. Learns How to Anger Friends While Failing to Influence Enemies; Trade:
Global Economy Cuts Effectiveness of Unilateral Sanctions. American Businesses
Complain of Lost Opportunities, L.A. TIMES, March 24,1997, at A6.
72. Thomas Omestad, Addicted to Sanctions, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June 15,
1998, at 30, available in 1998 WL ALLNEWS database.
73. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1994).
74. The China sanctions actually began with the Commerce Department tightening of
the controls on exports of goods and technology with military significance as a result of the
success of Communist forces within China. This escalated into a full embargo in 1950 with
China's support of the North Korean invasion of South Korea. The sanctions were
administered by the Treasury Department, and "blocked" or froze virtually all types of
financial transactions and other dealings in a manner similar to the subsequent Cuban
controls. See 15 Fed. Reg. 9,040 (1950). The embargo was effectively lifted in 1971 in
connection with President Nixon's visit to China, although residual controls remained in
place until outstanding claims were settled in 1980. See 36 Fed. Reg. 8,584, 11,441, (1971);
45 Fed. Reg. 7,224, (1980). See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: SUPPLEMENTAL CASE HISTORIES, 100-109 (2d. ed. 1990)
[hereinafter "SANCTIONS SUPPLEMENT"].
75. See id., 31 C.F.R. § 500 et seq. (1999). See generally SANCTIONS SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 74, at 110-14. On September 17, 1999, the President announced that the
sanctions on North Korea would be loosened in the near future. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN
ASSETS CONTROLS, What's New, Appendix A, (visited September 20, 1999)
<http://www.ustreas.gov/ofactlledit.txb> (copy on file with Hastings Law Journal).
76. A variety of controls were applied to Cuba beginning in 1960 as a result of the
nationalization and expropriation of various properties. Initially, these took the form of
restrictions on various exports to, and imports from, Cuba. The full embargo was imposed
following the Cuban missile crisis. See 28 Fed. Reg. 6,974 (1963). See generally
SANCTIONS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 74, at 194-204.
77. As was the case with the Chinese sanctions, the larger embargo of North Vietnam
was preceded by a tightening of the product oriented export controls as early as 1954. The
embargo itself was imposed ten years later, see 29 Fed. Reg. 6,025, (1964), prospectively
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South Vietnam (1975-1994)78 and Cambodia (1975-1992).79 More
recently the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA)8° provided the primary legislative basis8' for economic
sanctions directed against Iran (1979-present), South Africa (1985-
lifted in 1994, see 59 Fed. Reg. 5,696 (1994), and completely removed upon settlement of
outstanding claims the following year, see 60 Fed. Reg. 12,885 (1995). See generally
SANCrIONS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 74, at 133-41.
78. See supra note 77. The embargo of North Vietnam was extended to the entire
country with the fall of South Vietnam. See 40 Fed. Reg. 19,202 (1975).
79. The embargo of Cambodia, or Kampuchea, was established with the rise of the
National United Front under Prince Sihanouk and the Communist Khmer Rouge. See 40
Fed. Reg. 17,262 (1975). It was prospectively lifted in 1992, see 57 Fed. Reg. 1,872 (1992),
and completely removed in 1994, see 59 Fed. Reg. 60,558 (1994). See generally SANCrIONS
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 74, at 412-16.
80. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994).
81. Other statutes have also supported the imposition of economic sanctions. For
example, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1945),
mandates the imposition of sanctions in accordance with decisions of the Security Council
under Article 41 of the UN Charter. This was used to impose financial and trade
restrictions on Rhodesia when Ian Smith's white-minority government unilaterally
declared its independence from the United Kingdom in 1965 thereby thwarting steps
towards self-determination in Southern Rhodesia. See 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1945). Then
U.N. Security Council Res. No. 232 of December 16, 1966 called for mandatory sanctions
after a series of lesser steps failed, S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1340th mtg. at 7,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (1966), and then sanctions were still further tightened two years
later. See S.C. Res. 253, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1428th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc S/RES/253
(1968). The U.S. complied imposing sanctions. See Exec. Order No. 11,322, 32 Fed. Reg.
119 (1966); Exec. Order No. 11,419, 33 Fed. Reg. 10,837, (1968). But see H.R. Rep. No.
95-59, 3-4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 18, 19-20, which questioned the effect of
the Rhodesian sanctions in light of the "Byrd Amendment" to the Strategic and Critical
Materials Stock Piling Act of 1939, 50 U.S.C. 98, which authorized the import of
Rhodesian chrome from 1971-1977. The Rhodesian sanctions, see 31 C.F.R. § 530 et seq.
(1972), were prospectively lifted upon the accession of majority rule and the creation of
Zimbabwe in 1979, see Exec. Order No. 12,183, 44 Fed. Reg. 74,787 (1979), and entirely
removed in 1992, see 57 Fed.Reg. 1,386 (1992). See generally SANCrIONS SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 74, at 285-93.
Since the time of the Rhodesian sanctions, the more common practice has been to
predicate the imposition of sanctions on multiple pieces of legislation. For example, both
IEEPA and the UN Participation Act were used for the programs aimed at Iraq and
Kuwait, see infra notes 88-89; Haiti, see infra note 90; the former Yugoslavia, see infra note
91; and Angola, see infra note 92. IEEPA and the International Security Development
and Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9, together support the sanctions on
Libya, see infra note 86, and the second round of sanctions aimed at Iran, see infra note 82;
and the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 bolstered the IEEPA based sanctions
on South Africa, see infra note 83.
The sanctions programs targeted at the Terrorism List Governments, see infra note
83, and Foreign Terrorist Organizations, see infra note 99, are predicated solely upon the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, rather than jointly with IEEPA.
The only IEEPA based terrorist sanctions are those aimed at organizations threatening
the Middle East peace process. See infra note 97.
82. Following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, President Carter first
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imposed a ban on importing any Iranian oil, Pres. Proclamation No. 4,702, 44 Fed. Reg.
65,581 (1979), and then tightened immigration and visa requirements for Iranian nationals,
44 Fed. Reg. 65,727 (1979). The next day the President used his authority under IEEPA
to "block" all assets of the Iranian Government or its controlled instrumentalities which
came within U.S. jurisdiction. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979).
The Iranian Assets Control Regulations (IACR) followed immediately. See 44 Fed. Reg.
65,956 (1979); 31 C.F.R. § 535 et seq. (1999). It is interesting to note that "blocking" assets
with financial sanctions is a term of art referring to the ultimate effect of a broad
prohibition, see, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1999), on all financial dealings or transfers
affecting an embargoed target. The term is not defined in the Iranian regulations
themselves, although there are references to "blocked," "blocking," see, e.g., id. § 535.217,
and "unblocking" accounts or persons, see, e.g., id. §§ 535.414, 535.508, 535.566, 535.802.
These limited blocking measures were then expanded to include a broader trade embargo
as the hostage crisis continued. See Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980);
Exec. Order No. 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685, (1980). Agreement was ultimately reached
on the release of the hostages, and the return of the blocked assets with a complex arbitral
process administered by a bilateral Claims Tribunal at the Hague, and most of the IACR
controls were prospectively lifted in 1981. See Exec. Order No. 12,283, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,927
(1981); 31 C.F.R. § 535.579 (1999). These Executive Orders and the IACR represented
the first use of IEEPA, as opposed to the TWEA, to support economic sanctions. See
generally SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 65 at 153-62.
Iran is also subject to further sanctions under the Iranian Transaction Regulations,
(ITR), 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (1999), which now have greater impact than the IACR. The ITR
were initially implemented under the authority of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9, as a result of Iran's
designation as a country supporting state sponsored terrorism. See Exec. Order No.
12,613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (1987). The ITR augmented a number of product oriented
export restrictions imposed under the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §
2405(m), with a series of import restrictions on Iranian origin goods or services. See 31
C.F.R. § 560.201 (1999). The ITR were bolstered, and their legislative basis expanded to
include IEEPA, in 1995 when the President banned contracts for the development of
Iranian petroleum resources, as well as "blocking" new investments, exports, reexports,
financing, or brokering transactions for the benefit of the Government of Iran or its
controlled instrumentalities with a series of Orders. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed.
Reg. 14,615 (1995); Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (1995); 60 Fed. Reg.
47,061, 47,063 (1995). The amended ITR also included a broadly worded prohibition on
those subject to the regulations taking any acts to evade or avoid their application. See 31
C.F.R. § 560.203 (1999). Additional restrictions on investing more than $40 million in the
development of Iranian petroleum resources in any 12 month period were imposed with
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. Pub. L. 104-172, 110 Stat. 541 (1996) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1701, note).
83. See Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985). The South African
Transaction Regulations (SATR), 50 Fed. Reg. 41,682 (1985) were imposed in an effort to
head off more sweeping sanctions then being proposed by Congress. The SATR, 31
C.F.R. § 545 et seq. (1986) as initially promulgated were largely patterned after United
Nations Security Council Resolution No. 569 of 1985. S.C. Res. 569, U.N. SCOR, 40th
Sess., 2602d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/569 (1985). Resolution No. 569 was then the latest in
a series of U.N. resolutions condemning the apartheid practices in South Africa which
extended back to 1962. It called for a broad economic embargo on transactions with the
South African Government, after years of more limited measures. The U.S. had followed
these earlier U.N. measures by initially imposing limited product oriented trade
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restrictions on exports of arms and related equipment, see 15 C.F.R. § 385.4 (1964), and
later on all exports, to the South African military and police. See 43 Fed. Reg. 7,311
(1978). The IEEPA based sanctions issued in 1985, see 50 Fed. Reg. 46,726 (1985),
expanded the product oriented trade controls to ban most computer exports to the
apartheid enforcing agencies, as well as most exports of nuclear goods and technology,
severely limited the ability of U.S. financial institutions to extend credit to the South
African Government, and prohibited the importation of South African arms, military
vehicles, or Krugerrands. The 1985 controls were substantially modified and broadened
the following year, in accordance with the Congressionally mandated program of sanctions
found in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-440,10
Stat. 1086 (1986). See also Exec. Order No. 12,571, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,505 (1986); 51 Fed.
Reg. 41,906 (1986); 51 Fed. Reg. 46,853 (1986).
However, even the post-CAAA sanctions fell short of the sweeping prohibitions
found in the TWEA based programs under the FACR and CACR, focusing more on
various specific types of prohibited transactions rather than imposing a blanket
prohibition on all dealings with South Africa or South African nationals. See generally,
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 65 at 221-48. They did include a variety of
limitations on new investment and loans, and wider bans on imports or exports directly or
indirectly involving the Government of South Africa, apartheid enforcing agencies, or
government controlled or subsidized entities known as "South African Parastatal
Organizations." See id; 31 C.F.R. §§ 545.208, 545.315 (1987). Additionally, unlike the
earlier sanctions programs where the blacklists were maintained by the Treasury, the
publication of the names of the blacklisted Parastatal Organizations was a responsibility of
the Secretary of State. See Department of State Public Notice No. 983, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,912 (1986) revised by Department of State Public Notice No. 1007, 52 Fed. Reg. 9,982
(1987). Similarly, the Commerce Department blacklisted a number of "South African
Entities Enforcing Apartheid" as an adjunct to its product oriented trade and export
controls. See 52 Fed. Reg. 27,798 (1987). This reflects the complex delegations of
authority to the Treasury, Commerce, and State Departments which were required to
carry out the policy towards South Africa mandated by the CAAA and Executive Orders.
The SATR were prospectively lifted in 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,056 (1991), although
products subject to the U.N. arms embargo and certain U.S. unilateral controls on dealings
with the military and police remained controlled until the U.N. lifted its arms embargo
three years later, see S.C. Res. 919, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3379th mtg. at 69, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/919 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 30,684 (1994), and the last remaining restrictions, affecting
dealings in gold coins, were removed in 1995, see 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
84. Namibia, as part of South Africa, was initially caught in the sanctions which were
aimed at dealings with the Government of South Africa. It was removed from the scope of
the SATR in March of 1990 following Namibian independence. See 55 Fed. Reg. 10,618
(1990).
85. See Exec. Order No. 12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985). The Nicaraguan
Transaction Control Regulations (NTCR), see 50 Fed. Reg. 19,890 (1985) and 31 C.F.R. §
540 et seq. (1986), were imposed as part of the Reagan Administration's opposition to the
Sandinista Government of President Daniel Ortega. They were lifted prospectively
following the election of the Chamorro Government in 1990, see 55 Fed. Reg. 28,613
(1990), and removed entirely in 1995, see 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995). See generally
SANCMIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 65 at 175-91.
Unlike the FACR or CACR, however, the NTCR were largely trade (import/export)
restrictions which lacked the broad general prohibitions of the other programs. They
incidentally used a specific prohibition which affected direct dealings with Nicaraguan
registered vessels and aircraft, but unlike some of the other programs (see, e.g., infra note
88 (ISR), 91 (FRYSR)) the NTCR did not specifically employ a blacklist for those vessels
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(1986-present), 86 Panama (1988-1990),87 Iraq (1990-present), 88 Kuwait
and aircraft. See 31 C.F.R. § 540.206-207 (1985). But see id § 540.208 (1985) (broadly
prohibiting engagement in "related transactions" which might result in violations of the
NTCR). Thus the NTCR were more directed at embargoing direct transactions between
the U.S. and Nicaragua with less control over off-shore or indirect dealings than was the
case with many other OFAC sanctions programs
86. As is often the case, the economic sanctions imposed on Libya were preceded by a
tightening of the product-oriented export controls dating back to 1978 when military sales
were suspended because of Libyan support for international terrorism. These trade
sanctions were expanded to a wider range of goods as tensions escalated through the early
1980s, and particularly focused on goods and technology used in the petroleum industry.
See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 11,247, 11,249 (1982); 49 Fed. Reg. 10,247, 10,248 (1984); 50 Fed.
Reg. 3704, 3743 (1985). After a series of terrorist incidents involving Libya which
cumulated in the Palestinian attack at the Rome airport in December of 1985, for which
Abu Nidal claimed a "considerable amount of financing and assistance" from Momar
Gadhafi, President Reagan invoked IEEPA to impose a broad trade and financial
embargo of Libya. See, SANCrIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 65, at 140-152.
Additional authority for the President's actions was predicated upon the International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2349aa-8, 2349aa-9
(1994), which would be used the following year to support the ITR, see supra note 82, as
well as the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1514 (1994).
Two Executive Orders were issued in quick succession on January 7th and 8th, 1986,
Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (1986) and Exec. Order No. 12,544,51 Fed. Reg.
1235 (1986), which provided the basis for the Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §
550 et seq. (1999). The LSR froze or "blocked" all manner of property interests of the
Government of Libya and its controlled entities which came within the possession or
control of "U.S. Persons," in addition to restricting imports and exports. See id § 550.200.
In this regard the LSR are more similar to the TWEA based sanction programs than is the
case with the NTCR, see supra note 85, or even the SATR, see supra note 83. The LSR
was also the first IEEPA based sanctions program to include a regulatory definition of a
"blocked account" or "blocked property" as "any account or property in which the
Government of Libya has an interest, with respect to which payments, transfers or
withdrawals or other dealings may not be made or effected except pursuant to an
authorization or license," thereby highlighting the importance of being within or without
the definition of "Government of Libya." See 31 C.F.R. § 550.316 (1999). Additional
restrictions on investing more than $40 million in the development of Libyan petroleum
resources in any 12 month period were imposed with the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of
1996. See Pub. L. 104-72,110 Stat. 541 (1996) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701, note).
87. See Exec. Order No. 12,635, 53 Fed. Reg.12,134 (1988). The Panamanian
Transaction Regulations were imposed as part of the Reagan Administration's efforts to
isolate and undermine the regime headed by General Manuel Noriega because of
involvement with drug trafficking. See 53 Fed. Reg. 20,566 (1988) and 31 C.F.R. § 565 et
seq. (1988). The PTR were lifted prospectively in 1990 following the U.S. incursion which
removed General Noriega from power, 55 Fed. Reg. 3,560 (1990), and removed entirely in
1995, 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995). See generally SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note
65, at 249-67.
88. As a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President Bush issued
two Executive Orders, one restricting imports and exports to Iraq and "blocking" Iraqi
Government property, Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (1990), and another
"blocking" Kuwaiti Government property as a protective measure to limit looting by Iraq,
Exec. Order 12,723, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,805 (1990). The United Nations immediately
condemned the Iraqi invasion, see S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. at 19,
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(1990-1991),9 Haiti (1991-1994), 90 the former Yugoslavia (1992-1996,
1998-present), 91  Angola (1993-present), 92 Burma (1997-present), 93
U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990), and called for mandatory embargo of Iraq by all member
nations, see S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess. 2932d mtg. at 19-20, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/661 (1990). This was supported by a naval blockade, see S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR
45th Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990), and restrictions of food and
humanitarian shipments, S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2939th mtg. at 21-22. U.N.
Doc. S/RES/666 (1990), and an air embargo, see S.C. Res. 667, U.N.SCOR, 45th Sess.,
2940th mtg. at 23-24. U.N. Doc. S1RES/667 (1990), as a prelude to the Gulf War.
Although the initial U.S. and U.N embargoes were quite similar, the U.S. sanctions were
brought completely into line with the U.N. actions by Executive Order Number 12,724
with regard to Iraq, see Exec. Order No. 12,724 55, Fed. Reg. 33,089 (1990), and Number
12,725 with regard to Kuwait, see Exec. Order No. 12,725, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,091 (1990),
thereby grounding the controls both in IEEPA and the U.N. Participation Act, 22 U.S.C.
287c.
The Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 2112 (1991); 31 C.F.R. § 575 et seq.
(1999), and the separate but related Kuwaiti Assets Control Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg.
49,856 (1990); 31 C.F.R. § 570 et seq. (1991), utilize the full range of sanctions tools
available to the Government in a manner not seen since the TWEA-based FACR and
CACR. They employ a combination of financial sanctions (asset blocking), trade
sanctions (export/import controls), travel restrictions, and contract restrictions, together
with a broad prohibition on those subject to the regulations taking steps to evade or avoid
the prohibitions. See, MICHAEL P. MALLOY, supra note 40 at § 9A.2.1 (Supp. 1996).
Following the liberation of Kuwait, the KACR were prospectively lifted in 1991, 56 Fed.
Reg. 12,450 (1991), and entirely removed in 1995, 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995). The ISR
remain in effect.
89. See supra note 88.
90. The Haitian sanctions are unique in that they were applied, removed, and then
applied again during the course of the same crisis. The President invoked IEEPA to
impose "blocking" sanctions against the Government of Haiti following the coup which
ousted the then recently elected President Aristide. See Exec. Order No. 12,775, 56 Fed.
Reg. 50,641 (1991). The blocking measures were expanded after the OAS condemned the
coup in Resolution 2/91 of October 1, 1991. See Exec. Order No. 12,779, 56 Fed. Reg.
55,975 (1991). Together the two orders imposed a broad range of financial and trade
sanctions on the de facto Haitian Government and its various instrumentalities, along with
the now standard prohibition against "evasion" of the regulatory requirements. The
OFAC Haitian Transaction Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 580 et seq. (1993), which embodied
the controls created by the Executive Orders, were issued in March of 1992. See 57 Fed.
Reg. 10,820 (1992). Later in August of 1993, U.N. Security Council Res. 861 called for the
suspension of some of the sanctions based upon the Governor's Island Agreement for the
return of the elected President. See S.C. Res. 861, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3271st mtg. at
121, U.N. Doc. S/RES/861 (1993); 58 Fed. Reg. 46,540 (1993). However when the return
did not occur as scheduled the U.N. called for the reimposition of the sanctions. See S.C.
Res. 873, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., 3291st mtg. at 125, U.N. Doc. S/RES/873 (1993); Exec.
Order No. 12,853, 58 Fed. Reg. 35,843 (1993). Further measures were taken when the
issue remained unresolved the following year. See S.C. Res. 917, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess.,
3376th mtg. at 47, U.N. Doc. S/RES/917 (1994). When the democratically elected
President Aristide returned to Haiti, the sanctions were first suspended, see Exec. Order
No. 12,932, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,403 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 51,066 (1994), and then finally
removed in June, 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
91. Exec. Order No. 12,808, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,299 (1992), was issued following the
breakup of Yugoslavia, blocking property of the governments of Serbia and Montenegro
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Sudan (1997-present) 94 and Afghanistan (1999-present). 95
Additionally, five more programs were recently created which are not
necessarily tied to any one specific country, imposing economic
sanctions on narcotics traffickers (1995-present), 96 Middle Eastern
(the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" or FRY) when their troops seized territory within
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Simultaneously, U.N. Security Council Res. No. 757 of
May 30, 1992, called for a broad range of trade and financial sanctions to be directed at
the FRY, resulting in the issuance of Executive Order Number 12,810, 57 Fed. Reg.
24,347 (1992), which imposed additional controls to limit trade, and Executive Order
Number 12,831, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,253 (1993), which expanded the blocking measures to
companies and FRY controlled entities, thereby bringing the U.S. sanctions in line with
the U.N. measures. As the U.N. called for still further sanctions, S.C. Res. 820, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3200th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc S/RES/820 (1993); S.C. Res. 942, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3428th mtg. at 30, U.N. Doc S/RES/942 (1994), to tighten the embargo
as the situation in the former Yugoslavia deteriorated, the United States followed suit,
adjusting its own sanctions to block trade and financial dealings with the Serbian
controlled portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Exec. Order No. 12,846, 58 Fed. Reg.
25,771 (1993); Exec. Order No. 12,934,59 Fed. Reg. 54,117 (1994). The blocking measures
directed at Serbia and Montenegro were prospectively lifted in January of 1996 as a result
of the Dayton Peace Accords, see 61 Fed. Reg. 1282 (1996); 31 C.F.R. § 585.525 (1999),
but were not similarly lifted for the Serbian controlled areas of Bosnia until May, see 61
Fed. Reg. 24,697 (1996); 31 C.F.R. § 585.527 (1999), when the Serb forces withdrew.
Sanctions were then reimposed in 1998 because of Serbian actions in Kosovo. See S.C.
Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3868th mtg. at 8-9, U.N. Doc S/RES/1160 (1998); Exec.
Order No. 13,088,63 Fed. Reg. 32,109 (1998); 31 C.F.R. § 586 etseq. (1999). See also supra
notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
92. Sanctions were initially imposed on dealings with UNITA (the National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola), see Exec. Order No. 12,865, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,005
(1993), in accord with U.N. Security Council Resolution 864, S.C. Res. 864, U.N. SCOR
48th Sess., 3277th mtg. at 59, U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (1993), and later expanded. See Exec.
Order No. 13,069, 62 Fed. Reg. 65,989 (1997); Exec. Order No. 13,098, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,771
(1998). The UNITA (Angola) Sanctions Regulations essentially block assets of those
affiliated with UNITA and impose an arms embargo and prohibit actions which facilitate
the sale of arms or petroleum products to UNITA or Angola. See 58 Fed. Reg. 64,904(1993). However, Executive Order 13098 required so many changes to the details of the
regulations that the USAR were entirely reissued on August 12, 1999. See 64 Fed. Reg.
43,924 (1999); 31 C.F.R. § 590 et seq. (1999).
93. The Government of Burma, or Myanmar, was sanctioned in May of 1997 for its
"large scale repression of the democratic opposition" by the imposition of a prohibition on
any new investment in the country. See Exec. Order 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (1997); 63
Fed. Reg. 27,846 (1998) and 31 C.F.R. § 537 (1999).
94. The Government of Sudan was sanctioned in November of 1997 for its support of
terrorism, efforts to destabilize its neighbors, and for human rights violations within Sudan
by the imposition of a variety of "blocking" measures. See Exec. Order No. 13,067, 62
Fed. Reg. 59,989 (1997). The Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SDR) are found at 31
C.F.R § 538 etseq. (1999).
95. Sanctions were imposed on dealing with the Taliban in Afghanistan on July 6,
1999. See Exec. Order No. 13,129, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,759 (1999). In addition to an asset
freeze, these sanctions also impose a limited trade embargo affecting the areas of
Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. See id.
96. In October, 1995, sanctions were imposed that prohibit dealings with designated,
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terrorists (1995-present),97 governments which support terrorism
(1996-present),98 foreign terrorist organizations (1997-present), 99 and
those engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(1998-present). 1°°
Apart from the various Asian sanctions, which were
administered with a single common set of regulations,101 entirely new
and separate regulations were created for each of these various
sanctions programs .10 One common element, however, is that
virtually all of them employ some sort of blacklist tool. 03
primarily Colombian, narco-traffickers, and which block their property. See Exec. Order
12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (1995). The IEEPA-based Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions
Regulations (NTSR) were created in March, 1997. See 31 C.F.R. § 536 et seq. (1999). The
recently signed Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, Title VIII of Pub. L. No. 106-
120, will presumably expand these sanctions beyond the Colombian drug cartels.
97. In January, 1995, sanctions were imposed which prohibit dealings with designated
terrorists and terrorist organizations which are deemed to pose a threat to the Middle East
peace process. See Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5,079 (1995). The Terrorism
Sanctions Regulations (TSR), 31 C.F.R. § 595 et seq. (1999), which are the only IEEPA
based terrorist sanctions program, were created in February, 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 3,805
(1996). The sanctions programs targeted at the Terrorism List Governments, see infra
note 98, and Foreign Terrorist Organizations, see infra note 99, are predicated upon the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, rather than IEEPA.
98. The Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations (TLGSR), 31 C.F.R. §
596 et seq. (1999), and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations
(FTOSR), 31 C.F.R. § 597 etseq. (1999), are unusual among the recent sanctions programs
in that they are not predicated upon IEEPA. The TLGSR were issued under the
authority of section 321 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 302-303, 110 Stat. 1214, 1248-1253 (1998), and prohibit unlicensed
financial dealings with any government designated by the Secretary of State as supporting
terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §
2405. This currently affects dealings with Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and
Syria. See 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (1999). All, except Syria, are countries which are already
affected by other OFAC sanctions programs.
99. The FTOSR, id. § 597 et seq., like the TLGSR, id. § 596 et seq., are not predicated
upon IEEPA. The FTOSR were issued under the authority of §§ 302-303 of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. at 1248-
1252 (1996), and prohibit providing material support or resources to designated terrorist
organizations and also require the blocking of the assets of such organizations.
100. Certain persons engaged in weapons proliferation are subject to an import ban.
Initially established in 1998 by Exec. Order No. 13,094, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,803 (1998), the ban
was implemented with the Weapons of Mass Destruction Trade Control Regulations
(WMDTCR), 31 C.F.R. § 539 et seq. (1999).
101. The embargoes of China, Vietnam, and Cambodia were all administered by OFAC
under the FACR, as is the current embargo of North Korea. See supra notes 74-79 and
accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
103. Only the Burma program lacks a clear blacklist tool as part of its sanctions. See
supra note 93.
There are three additional programs administered by OFAC which fall outside the
usual model, the Transaction Control Regulations (TCR), 31 C.F.R. § 505 et seq. (1999),
(2) A Plethora of Blacklists
The terminology associated with each blacklist varies, as the
Government slightly restructures the basic sanctions mechanisms
each time it drafts a new program. A confusing array of different
terms, such as "specially designated,"' 04 "controlled,"105 "blocked,,"10
or "governmental,"'107 persons or entities are employed in conjunction
with the blacklists used for the various programs. The purpose of the
blacklist within each program, however, remains unaltered-to
extend the reach of the sanctions beyond just the geography
associated with the target country to reach transactions involving
specific individuals or organizations wherever they may be located.
The term "Specially Designated National" (SDN) - which
harkens back to President Roosevelt's "Proclaimed Nationals" List' 08
- was used in the early regulations and blacklists associated with the
Asian'09 and Cuban"10 sanctions. It gradually disappeared from the
regulatory text used in the later programs. Interestingly, however,
even though the SDN term was no longer being used in the sanctions
regulations themselves by the 1990s, it was sufficiently well
the Foreign Funds Control Regulations (FFCR), 31 C.F.R. § 520 et seq. (1994), and the
Soviet Gold Coin Regulations (SGCR), 31 C.F.R. § 555 etseq. (1994).
The TCR were established as a TWEA based program in 1953 to supplement the
Commerce Department's Cold War era trade controls, and prohibited U.S. persons from
facilitating exports of strategic goods to the then-communist countries, via transactions
outside of the U.S. The controls were lifted in 1995 for goods controlled for national
security reasons under the Export Administration Act, see 60 Fed. Reg. 34,143, 34,144(1995), but remain applicable to items controlled under the Arms Export Control Act of
1976, 22 U.S.C. 2778 (1994), or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2 011-2297g-4
(1994).
The FFCR were established in 1966 when authority over the residual World War II
era claims settlements to blocked assets involving Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania were transferred from the Justice Department to
OFAC. See 31 Fed. Reg. 7,333 (1966). With subsequent settlements and the independence
of the Baltic states these controls lost virtually all practical effect by 1992. See 38 Fed.
Reg. 7,984, 7,985 (1973); 47 Fed. Reg. 12,338, 12,339 (1982); 57 Fed. Reg. 44,682 (1992).
They were entirely removed from the CFR in 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
The SGCR were imposed as an adjunct to restrictions on importing South African
gold Kruggerands mandated by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986. See 51
Fed. Reg. 41,916 (1986). The restrictions were prospectively lifted in 1992, see 57 Fed. Reg.
10,291 (1992), and the regulations removed in 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995). See
also supra note 83.
104. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text; infra notes 109-114 and
accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 115-136 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 82; infra notes 115-149 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 150-169 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
109. See 31 C.F.R. § 500.306 (1999).
110. See id. § 515.306.
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recognized as a term of art to be included parenthetically in the
captions of the separately published blacklists used with the Libyan"'
and Iraqi" 2 embargo programs. The SDN term also reappeared in
the caption to the comprehensive blacklist published in the Federal
Register in 1994,113 and in the master consolidated blacklist which is
now found in the appendices to 31 C.F.R., Chapter V.114 The
"controlled" or "blocked" terms are loosely used, almost
interchangeably, in a number of other OFAC programs to
simultaneously identify the sanctioned parties and to explain the
111. As the Libyan sanctions developed over time they used an SDN list to extend the
reach of the controls. See 56 Fed. Reg. 37,156 (1991), which created a blacklist of SDN's of
Libya at 31 C.F.R. § 550 app. B (1991), see also 56 Fed. Reg. 20,540 (1991), which created
a blacklist of "Organizations Determined to be Within the Term "Government of Libya"
at 31 C.F.R. § 550 app. A (1991). The LSR themselves neither mention the SDN
mechanism nor define the term as was done in the FACR and CACR. The SDN
terminology only appears in the notices publishing the Libyan blacklist or its updates,
along with the explanation that "individuals determined to be 'specially designated
nationals'... thus fall within the definition of 'Government of Libya' contained in section
550.304(a) of the Regulations, and are subject to all prohibitions applicable to other
components of the Government of Libya." 57 Fed. Reg. 29,424 (1992). The Libyan
blacklists are now consolidated into the appendices to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V (1999).
112. OFAC blacklisted a number of individuals and entities by defining them to be part
of the sanctioned Iraqi or Kuwaiti government targeted by these regulations. See 31
C.F.R. § 570-306(d) (1991) and Appendix A (listing of "Kuwaiti Governmental Entities"),
and 56 Fed. Reg. 13,584 (1991), which created "Individuals and Organizations Determined
to Be Specially Designated Nationals of the Government of Iraq" and "Merchant Vessels
Registered, Owned, or Controlled by the Government of Iraq or by Persons Acting
Directly or Indirectly on behalf of the Government of Iraq" in Appendicies A and B of 31
C.F.R. § 575 (1991). See also infra notes 164-169 (discussing the related Kuwaiti
blacklists). This is not dissimilar to what was done under the LSR, see supra notes 86, 111,
infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text; and the PTR, see supra note 87; infra notes
161-163 and accompanying text; and arguably with the IACR/ITR, see supra note 82. Once
again, as the focus of the regulations is on identifying which persons or organizations
should be "blocked" as part of the respective target governments (see 31 C.F.R. § 575.306
(1998)), the SDN mechanism was neither explicitly used nor defined in the ISR. The SDN
term nevertheless appeared in the caption of the blacklist itself and in the Federal
Register notice describing the blacklist. The Iraqi blacklist now appears in the appendices
to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V (1999).
113. List of Blocked Persons and Specially Designated Nationals, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460
(1994) (emphasis added).
114. See 31 C.F.R. ch. V apps. A (Alphabetical Listing of Blocked Persons, Specially
Designated Nationals, Specially Designated Terrorists, Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
and Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers); B (Alphabetical Listing By Location of
Blocked Persons, Specially Designated Nationals, Specially Designated Terrorists, Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, and Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers); C (Alphabetical
Listing of Vessels That Are The Property of Blocked Persons or Specially Designated
Nationals) (1998) (emphasis added). These appendices were added to Chapter V of 31
C.F.R. on June 26,1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 32,936 (1996). The original version of Appendix
B, however, was removed three years later, and Appendix C redesignated as the new
Appendix B. See 64 Fed. Reg. 34,984 (1999); 31 C.F.R. ch. V apps. A, B (1999).
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effect of the sanctions. 115 Blacklisting of "controlled"" 6 entities is
seen most clearly in the Yugoslav" 7 and IranianM8 sanctions
programs, whereas "blocking" of blacklisted parties is seen in the
Haitian sanctions.119
When the Yugoslav sanctions were initially imposed in mid-1992,
OFAC published an extensive list of "Controlled Yugoslav Entities"
in its General Notice No.1, rather than using the SDN term.120 The
release of this blacklist actually occurred eight months before the
publication of the sanctions regulations themselves,' 2' and was
predicated upon OFAC's implicit ability to determine whether a
particular person or organization was within the scope of the
"Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia &
Montenegro)' 22 targeted by the President's Executive Orders.'23 This
"Notification of the Status of Controlled Yugoslav Entities" also
highlights the almost interchangeable ability to refer to such parties as
"blocked" persons or entities, in that the caption of the actual list
provided in the Notice is, "Blocked Yugoslav Entities Currently
115. In fact, under the TWEA based Asian and Cuban embargo programs, one "effect"
of being blacklisted as an SDN was that all property and accounts in which the SDN had
any interest was "blocked." See 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201, 500.205 (FACR); 515.201, 515.205(CACR) (1999). This is clearly seen in the regulatory definition of "Blocked Account" in
the FACR and CACR which states: "The term blocked account shall mean an account in
which any designated national has an interest, with respect to which account payments,
transfers or withdrawals or other dealings may not be made or effected except pursuant to
an authorization or license authorizing such action." Id. §§ 500.319 (FACR); 515.319(CACR) (1999). Similar definitions are found in other sanctions programs, even those
which do not specifically employ the term "specially designated" mechanism. See, e.g., id.§§ 536.301 (SSR); 550.316 (LSR); 575.301 (ISR); 585.302 (FRYSR); 586.301 (KSR) (1999).
116. The precise meaning of the term "controlled" is not provided in any of the
sanctions regulations. A number of programs, however, give OFAC broad power to
determine which parties "controlled" by the sanctions target may be brought within a
particular program's provisions. See, e.g., id. §§ 535.301(a)(2), (4) (IACR); 536.312(c)(NTSR); 538.305(b)-(c) (SSR); 550.304(b)-(c) (LSR); 560.303, 560.304(b)-(c) (ITR);
575.304(a), 575.306(b)-(c), 575.307(b)-(c) (ISR); 585.311(b)-(c) (FRYSR); 586.306-308
(KSR); and 590.307(b)-(c) (USAR) (1999).
117. See infra notes 120-129 and accompanying text.
11& See infra notes 130-137 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 138-149 and accompanying text.
120. Notification of Status of Controlled Yugoslav Entities, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,051 (1992).
121. General Notice No.1 was published on July 20, 1992. See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,051(1992). The FRYSR were published on March 10, 1993. See 58 Fed. Reg. 13,199 (1993).
122. See e.g. Milena Ship Management Co. v. Newcomb, 804 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. La.
1992), aff'da 995 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1993). See also supra note 116 discussing OFAC's
broad authority to define parties as being within the scope of a particular sanctions target,
once regulations have been issued.
123. Exec. Order No. 12,808, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,299 (1992); Exec. Order No. 12,810, 57
Fed. Reg. 24,347 (1992).
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Identified.' 124  The term "blocked" predominated the term
"controlled" when the Yugoslav blacklist was subsequently
republished in OFAC's comprehensive "List of Blocked Persons and
Specially Designated Nationals" in 1994,125 and when the Yugoslav
list was separately republished126 in the "Notice of Blocking" 127 which
added various "Bosnian Serb Civilian and Military Authorities" to
the Yugoslav blacklist in 1995.128 Additionally, beyond just addressing
natural or juridical persons these lists also included a category for
"blocked vessels"- ships that were determined to be the property of,
or controlled by, blacklisted Yugoslav parties. 129
At about the same time, OFAC released a list of eighty-four
"Banks Controlled by the Government of Iran,' ' 130 under the Iranian
sanctions.131 Their precise status is somewhat confusing, however,
especially for those banks with offices which are physically located
outside of Iran. Despite the broad authority granted under the
regulations to define parties as being "Iranian"'132 or part of the
"Government of Iran,'1 33 OFAC did not expressly do so in issuing
this list, and these banks' names do not appear in the consolidated
blacklist found in the appendices to the current regulations.13
124. See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,051 (1992).
125. See 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460 (1994).
126. The publication of the "comprehensive" List of Blocked Persons and Specially
Designated Nationals in November, 1994, see id, was only a convenience. OFAC did not
establish a single consolidated blacklist in the regulations until it created the appendices to
Chapter V of 31 C.F.R. in 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 32,936 (1996).
127. 60 Fed. Reg. 19,448 (1995).
128. The title given to the section of the 1995 list dealing with Yugoslav entities was
"Blocked Persons and Specially Designated Nationals of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)." Id at 19,450.
129. See 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460, 59,461 (1994); 60 Fed. Reg. 19,448, 19,450 (1995). Vessels
owned or controlled by sanctioned governments, SDNs, or blocked entities were also
blacklisted under other sanctions programs, notably the Cuban and Iranian embargoes.
However, the Yugoslav program was the first program to specifically provide for this
particular type of blacklisting in its regulations. See 31 C.F.R. § 585.418 (1999).
130. See Annex to General License No. 3, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,881, 40,883 (1995). This list
was released as part of a series of interim measures OFAC took to implement Exec. Order
No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (1995), and Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757
(1995). These provisions are now embodied in 31 C.F.R. 88 560.304,560.320, and 560.517
(1999).
131. There are two different sets of regulations imposing sanctions on Iran, the IACR
and the ITR. See supra note 82.
132. See 31 C.F.R. §H 535.301 (IACR); 560.303 (ITR) (1999).
133. See id. § 560.304.
134. However, in April of 1999, four years after this list was initially released, the banks
were added to the ITR themselves in a special appendix entitled "Financial Institutions
Determined to be Owned or Controlled by the Government of Iran." See 64 Fed. Reg.
20,168, 20,175 (1999), 31 C.F.R. § 560 app. A (1999); see also infra notes 311-317 and
accompanying text (discussing the effect of this list under the Iranian sanctions).
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Accordingly, while the banks are considered to be "controlled" by
Iran,135 they are not themselves "blocked.' 36 OFAC nevertheless
asserts that many financial dealings with the named institutions are
prohibited by the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR), absent its
approval. 37
The "blocking" of blacklisted parties is perhaps most clearly
evident in the now-defunct Haitian sanctions1 38 A lengthy list of
"Blocked Persons of the De Facto Regime in Haiti" was issued in
July, 1993, as a special appendix to the Haitian Transactions
Regulations.139 The list consisted of two sections. The first section,
entitled "Blocked Individuals of the De Facto Regime in Haiti,'1 40
included the names of individuals who were serving in the Haitian
government or senior Haitian military positions following the coup
which deposed President Aristide. The second section, "Blocked
Entities of the De Facto Regime in Haiti," listed organizations
located in Haiti.' 41  The blacklisted individuals were briefly
"unblocked" in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution
No. 861,142 which prospectively suspended certain sanctions when a
settlement appeared possible later that year, but the organizational
entities remained subject to blocking. 43  When the political
settlement embodied in the Governors Island Agreement regarding
the return of President Aristide collapsed, the sanctions were
reimposed. 44 Accordingly, OFAC issued a "Notification of Blocked
135. 31 C.F.R. § 560.313 (1999).
136. In fact the banks, despite being deemed "controlled" by Iran, are not subject to the
prohibitions of the IACR, id. § 535.201, at all, but rather fall under the provisions of the
ITR, which do not contain any "asset blocking" provisions. See supra note 82; infra note
137 and accompanying text.
137. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of Treas., Iran: What You Need to
Know About U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran (visited July 27, 1999)
http:lwww.ustreas.gov/ofacltlliran.pdf (copy on file with Hastings Law Journal); see also
31 C.F.R. § 560.517 (1999).
138. The sanctions were imposed by an Executive Order issued in October, 1991, and
the subsequent Haitian Transactions Regulations were removed in June, 1995. See supra
note 90.
139. See 58 Fed. Reg. 40,043 (1993); 31 C.F.R. § 580 app. A (1994).
140. Id. at app. A § I.
141. Id at app. A § II.
142. S.C. Res. 861, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3271st mtg., at 121, U.N. Doc. SIRES/861
(1993).
143. See 58 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,541 (1993) which removed the "Blocked Individual"
listings from 31 C.F.R. § 580 app. A § I, but left the § II "Blocked Entities" listing intact,
and simultaneously created a new regulatory provision, 31 C.F.R. § 580.518(c), which
"unblocked" the property of those individuals who had been listed as "blocked."
144. This was accomplished by simply revoking the regulatory provision easing the U.S.
sanctions, 31 C.F.R. § 580.518, which had been published the previous month. See 58 Fed.
Reg. 54,024 (1993).
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Individuals of Haiti" blocking the property of 41 individuals in
November, 1993,145 and expanded the blacklist to name 564
individuals in a revised regulatory appendix in early 1994 as President
Aristide's return was further delayed.146 The sanctions were lifted in
December, 1994,147 following President Aristide's actual return to
Haiti. The use of "blocking" terminology remains, however, common
to several of OFAC's current sanctions programs,148 and is reflected
in the caption of the consolidated master blacklist in the appendices
to the regulations.149
In addition to these blacklists of "specially designated,"
"controlled," or "blocked" parties, OFAC blacklists various
"governmental" persons or entities. Once again, the terminology is
more a reflection of the circumstances surrounding the creation of a
145. See General Notice No. 2: Notification of Blocked Individuals of Haiti, 58 Fed.
Reg. 58,480 (1993). The 41 individuals listed included 16 names which had been removed
from the 31 C.F.R. § 580 app. A, blacklist just two months before. Compare 58 Fed. Reg.
40,043, 40,045 (1993) with 58 Fed. Reg. 58,480, 58,481, (1993). Interestingly, the Notice
provides no indication whatsoever that these individuals names would be included in the
Haitian (Appendix A) blacklist found in the regulations. This is perhaps due to the fact
that the § 1 "Blocked Individuals" portion of the Appendix A blacklist had been abolished
by OFAC's earlier actions, and the number of rapid changes occurring in the Haitian
program had temporarily distracted OFAC from the need to consider reinstituting that
part of Appendix A. See also infra note 146.
146. See Blocked Individuals of Haiti, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,548 (1994), which reconstituted
the § 1 "Blocked Individuals" portion of the 31 C.F.R. § 580, Appendix A, blacklist.
However, unlike the earlier incarnation of the "Blocked Individuals" portion of Appendix
A blacklist, the list was now comprised almost entirely of the names of members of the
Haitian military.
147. See 59 Fed. Reg. 51,066 (1994). The removal of the Haitian sanctions actually
began with a "suspension" of many of their provisions on October 6, 1994, in anticipation
of President Aristide's return. However, this did not include "unblocking" the property of
blacklisted parties. See 59 Fed. Reg. 51,066 (1994). This action was followed by a belated
and retroactive lifting of sanctions for transactions occurring after October 16, 1994 which
was published on December 27, 1994. See 59 Fed. Reg. 66,476 (1994). The HTR were
finally removed from the C.F.R. in 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
148. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.301(a)(2), (4) (IACR); 536.312(c) (NTSR); 538.305(b)-
(c) (SSR); 550.304(b)-(c) (LSR); 560.303, 560.304(b)-(c) (ITR); 575.304(a), 575.306(b)-(c),
575.307(b)-(c) (ISR); 585.311(b)-(c) (FRYSR); 586.306-.308 (KSR); and 590.307(b)-(c)
(USAR) (1999).
149. See 31 C.F.R. ch. V apps. A (Alphabetical Listing of Blocked Persons, Specially
Designated Nationals, Specially Designated Terrorists, Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
and Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers); B (Alphabetical Listing By Location of
Blocked Persons, Specially Designated Nationals, Specially Designated Terrorists, Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, and Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers); and C
(Alphabetical Listing of Vessels That Are The Property of Blocked Persons or Specially
Designated Nationals) (1998) (emphasis added). These appendices were added to Chapter
V of 31 C.F.R. on June 26, 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 32,936 (1996). Three years later the
Appendix B geographical listing was removed, and Appendix C redesignated as the new
Appendix B. See 64 Fed. Reg. 34, 984 (1999); 31 C.F.R. ch. V apps. A-B (1999).
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particular sanctions program rather than an indication of a
substantive difference in the nature or operation of the blacklist
mechanism. Blacklisting, irrespective of the terminology associated
with a particular designation, is simply the trigger for the controls
embodied in a given sanctions program. In fact, the three previous
examples, involving the Haitian, Iranian, and Yugoslav sanctions
programs, also all serve to highlight the substantial overlap with the
notion of blacklisting "governmental" entities. In each case, the
blacklisted parties were deemed to be acting for, or on behalf of, the
sanctioned target government.150 Nevertheless, OFAC chose to
specifically single out "governmental entities" for blacklisting in a
number of other programs, including the South African,151 Libyan,152
Panamanian, 5 3 and Kuwaiti 54 sanctions.
Identifying blacklisted parties with a sanctioned government is
clearly seen in the 1980's-era South African sanctions under the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act,155 where the State Department
published an extensive list of "South African Parastatal
Organizations,' 1 56 which triggered various restrictions under OFAC's
South African Transaction Regulations (SATR). 157 It also appears in
the IEEPA based sanctions programs as well.
Although the Libyan sanctions imposed in 1986 were the first
IEEPA-based program to include a definition of "blocked" accounts
or property,158 they are also notable for employing a blacklist of
"Organizations Determined to be Within the Definition of the
Government of Libya," which was parenthetically captioned as a list
of "Specially Designated Nationals of Libya."' 5 9 In doing so, the
150. The notion that individual parties are being blacklisted because of their
relationship to the target government is self evident in Yugoslav sanctions "List of
Controlled Yugoslav Entities" (see supra notes 120-129 and accompanying text), the list of
"Banks Controlled by the Government of Iran" (see supra notes 130-137 and
accompanying text), and the list of "Blocked Persons of the Defacto Regime in Haiti" (see
supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text).
151. See infra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
155. Comprehensive Ant-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440,100 Stat. 1086.
156. See State Department Public Notice No. 983, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,912 (1986), revised by
State Department Public Notice No. 1007, 52 Fed. Reg. 9,982 (1987),
157. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 545.208, 545.315 (1986). The South African sanctions were
unusual in that the blacklist of Parastatal Organizations which triggered OFAC's controls
was published by the State Department rather than by the Treasury Department itself.
This also occurs in the TLGSR, see supra note 98, where the State Department's
designation of a government as a state sponsor of terrorism which triggers the OFAC
sanctions.
158. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.316 (1999). See also supra note 86.
159. See 56 Fed. Reg. 20,540 (1991) and 31 C.F.R. § 550 app. A (1991). See also supra
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Libyan Sanctions Regulations (LSR) combined both the Specially
Designated National mechanism of the TWEA-based Asian and
Cuban embargoes with the flexible definition of "blocked" persons or
organizations employed in the IEEPA-based Iranian sanctions. 16°
Under the Panamanian program, OFAC created two separate
blacklists, one identifying the "Panamanian Governmental Entities"
subject to sanctions, 161  and another listing "Persons and
Organizations Acting on Behalf of the Noriega/Solis Regime."' 62 This
was necessary because there were effectively two "governments" of
Panama, the Noriega regime and the U.S.-recognized government in
exile. The U.S. Government used both of these blacklists to refine the
scope of the sanctions, specifying precisely who should be treated as
part of the Noriega regime, in a manner similar to what was done with
the Libyan program.163
OFAC similarly identified a number of individuals and
organizations as "Kuwaiti Governmental Entities" during the Gulf
War, in order to impose "protective" blocking measures to preserve
Kuwaiti assets from diversion or confiscation by the invading Iraqi
forces.164 The entries on this Kuwaiti list were subdivided in order to
provide greater precision in determining precisely what controls
OFAC was imposing, and in a manner which neatly highlights the
interrelationship of the various terms used in connection with
OFAC's blacklists. The various Kuwaiti Governmental Entities were
categorized as either "Controlled/Blocked,"' 16 "Controlled/Licensed
note 112 and accompanying text discussing the relationship of the "governmental"
blacklist to the SDN mechanism used in other sanctions programs. The blacklists
established under the later Panamanian program actually predate this Libyan blacklist,
which was not added to the LSR until 1991. See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying
text. The Libyan SDN List is now incorporated into the consolidated master blacklist
found in the appendices to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V (1999).
160. Compare 31 C.F.R. § 535.301 (IACR definition of "Iran" and "Iranian") and §
560.304 (ITR definition of "Government of Iran") with § 550.304 (LSR definition of
"Government of Libya") (1999). In a sense, the list of "Banks Controlled by the
Government of Iran" is also similar to the Libyan list in that each blacklist tries to
specifically reach a subset of a targeted sanctioned government. See supra notes 130, 136
and accompanying text; Annex to General License No. 3, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,881, 40,883
(1995).
161. See 53 Fed. Reg. 20,566 (1988); 31 C.F.R. § 565 app. A (1988).
162. See 54 Fed. Reg. 36,272 (1989); 31 C.F.R. § 565 app. B (1990).
163. See supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text. However in the case of the
Panamanian program, virtually all of the parties listed were located within Panama itself.
The PTR were removed entirely in 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
164. See 55 Fed. Reg. 49,856 (1990); 31 C.F.R. § 570 app. A (1991).
165. This meant that:
[t]he entities listed as "Controlled/Blocked" have been determined to be
controlled by the Government of Kuwait and/or the Government of Iraq and
should be regarded as blocked entities. This means U.S. persons are prohibited
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to Operate,"1 66 or "Not Controlled/No Restrictions."' 67 The blocking
effect of these designations was lifted in 1991, when Kuwait was
liberated by the coalition forces,168 and the Kuwaiti regulations were
entirely removed in 1995.169
A similar level of precision is sometimes found in the sanctions
regulations themselves, rather than in the associated blacklists. This
can be seen in the Angolan sanctions program, which is specifically
targeted at the Unido Nacional para a Independencia, or UNITA,
and the territory it controls, rather than at the entire government or
territory of Angola.170 Moreover, even particular entities, such as the
organization "Free Angola Information Services, Inc." or the "Center
for Democracy in Angola," are specifically defined in the regulations
as being part of the sanctions target.171 The majority of the IEEPA-
based sanctions programs created since the mid 1980's have in fact
defined various particular entities as part of the sanctioned
from engaging in transactions with these entities and all assets under U.S.
jurisdiction owned or controlled by those entities are blocked. U.S. persons are
not prohibited, however, from paying funds owed to these entities into blocked
accounts held in U.S. financial institutions.
55 Fed. Reg. 49,856,49,868 (1990); 31 C.F.R. § 570 app. A (1991).
166. This meant that:
[t]he entities listed as "Controlled/Licensed to Operate" should also be regarded
as controlled by the Government of Kuwait, but as licensed to operate. This
means the Office of Foreign Assets Controls has determined that the entities are
under the effective control of the recognized Government of Kuwait and U.S.
persons are authorized to engage in transactions with them. These authorized
transactions include entering into contracts, making and receiving payments, and
conducting other commercial or financial transactions. If questions arise, U.S.
persons should request from the entities concerned to see copies of the operating
licenses.
55 Fed. Reg. 49,856,49,868 (1990); 31 C.F.R. § 570 app. A (1991).
167. This meant that:
[t]he entities listed as "Not Controlled/No Restrictions" are not regarded by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control as controlled by the Government of Kuwait.
The names of these entities appear on the list solely for the purpose of
clarification because requests regarding their status have been received. Some of
the entities on this list may be subject to special Treasury Department licensing
or reporting requirements.
55 Fed. Reg. 49,856,49,868 (1990); 31 C.F.R. § 570 app. A (1991).
168. See 56 Fed. Reg. 12,450; 56 Fed. Reg. 26,034 (1991).
169. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
170. See supra note 92. The sanctions imposed on the Taliban in Afghanistan are
similar in that they target a particular group within the larger territory of Afghanistan. As
initially promulgated the sanctions only blacklisted one individual, Mohammed Omar
(Amir al-Mumineen [Commander of the Faithful]), see Annex to Exec. Order No. 13,129,
64 Fed. Reg. 36,759, 36,761 (1999). However, as of this writing, no regulations have been
issued to further elaborate upon the sanctions imposed under the Executive Order. See
supra note 95.
171. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 590.314(a)(3), (4) (1999).
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government, typically including at least the local government's
"central bank."'1 72
The utility and flexibility demonstrated in these programs led the
Government to push the blacklisting tool to its logical conclusion in
recent years. In several of the newer programs, specific parties or
organizations are blacklisted arguably without any direct connection
to any particular state or geography whatsoever. In these programs,
the blacklist is no longer employed as a secondary tool, capturing the
activities of corporate cloaks or front organizations which might
enable a targeted country to avoid the effects of the sanctions, but is
instead employed as the primary tool for achieving the Government's
objectives. Those objectives also shift: from achieving the traditional
goal of isolating of the sanctioned territory as a prelude or
alternative to war-as was the case with the World War II sanctions-
to demonstrating political "leadership"' or to claim the "moral high
ground" for domestic or international political purposes, with much
less concern for whether the sanctions will actually restrict the actions
of their intended target. That is, blacklisting is now seen as politically
useful in attempting to address some of the more intractable
problems facing policy makers today, such as narco-trafficking,
terrorism, and human rights violations. Interestingly, there is also a
return to the use of the "specially designated" terminology in the
blacklists associated with these newer sanctions programs.
These recent, less geographically-oriented sanctions began
appearing in January, 1995, with President Clinton's announcement
that twelve terrorist organizations would be subject to blocking, 73
and OFAC's simultaneous release of the "List of Specially
Designated Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East
Peace Process."' 74 This Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT) list
elaborated upon the organizations named in the President's
Executive Order by identifying twenty-six individuals and forty-five
organizations believed to be conducting terrorist operations in nine
Middle Eastern countries, Gaza and the West Bank,175 and it has
since been further expanded.176
Similarly, in October, 1995, the President announced a blocking
172. See, e.g., id. §§ 538.305 (SSR); 550.304 (LSR); 575.306-.307 (ISR); 585.311
(FRYSR) (1999); and 31 C.F.R. § 570.306 (KACR) (1991).
173. See Exec. Order No. 12,947,60 Fed. Reg. 5,079,5,081 (1995).
174. 60 Fed. Reg. 5,084 (1995).
175. See id-
176. The Specially Designated Terrorist List (SDT) was separately updated twice prior
to the creation of the Terrorist Sanctions Regulations (TSR), in February, 1996. See 60
Fed. Reg. 41,152 (1995); 60 Fed. Reg. 58,435 (1995); 31 C.F.R. § 595 (1999); see also supra
note 97. The current version of the SDT list is now incorporated in the consolidated
master blacklist in the appendices to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V (1999).
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program aimed at four significant international narcotics
traffickers,177 which was again accompanied by the simultaneous
release of another new blacklist from OFAC, entitled the "List of
Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers" (SDNTs). 178 The four
individuals named by the President, along with others designated by
the Secretary of the Treasury as being significantly involved in drug
trafficking activities, and the various entities which they own or
control, comprise the list of SDNTs. Although there is no express
geographic limitation on the application of the narcotics trafficking
sanctions in either the Executive Order or the implementing
regulations,179 the several hundred parties now designated as SDNTs
through the end of 1999 have all been based in, or affiliated with,
Colombia.180
Two other programs, sanctioning Terrorism List Governments 181
and Foreign Terrorist Organizations,1s2 grew out of passage of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.183 This Act
authorizes OFAC to regulate dealings with governments designated
as supporters of international terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act,184 or those foreign organizations
designated under amendments to the Immigration and Naturalization
Act'85 as involved in terrorism. In both programs, it is the Secretary
of State, and not the Treasury, who makes the initial designation. 8 6
However, OFAC republishes the lists of such parties, and in the case
of the sanctions on Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), is also
empowered to expand upon the Secretary of State's designations by
similarly declaring that those who are acting for, or on behalf of, such
parties are themselves FTOs.1s7
177. See Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions with Significant Narcotics
Traffickers, Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (1995).
178. 60 Fed. Reg. 54,582 (1995).
179. The Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions Regulations (NTSR), were issued in March,
1997. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9,959 (1997); 31 C.F.R. § 596 et seq. (1999).
180. See Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (1995); 60 Fed. Reg. 54,582; 60
Fed. Reg. 61,288 (1995); 61 Fed. Reg. 9,523 (1996); and the appendices to 31 C.F.Rt
Chapter V (1999). The recently signed Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, Title
VIII of Pub. L. No. 106-120 (1999), will presumably expand these sanctions beyond the
Colombian drug cartels.
181. The Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations (TLGSR), were issued in
August of 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 43,462 (1996); 31 C.F.R. § 596 et seq.(1999).
182. The Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR) were issued
in October of 1997. See 62 Fed. Reg. 52,493, 52,495 (1997); 31 C.F.R. § 597 et seq. (1999).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (1996).
184. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (1994).
185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (1994).
186. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 596.310 (TLGSR), 597.309 (FTOSR) (1999).
187. See ki § 597.301 (FTOSR) (1999). OFAC publishes the list of Terrorist List
Governments in the regulations at § 596.201; the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations
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The narcotics trafficking sanctions and each of the three terrorist
programs attempt to block all the blacklisted parties' property within
the reach of U.S. jurisdiction,'8 and broadly prohibit any attempts to
engage in unlicensed dealings with the blacklisted parties or to evade
or avoid the programs' restrictions. 189 Thus, while they may appear
superficially different from traditional geographically based
sanctions,190 they employ the same asset "blocking" techniques
associated with the classic economic embargoes aimed at isolating
specific countries.19' Nevertheless, these programs do represent a
natural progression in the evolution of blacklisting as a tool of U.S.
government policy in the later part of the 20' century.' 92 Perhaps the
appear in the consolidated master blacklist in the appendices to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V
(1999).
188. See id. § 536.201 (NTSR); 595.201 (TSR); 596.201 (TLGSR); 597.201 (FTOSR)
(1999).
189. See id. § 536204 (NTSR); 595.205 (TSR) (1999).
190. The SDTs are truly international, involving groups and individuals from many
countries around the world, although there is a rudimentary "geographic" element to the
TSR in that the SDT designation is predicated upon a potential threat to the peace process
in the Middle East. See id. § 595.311 (TSR) (1999). Even this element is absent, however,
when dealing with FTOs. See id. §§ 597.301, 597.309 (FrOSR) (1999). The SDNTs are
more localized, at least currently, in that they are all associated with the Cali drug cartel
based in Colombia and to that degree the NTSR contain a rudimentary "geographic"
element. See id. § 536.312 (1999). However, the NTSR can be expected to expand its
sanctions beyond the Colombian drug cartels as a result of the recently signed Foreign
Narcotics Drug Kingpin Act, Title VIII of Pub. L. No. 106-120 (1999).
191. One might query the practicality of blacklisting some of these persons or
organizations, such as Abu Nidal or the Black September Organization who appear as
SDTs or FrOs, as they presumably operate in secret or conceal their identities, at least
when dealing with U.S. parties and financial institutions.
192. OFAC's experience with blacklisting and economic sanctions has also
demonstrated the usefulness of the blacklisting tool to other parts of the Government,
such as the Commerce and State Departments. Both agencies have long made use of
blacklists of parties who violate their regulatory controls on exporting U.S. goods, services,
or technology as an adjunct to their enforcement powers. In addition to the various civil
and criminal penalties which may be imposed, the Commerce Department can "deny the
export privileges" of those who have failed to comply with its Export Administration
Regulations, see 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(a)(2) (1999), and the State Department can "debar"
those who failed to comply with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, see 22
C.F.R. § 127.7 (1999). However, both agencies began importing the OFAC approach of
using blacklisting to expand the reach of the controls, rather than to punish, following
President Bush's 1990 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, Exec. Order No. 12,735,
55 Fed. Reg. 48,587(1990). Accordingly, Commerce now maintains an "Entity List," 15
C.F.R. § 744, Supp. No. 4 (1999), which triggers additional regulatory controls because of
the Government's concern that certain foreign parties, otherwise beyond the reach of U.S.
jurisdiction, are engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, the
State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs periodically announces that
particular parties are engaged in proliferation-related activities, thereby triggering controls
in the Export Administration Regulations or International Traffic in Arms Regulations
which are dependent upon the U.S. exporter's "knowledge" that an importer or customer
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most natural and logical (but long resisted) step in this progression
was also taken in 1996 when the proliferation of separate blacklists
forced OFAC to create a consolidated master blacklist for virtually all
its programs in the appendices to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V, naming all the
various Blocked Persons, SDNs, SDTs, SDNTs, and FTOs in one
place in the regulations.193
One of the newest sanctions programs, however, may undermine
some of this progress. The Weapons of Mass-Destruction Trade
Control Regulations' 94 impose an import ban on transactions
involving "designated foreign persons" identified as being engaged in
weapons proliferation by the Department of State. As initially
announced, OFAC followed the model of many of the sanctions
programs from the early 1990s in placing this blacklist of "designated
foreign persons" only in the WMDTCR regulations themselves, 95
and not in the consolidated master list contained in the Appendices to
31 C.F.R. Chapter V. This appears to represent a retreat even from
the approach recently employed with the Foreign Terrorist
Organizations blacklist, which also originates at the State
Department, but nevertheless is republished in the consolidated
master list in the Appendices at the end of the CFR.196
(3) A History of Administrative Problems
The proliferation of sanctions programs over time, each with its
own set of regulations and its own peculiar blacklist, makes it more
difficult for OFAC to administer the controls in a smooth, consistent,
and efficient manner. Additionally, unlike other agencies involved in
international trade-such as the Commerce Department's Bureau of
Export Administration, or the State Department's Defense Trade
is involved in a potentially proscribed "end-use." See, e.g., 61 Fed Reg. 29,784 (1996); 60
Fed. Reg. 13,201, 30,148 (1995); 59 Fed. Reg. 10,663, 44,222, 61,648, 65,837 (1994); 58 Fed.
Reg. 45,408 (1993). See also FITZGERALD, supra note 27, at 28-35.
193. See 61 Fed. Reg. 32,936 (1996). Previously, OFAC had published a "convenience"
copy of a "comprehensive" version of the blacklist in the Federal Register in 1994, see 59
Fed. Reg. 59,460 (1994), but the master list did not become part of the regulations
themselves until 1996. However, this consolidated master blacklist still omits the list of
Banks Controlled by the Government of Iran. See supra notes 130-137, and accompanying
text; infra notes 311-317 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Terrorist List
Governments are found only in the TLGSR, see supra notes 181-187 and accompanying
text, as are the Designated Foreign Persons blacklisted under the WMDTCR, see infra
notes 194-196,318 and accompanying text.
194. 31 C.F.R. § 539 (1999).
195. See id. § 539 app. I.
196. See id. ch. V apps. A-B. It should also be noted, however, that the Terrorist List
Governments sanctioned under the TLGSR do not appear in the appendices to 31 C.F.R.
Chapter V, but only in the actual regulations themselves. See supra notes 181-187, 193 and
accompanying text.
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Controls Agency-OFAC has been slow to develop a cooperative
relationship with those who must comply with its regulations. While
OFAC's singular focus on economic and financial sanctions has
enabled it to avoid some of the problems the Commerce Department
sometimes experiences as a result of its dual missions of both
promoting and controlling trade,197 it has also fostered a more
adversarial relationship with the trading community. As OFAC has
focused on each sanctions program individually, rather than as part of
a comprehensive system of controls, it has tended to be insensitive to
the needs of those who must integrate its diverse regulatory
requirements into an overall business compliance process.
This insensitivity is an outgrowth of OFAC's historical mission,
and its self-image as an organization engaged in "economic warfare"
with particular enemies of the U.S. Government.198 OFAC publicly
states that its mandate is to advance U.S. foreign policy, and not to
respond to the needs of industry. This, in turn, produced a degree of
isolation which has only recently begun to break down.199 Moreover,
as a small office separate and apart from the main "trade control"
operations at State and Commerce, it has also sometimes had
difficulty keeping up with the increasing demands for new and
different sanctions programs in the post Cold War era. The ultimate
result is, in the jargon of the corporate world, that OFAC has
traditionally not felt it necessary to be "customer" or "service"
oriented in administering its programs. This can be seen in the
manner in which OFAC issues and removes controls from its
regulations, and in the way it has handled the blacklists associated
with its various programs.
(a) Problems Detailing New Controls
OFAC can sometimes be quite slow in formulating the detailed
regulations which implement the various Presidential Orders or
Congressional legislation imposing sanctions. Although OFAC tends
to use a common set of "tools" in many of its sanctions programs-
consisting of financial sanctions (such as freezing or blocking assets
or prohibiting new investments), trade sanctions (such as import and
export prohibitions), travel restrictions to and from the target
197. See, e.g., Bureau of Export Administration, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, China's
Demand for Commercial Technology Poses Dilemma for U.S. Companies: Commerce
Report Finds, (visited Jan. 28,1999) http://www.bxa.doc.gov/PRESS/99/PRCTeh.html.
198. See, e.g., Kendrick, supra note 60, at A21; Benjamin Weiser, Sanctions Czar: Big
Gun or Loose Cannon?", WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at H-1.
199. See Shipping Medical Products to Cuba: OFAC Requirements Swamp the Raft,
EXPORT CONTROL NEwS, September 30, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2247159.
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destination, and contract restrictions200-it persists in issuing stand-
alone programs for each target rather working from a standardized
set of regulations. If it were to establish a common set of regulations
as a baseline from which the particular sanctions applicable to a given
target could be selectively invoked, many interpretative problems
introduced by slight variations in wording over time would be
mitigated,2 0 ' and the process of issuing regulations as new programs
are created would be streamlined. 202
Delays in issuing the detailed implementing regulations have
been a significant problem with the OFAC sanctions programs for
nearly a decade. For example, from the time of the Executive Order
imposing the applicable sanctions there was:
-a four-month delay in issuing KACR under the Kuwaiti
program,20 3
-a four-and-a-half-month delay in issuing ISR under the Iraqi
program,204
-a six-month delay in issuing the HTR under the Haitian
program2 05
-a nine-month delay in issuing the FRYSR under the Yugoslav
program,206
-a delay of more than two months in issuing the initial USAR
under the Angolan program,20 7
200. See R. Richard Newcomb, Office of Foreign Assets ControL An Overview,
September 30, 1998, in PLI COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 115,125-26 (1998).
201. For example, as initially issued, the IACR contained basically the same blocking
provisions used in earlier programs, but OFAC nonetheless interpreted them differently
with regard to "transfers" of "property interests" involving the Iranian Government. See
Michael P. Malloy, The Iran Crisis: Law Under Pressure, 15 WIS. INT'L. LJ., 15, 30-33 &
n.92 (1984).
202. See MALLOY, supra note 40, at 681-682. OFAC made a limited move towards a
single set of regulations when it consolidated licensing application, reporting, and records
retention requirements into the Reporting and Procedures Regulations, which were
created in 1997. See 62 Fed. Reg. 45,101 (1997); 31 C.F.R. § 501 etseq. (1999).
203. Executive Order Number 12,723 was issued on August 2, 1990, see 55 Fed. Reg.
31,805 (1990), and the regulations were published on November 30, 1990, see 55 Fed. Reg.
49,856 (1990).
204. Executive Order Number 12,722 was issued on August 2, 1990, see 55 Fed. Reg.
31,803 (1990), and the regulations were published on January 18, 1991, see 56 Fed. Reg.
2,112 (1991).
205. Executive Order Number 12,775 was issued on October 4, 1991, see 56 Fed. Reg.
50,641 (1991), and the regulations were published on March 31, 1992, see 57 Fed. Reg.
10,820 (1992).
206. Executive Order Number 12,808 was issued on May 30, 1992, see 57 Fed. Reg.
23,299 (1992), and the regulations were published on March 10, 1993, see 58 Fed. Reg.
13,199 (1993).
207. Executive Order Number 12,865 was issued on September 26, 1993, see 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,005 (1993), and the regulations were published on December 10, 1993, see 58 Fed.
Reg. 64,904 (1993).
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-an eight-month delay in amending the FRYSR to reflect the
Bosnian Serb sanctions, 208
-a nearly thirteen-month delay issuing the TSR under the
Middle East terrorist program,209
-a six-month delay in amending the ITR to reflect new
sanctions on Iran for its continuing support of international
terrorism,210
-a sixteen-month delay in issuing the NTSR under the narco-
trafficking program,2 11
-an eight-month delay in issuing the SDR under the Sudanese
program,212
-a four-month delay in issuing the KSR under the Kosovo
program,2 1 3
-a seven-month delay in issuing the WMDTCR under the
recent sanctions program aimed at the proliferators of weapons of
mass destruction,214
-a twenty-month delay to further amend the ITR to reflect the
President's "clarification" of those sanctions,2
15
-and a twelve- to twenty-month delay updating and reissuing
the USAR following announcements of two different sets of revisions
to those sanctions.21 6
208. Executive Order Number 12,934 was issued on October 27, 1994, see 59 Fed. Reg.
54,117 (1994), and the regulations were published on June 30, 1995, see 60 Fed. Reg.
34,144 (1995).
209. Executive Order Number 12,947 was issued on January 23, 1995, see 60 Fed. Reg.
5,079 (1995), and the regulations were published on February 2, 1996, see 61 Fed. Reg.
3,805 (1996).
210. Executive Order Number 12,957 was issued on March 17, 1995, see 60 Fed. Reg.
14,615 (1995), and Executive Order Number 12,959 was issued on May 6,1995, see 60 Fed.
Reg. 24,757 (1995), and the regulations were amended on September 11, 1995, see 60 Fed.
Reg. 47,061 (1995).
211. Executive Order Number 12,978 was issued on October 21, 1995, see 60 Fed. Reg.
54,579 (1995), and the regulations were published on March 5, 1997, see 62 Fed. Reg."
9,959 (1997).
212. Executive Order Number 13,067 was issued on November 5,1997, see 62 Fed. Reg.
59,989 (1997), and the regulations were published on July 1, 1998, see 63 Fed. Reg. 35,809
(1998).
213. Executive Order Number 13,088 was issued on June 9, 1998, see 63 Fed. Reg.
32,109 (1998), and the regulations were published on October 13, 1998, see 63 Fed. Reg.
54,575 (1998).
214. Executive Order Number 13,094 was issued on July 28, 1999, see 63 Fed. Reg.
40,803 (1998), and the regulations were published on February 23, 1999, see 64 Fed. Reg.
8,715 (1999).
215. Executive Order Number 13,059 was issued on August 19, 1997, see 62 Fed. Reg.
44,531 (1997), and the regulations were published on April 26, 1999, see 64 Fed. Reg.
20,168 (1999).
216. Executive Order Number 13,069 was issued on December 12, 1997, see 62 Fed.
Reg. 65,989 (1997), and Executive Order Number 13,098 was issued on August 18, 1998,
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In the interim between the Presidential announcement of a new
sanctions program and the issuance of implementing regulations,
OFAC's practice is to run the sanctions by administrative fiat, often
through unpublished "general licenses" or "notices." When
regulations are subsequently published in the Federal Register,
several of the regulatory provisions may simply embody these
previously unpublished licenses and notices. For example:
-when the Iraqi regulations were issued in 1991, they codified
twelve previously unpublished general licenses which were issued
between August and October of 1990;217
-the Haitian regulations issued in 1992 codified eight
unpublished general licenses issued between November, 1991, and
February, 1992;218
-the Yugoslav regulations issued in 1993 codified seven
unpublished general licenses which were issued in June and July of
1992;219
-the September, 1995, amendments to the Iranian Transactions
Regulations codified twelve general licenses issued over the
preceding five months;22 0
-and the Kosovo Sanctions Regulations issued in October of
1998 codified yet another general license which had been issued three
months previously. 2 '
With the issuance of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations in
1996, OFAC even included a specific regulatory provision preserving
and acknowledging the republication of an unspecified number of
general licenses issued during the thirteen months which had elapsed
from the date of the President's Executive Order imposing the
sanctions.222 A similar provision was included in the Narcotics
Trafficking regulations, issued in 1997, sixteen months after the
imposition of sanctions.m This practice has now been further
see 63 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (1998), requiring so many changes that the USAR were entirely
reissued on August 12,1999, see 64 Fed. Reg. 43,924 (1999).
217. See 56 Fed. Reg. 2,112 (1991).
218. See 57 Fed. Reg. 10,820,10,821 (1992).
219. See 58 Fed. Reg. 13,199,13200 (1993).
220. See 60 Fed. Reg. 47,061, 47,062 (1995).
221. See 63 Fed. Reg. 54,575, 54,577 (1998). Three other unpublished General Licenses
for the Kosovo program have since been created, but have yet to appear in the
regulations. See "General License No. 2" regarding trade transactions with Montenegro,
"General License No. 3" regarding exports and reexports, and "General License No. 4"
addressing trade and investment, which briefly appeared on the OFAC website. Office of
Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, What's New, May 21, 1999, and August
18, 1999, http:llwww.ustreas.gov/ofactlledit.txt (copies on file with Hastings Law
Journal).
222. See 31 C.F.R. § 595.801 (1997). See also supra note 209.
223. See 31 C.F.R. § 536.801 (1997). See also supra note 211. The language used in this
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institutionalized in OFAC's Reporting and Procedures Regulations
(RPR),22 4 where it states,
General Licenses may also be issued authorizing under appropriate
terms and conditions certain types of transactions which are subject
to prohibitions contained in economic sanctions programs the
implementation and administration of which have been delegated to
the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control but which are
not yet codified....2 2
As most of the details of precisely who is "controlled" and what
transactions are affected are contained in these provisions, rather
than in the underlying legislation or Executive Orders which impose
sanctions on a particular target, the failure to promptly and publicly
publish the implementing provisions leads to great uncertaintyz26 and
uneven application of the sanctions themselves.227 This is exacerbated
by the fact that OFAC rules and regulations are commonly
characterized as involving a "foreign affairs function," which exempts
them from the prior notice and comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act3m
It is also interesting to note that while the submission of a formal
request for a "license" is typically required to obtain OFAC's
approval for a given transaction which would otherwise be
provision and in the analogous provision under the TSR, first appeared in the HTR. See
31 C.F.R. § 580.801 (1993).
224. See 62 Fed. Reg. 45,101 (1997) and 31 C.F.R. § 501 et seq. (1999).
225. 31 C.F.R. § 501.801 (1999) (emphasis added).
226. See, for example, The OFAC Merry-Go-Round: Looking for Answers on Bosnia
Restrictions, EXPORT CONTROL NEWS, May 28, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2519306,
describing one individual's futile attempt to determine the precise scope of the sanctions
on the Bosnian Serbs announced on April 27,1993 by Executive Order No. 12,846,58 Fed.
Reg. 25,771 (1993), but prior to OFAC's amending the FYRSR on July 1,1993, see 58 Fed.
Reg. 35,828 (1993).
227. See Veterans Peace Convoy, Inc. v. Schultz, 722 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Tex. 1988);
infra notes 450-458 and accompanying text, discussing the case-by-case application of
unpublished "interpretations" to license applications.
Consistent enforcement of OFAC's requirements may also be problematic, as there is
a sizable gap between the letter of the law and the exercise of OFAC's prosecutorial
discretion. For example, retail cash transactions with blacklisted parties, what is
sometimes referred to as the "McDonald's problem," are prohibited by the regulations but
not prosecuted. Similarly, non-banking transactions historically were less likely to be
pursued, although this may be changing. See FITZGERALD, supra note 27, at 95-96.
Additionally, there are occasionally allegations that OFAC's exercise of discretion is
influenced by personal or political considerations. In the early 1990s an investigation was
conducted into the propriety of several OFAC enforcement actions, which found that
while there may have been an appearance of impropriety, however, there was no
actionable wrongdoing. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Sanctions Czar: "Big Gun" or "Loose
Cannon?", WASHINGTON POST, August 4,1996, at H-i; see also infra note 352.
228. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1), (b)-(e) (1994); 31 C.F.R. § 501.804 (1999). See also infra
notes 229,373-383 and accompanying text.
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proscribed, or an interpretation confirming that a transaction is
outside the scope of the controls, there are no time limits whatsoever
established in the regulations within which OFAC must act and
render a decision.229 In some cases it has taken OFAC as much as two
years to respond, 30 and in others no formal response was ever
forthcoming.231 Similarly, there are no time limits for OFAC to act on
an application to unblock assets due to mistaken identity,232 nor on an
application to remove an entry from the consolidated master
blacklist 33 The result, for those striving to comply in good faith with
the terms of the controls is a significant burden in determining
precisely what is or what is not permissible under the various
sanctions.
(b) Problems Removing Outdated Controls
Moreover, OFAC has sometimes been just as lax in removing
outdated controls from its regulations as in initially publishing the
229. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801 (1999). The Reporting and Procedures Regulations
(RPR), were issued in 1997. Like the creation of a master blacklist in the appendices to the
regulations the year before, the RPR represent an attempt to consolidate and standardize
some aspects of the various OFAC sanctions programs. The RPR primarily address
licensing procedures and common recordkeeping and reporting requirements which
previously were found in the individual sanctions programs themselves. The RPR apply
even where OFAC has yet to issue specific regulations detailing the controls for a
particular sanctions program. Even these common procedures were deemed to involved a
"foreign affairs function," and therefore exempt from the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act. They accordingly were issued without prior notice or
comment. See 62 Fed. Reg. 45,098, 45,099 (1997); supra note 228 and accompanying text.
See also infra note 346 and accompanying text.
230. For example, in communications with the author, IBM reported it received an
OFAC license approval on a minor matter which had been submitted two years
previously, and long since abandoned. Email from IBM Export Regulation Office to
author (May 25, 1999) (copy on file with Hastings Law Journal). Additionally, the Center
for Constitutional Rights sent a letter on February 5, 1999, to the Treasury Department,
State Department, and the National Security Council complaining inter alia of numerous
examples of OFAC's failure to act in a timely fashion on license applications for travel to
Cuba, and suggesting that a maximum time period be established for OFAC licensing
decisions. Letters from Center for Constitutional Rights to U.S. Dep't of Treasury, U.S.
Dep't of State, and Nat'l Security Council (Feb. 5, 1999) (copy on file with Hastings Law
Journal).
231. For example, in communications with the author, IBM reported that no formal
response was ever made to a letter sent on June 10, 1996 requesting guidance on how
internet service providers should address the possibility that online transactions might,
without their direct knowledge or participation, involve blacklisted parties. Additionally,
the Center for Constitutional Rights letter of February 5, 1999, also complains of
numerous examples where OFAC failed to respond to license applications it received. See
supra note 230.
232. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.806 (1999).
233. See id § 501.807.
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details of the sanctions. For example, there was more than a month's
delay in unblocking Cambodian assets following the lifting of
sanctions and the conclusion of a claims settlement agreement in
1994,234 and almost a two and a half month delay in unblocking
Vietnamese assets in 1995.P 5 Similarly, four months lapsed between
the Executive Order terminating the emergency which was the basis
of the sanctions against Nicaragua, and the retroactive lifting of
OFAC's controls 36  However, it is OFAC's handling of the
Panamanian, Kuwaiti, Haitian, and Yugoslav controls which perhaps
provides the most dramatic examples of the problems associated with
the termination or lifting of their sanctions programs.
OFAC prospectively lifted the Panamanian sanctions in 1990, a
little over a month after the President directed that they do so,237 but
left the two associated blacklists in place for another five years.23 8 The
ostensible reason for leaving the blacklists in place was to ensure that
monies owed to "Panamanian Governmental Entities," blocked prior
to the lifting of sanctions, remained blocked and could not be
transferred without OFAC's approval 3 9 However, despite the
ostensible lifting of the sanctions, two specific government-controlled
entities on the blacklist, Marinexam, S.A. and Transit, S.A. remained
fully subject to the old controls.24° To make matters more confusing,
while a license approval procedure for monies owed to those on the
list of blocked "Panamanian Governmental Entities" was created
and amended several times over the next five years,241 nothing was
done with regard to the separate blacklist of "Persons and
234. See 59 Fed. Reg. 60,558 (1994).
235. See 60 Fed. Reg. 12,885 (1995).
236. See 55 Fed. Reg. 28,613 (1990). The NTCR also remained in the Code of Federal
Regulations, for transactions which occurred prior to the lifting of sanctions, until they
were finally removed in 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
237. See 55 Fed. Reg. 3,560 (1990), which introduced two new provisions into the PTR;
31 C.F.R. §§ 565.410, 565.510 (1990), lifting sanctions with respect to all transactions
occurring after December 20, 1989.
238. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995); 31 C.F.R. § 565 apps. A (Panamanian
Governmental Entities); B (Persons and Organizations Acting on Behalf of the
Noriega/Solis Regime) (1996).
239. 31 C.F.R. § 565.511 (1990). One might certainly argue that it is not necessary to
maintain outdated laws, regulations, or blacklists "on the books" in order to prosecute
violations which occurred prior to their termination or repeal.
240. See id. § 565.410.
241. See 55 Fed. Reg. 3,560 (1990); 59 Fed. Reg. 24,643 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 46,720
(1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 55,209 (1994). Ironically, no licenses were ever submitted under this
procedure to OFAC. Panama settled all outstanding claims against it, and the government
controlled Air Panama, without using the blocked funds. Accordingly the funds were
completely unblocked in late 1994. See 59 Fed. Reg. 46,720 (1994). Nevertheless, OFAC
did not remove the PTrR and their associated blacklists for another nine months. See 60
Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
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Organizations Acting on Behalf of the Noriega/Solis Regime. '242
Both lists remained as part of the regulations243 until the PTR were
completely removed in 1995.244 Additionally, although both blacklists
continued to appear in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
throughout this period, neither appeared in the "comprehensive" List
of Blocked Persons and Specially Designated Nationals which OFAC
published for the first time in the Federal Register 1994.245
The Kuwaiti controls were handled in a somewhat similar
fashion at about the same time. At the request of the Kuwaiti
Government following its liberation as a result of the Gulf War, the
controls imposed to protect Kuwaiti assets from expropriation during
the Iraqi occupation were lifted.246 The blocking measures directed at
blacklisted Kuwaiti Governmental Entities were removed
accordingly, first with regard to all but seven named banks,247 and
later, in 1991, to include those banks.248 Nevertheless, this blacklist -
including all seven banks - remained as part of the CFR249 until the
Kuwaiti Sanctions Regulations were completely removed in 1995.250
However, as with the Panamanian blacklists, this Kuwaiti blacklist
was not included in the "comprehensive" List of Blocked Persons and
Specially Designated Nationals that OFAC published in the Federal
Register in 1994.251
The removal of the Haitian controls was handled differently,
even though it occurred during roughly the same time period. The
Haitian controls were suspended in late 1993 within days of the
execution of the Governor's Island Agreement on the return of
President Aristide's government, and the extensive roster of
individual names in the blacklist of "Blocked Entities of the Defacto
Regime in Haiti" was removed.252 When the prospects of settlement
broke down a month later, the regulatory controls were promptly
reimposed.25 3 Over the following five months, the list of blocked
242. See supra note 241.
243. See 31 C.F.R. § 565 apps. A, B (1995).
244. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
245. See 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460 (1994). This list was later replaced (after the removal of
the PTR) by the consolidated master list in the appendices to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V (1999).
See also supra note 193.
246. The related controls on Iraq, however, still remain. See supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
247. See 56 Fed. Reg. 12,450 (1991).
248. See 56 Fed. Reg. 26,034 (1991).
249. See 31 C.F.R. § 570 app. A (1994).
250. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
251. See 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460 (1994).
252. See 58 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,541 (1993).
253. See 58 Fed. Reg. 54,024 (1993).
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individuals was also substantially reconstituted.254 The President
subsequently terminated the sanctions in 1994 when the
democratically-elected government returned to Haiti, but it took
OFAC over two months to announce the retroactive lifting of its
controls,255 and a further seven months before the HTR and its
associated blacklist were removed from the regulations2 56 As with
the Panamanian and Kuwaiti programs, the Haitian blacklist was also
omitted from the "comprehensive" List of Blocked Persons and
Specially Designated Nationals published in the interim.257
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the sanctions on the FRY
(S & M) and Bosnia were suspended as a result of the Dayton Peace
Accords in 1996, although assets which were blocked at that time
remain so pending the resolution of outstanding claims 5 8 The
President reimposed economic sanctions on the Federal Republic in
June of 1998 as a result of the Serbian actions in Kosovo,259 but it
took OFAC four months to reestablish the controls with new
regulations.26
Unlike the Panamanian, Kuwaiti, and Haitian programs, the
blacklists associated with the Yugoslav sanctions were initially
contained in a "General Notice" and not as part of the regulations
themselves. 261 Later, the blacklisted Yugoslav parties were included in
the "comprehensive" blacklist OFAC published in the Federal
254. Forty-one individuals were again blacklisted almost immediately. See 58 Fed. Reg.
58,480 (1993). A further 564 names, mostly from the Haitian armed forces, were
subsequently added. See 59 Fed. Reg. 16,548 (1994).
255. See 59 Fed. Reg. 66,476 (1994).
256. See 31 C.F.R. §580, app. B (1995). The 1995 Federal Register notice which finally
removed the Panamanian, Kuwaiti, and Haitian regulations from the CFR similarly
removed a number of other outdated controls at the same time. These included the
Nicaraguan Trade Control Regulations which were terminated in 1990, the South African
Transaction Regulations which were terminated in 1991, the related ban on the
importation of gold coins embodied in the Soviet Gold Coin Regulations which were
terminated in 1992, and the residual World War II era asset blocking measures of the
Foreign Funds Control Regulations which effectively expired with the independence of
the Baltic States in 1992. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
257. See 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460 (1994).
258. See 61 Fed. Reg. 1,282, 1,283 (1996). The suspension of sanctions on the FRY
(Serbia & Montenegro) occurred within a month of the Presidential Determination that
the controls should be suspended. See Presidential Determination No. 96-7, 61 Fed. Reg.
2,887 (1996). With regard to Bosnia, however, OFAC did not suspend the controls until
three months after the determination was made that they had met the requirements of the
Dayton Accords. See 61 Fed. Reg. 24, 696 (1996).
259. See Exec. Order No. 13,088, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,109 (1998).
260. See 63 Fed. Reg. 54,575 (1998).
261. The Yugoslav blacklist was first published in the Federal Register in 1992 as
"General Notice No.l." See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,051 (1992).
November 1999]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Register in 1994.262 The blacklisting of Bosnian Serbs was introduced
with another "Notice" in 1995,263 but was also not included in the
regulations themselves. Accordingly, when the Yugoslav sanctions
were suspended in 1996, there was no need to modify or remove a
Yugoslav blacklist from the regulations. However, when OFAC
created the new consolidated master blacklist in a series of
appendices in the regulations in June, 1996, it nevertheless chose to
include the names of the parties blacklisted under the Yugoslav
program despite the suspension of the sanctions at that time.264 The
fact that this same Yugoslav blacklist is employed with the sanctions
imposed in 1998 as a result of the Serbian actions in Kosovo 265 makes
the four-month delay in re-establishing the sanctions on those
particular parties under the KSR all the more striking.266
(c) Problems Managing the Blacklists
Entirely apart from the problems associated with delays in
issuing or removing detailed controls and their associated blacklists,
the manner of their distribution also raises issues. OFAC historically
placed great reliance upon unpublished notices and general licenses
in administering its sanctions programs.267 Since OFAC is primarily
focused on controlling assets and financial dealings, for many years its
practice was to emphasize communications with the Federal Reserve
and major commercial banks regarding changes in its controls,268 and
otherwise simply respond to inquiries from those who might have a
compliance concern. For example, in establishing the Iraqi and
Kuwaiti sanctions programs following the invasion of Kuwait, the
Director of OFAC is reported to have first "alerted the Federal
Reserve Bank in New York, which conducts international
governmental transactions, and as many of the major banks as
possible about the prospect of freezing Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets. Then
he summoned his staff to draw up the technical executive orders
262. See 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460 (1994).
263. See 60 Fed. Reg. 19,448 (1995).
264. See 61 Fed. Reg. 32,936, 32,936-937 (1996). The blacklisted Yugoslav parties were
kept in a separate section of the list, noting that the Yugoslav sanctions were then
suspended.
265. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 586.201; 586.306; 586.307 (1999).
266. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 217-228, 259-260 and accompanying text.
268. Other banking channels OFAC uses to communicate with the financial community
include the Office of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, the U.S. Council on
International Banking (now known as the International Financial Services Association),
the International Banking Operations Association, and the New York Clearing House
Association. See NEWCOMB, supra note 200, at 299-300. See also infra notes 319-330 and
accompanying text.
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President Bush had to sign to launch the sanctions. '269 While the
President's Executive Orders were issued the next day, it was another
four months before the Kuwaiti regulations were actually issued in
the Federal Register270 and nearly another month more before the
Iraqi regulations followed.271 As Professor Michael Malloy has noted,
the difficulties created by this approach to administering a sanctions
program are not trivial.
The situation was fraught with risk for those potentially subject to
the prohibitions and who critically needed guidance to ensure
good-faith compliance with the more generally worded
prohibitions found in the executive orders themselves. It
approaches the dimensions of a minor scandal that Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) had, throughout the
crucial months when sanctions were first put into place, not
formally promulgated any regulations. For that entire period, the
U.S. sanctions continued to be administered on the basis of
informally issued ad hoc regulations.... [T]his situation placed an
unfair burden on U.S. nationals affected by the embargo, and it put
counsel in an almost untenable position as they struggled in good
faith to comply with the sanctions. 27
2
The "informally issued ad hoc regulations" to which Professor Malloy
refers, were the thirteen general licenses which remained unpublished
until they appeared incorporated into the announcement of the Iraqi
Sanctions Regulations in the Federal Register. 273
Until the early 1990s, OFAC literally distributed these
unpublished general licenses and notices by placing them on the
radiator in the vestibule to the Treasury Department Annex Building
in Washington D.C. It was incumbent upon those who wished to
comply with the sanctions to contact OFAC to learn if new rules or
announcements were available.274  This "radiator distribution
system," combined with OFAC's inconsistent approach toward
publishing blacklists in the regulations, greatly complicated the task
269. Kendrick, supra note 60, at H-1 (emphasis added).
270. See 55 Fed. Reg. 49,856 (1990).
271. See 56 Fed. Reg. 2,112 (1991).
272. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, supra note 40, at 247-248 (Supp. 1996).
273. Ild. at 234-236.
274. See Guidelines for Complying with Restrictions on Specially Designated Nationals,
EXPORT CONTROL NEWS, July 30,1993, available in 1993 WL 2519249, which states:
U.S. Exporters may procure the SDN lists by contacting OFAC.... However the
SDN lists are by no means static; OFAC periodically updates them by adding and
subtracting names and companies. Unfortunately, OFAC has been inconsistent
in placing the SDN lists and the periodical updates in the Federal Register as
official rules. As a result, U.S. companies must monitor closely OFAC's
activities to ensure that their SDN screening lists are current.
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of complying with the various sanctions programs' blacklisting
requirements.
Prior to the creation of the consolidated master blacklist in the
Appendices to 31 C.F.R., Chapter V, in 1996, the only blacklists
actually published in the regulations were those associated with the
Libyan,275  Panamanian,276  Iraqi,277  Kuwaiti,278  or Haitian2 79
sanctions.28 0  None of the blacklists associated with the older
sanctions ever appeared in their respective programs' regulations, nor
do the blacklists for all the newer programs consistently appear in the
regulations either. For example, neither the Narcotics Trafficking28 1
nor the Middle East Terrorist8 2 sanctions programs' blacklists
appear, and the extensive blacklists created for the Yugoslav embargo
programs were also absent from the regulations.28 3
The blacklists for these other programs either appeared in the
Federal Register at irregular intervals, or remained unpublished. For
example, although the Cuban embargo was instituted in 1963, the first
publication of the Cuban SDN list in the Federal Register did not
occur until 1986,m and fifteen changes to entries in that blacklist
occurred prior to the incorporation of the consolidated master
blacklist into the regulations in 1996.285 Additionally, there were two
Federal Register notices concerning Blocked Yugoslav entities,286 two
concerning North Korean SDNs, 7 two concerning Vietnamese
SDNs,28 8 and one concerning Cambodian SDNs28 9 prior to the
creation of the consolidated list. Since publication of the
consolidated blacklist as Appendices to the C.F.R. began in 1996,
there have been fifteen interim changes issued.29°
275. See 31 C.F.R. § 550 apps. A, B (1995).
276. See 31 C.F.R. § 565 apps. A, B (1990).
277. See 31 C.F.R. § 575 apps. A, B (1995).
278. See 31 C.F.R. § 570 app. A (1991).
279. See 31 C.F.R. § 580 app. A (1994).
280. The South African sanctions included a cross reference to the list of "South
African Parastatal Organizations" which was published by the State Department, but did
not include this "blacklist" in the regulations themselves. See 31 C.F.R. § 545.315 (1987).
281. See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 174, 190 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 258-266 and accompanying text.
284. See 51 Fed. Reg. 44,459 (1986).
285. See 53 Fed. Reg. 44,398 (1988); 54 Fed. Reg. 3,446, 9,431, 14;215, 38,810, 45,750,
49,258 (1989); 55 Fed. Reg. 2,644,12,172,24,556, 31,179, 38,326 (1990); 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460
(1994); 60 Fed. Reg. 19,447,33,029 (1995).
286. See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,051 (1992); 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460 (1994).
287. See 54 Fed. Reg. 32,064 (1989); 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460 (1994).
288. See 53 Fed. Reg. 44,397 (1988); 54 Fed. Reg. 32,064 (1989).
289. See 51 Fed. Reg. 44,459,44,462 (1986).
290. Since the onetime publication of the "comprehensive" blacklist in the Federal
Register in 1994, the entire "consolidated" master blacklist has been published in the
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
The Yugoslav program also illustrates how OFAC sometimes
"mixes and matches" distribution mechanisms, variously employing
unpublished notices, press releases, or the Federal Register, at
different times even within the same sanctions program, and with
varying levels of detail. Moreover, it also highlights the
interrelationship between these "blacklist management" issues and
the "regulatory management" problems related to publishing the
detailed implementing provisions for the different sanctions
programs.
The blacklist of Controlled or Blocked Yugoslav Entities,
General Notice No. 1, was published in the Federal Register in July of
1992.291 It listed several hundred entities by name, but without
addresses or any other identifying information. The names provided
ranged from the easily recognized, such as "Yugotours," to the all
encompassing "Yugoslav National Army," and the common but
indefinite name "Global. ''292 Eleven of the blacklisted parties,
however, were identified as being located in the U.S.293 All of these
were deemed to be owned or controlled by the Government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and therefore subject to the
sanctions imposed by the President's Executive Orders294-even
though OFAC would not issue detailed regulations elaborating upon
the precise scope of the sanctions for another eight months.295 The
release of this initial Yugoslav blacklist was followed by a series of
Treasury Department press releases, naming several hundred
additional individuals, front companies, shipping firms, and even
vessels, deemed to be within the scope of the Yugoslav sanctions
296
Federal Register on two occasions, timed so as to be included as the Appendices to
Chapter V in the annual revision of the volume containing 31 C.F.R. This occurred in
June of 1996 and again in June of 1997. See 61 Fed. Reg. 32,936, 32,939-33,027 (1996); 62
Fed. Reg. 34,934, 34,935-35,035 (1997). Apart from those two occasions, thirteen separate
notices have appeared in the Federal Register adding or subtracting individual names
from the master list in the Appendices to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V. See 61 Fed. Reg. 43,459;
54,334; 64,289 (1996); 62 Fed. Reg. 2,903; 19,499; 19,500; 19,672; 41,850; 48,177; 67,729
(1997); 63 Fed. Reg. 28,896; 29,608 (1998); 64 Fed. Reg. 34,984; 34,992; 35,575; 60,660
(1999).
291. See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,051 (1992).
292. See id. at 32,053-054.
293. This list also included I.P.T. Company Inc., and identified it being located in the
U.S., but as with all the entries no other address information was provided. See id at
32,052-053.
294. See id. at 32,052.
295. See 58 Fed. Reg. 13,199 (1993).
296. See Treasury Exposes Yugoslav Shipping Fronts, U.S. Department of the Treasury,
News Release, March 11, 1993, available in 1993 WL 71078; Treasury Unmasks Yugoslav
Network, U.S. Department of the Treasury, News Release, May 20,1993, available in 1993
WL 170565; Treasury Names Yugoslav Financial Fronts in Cyprus, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, News Release, May 10,1994, available in 1993 WL 183007.
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Despite the belated publication of the regulations in March, 1993,
OFAC did not republish the expanded Yugoslav blacklist in the
Federal Register until November of 1994.297 This convoluted process
was the subject of much criticism and concern from those who were
trying to comply with the terms of the sanctions and needed to
establish internal business compliance procedures to prevent
transactions with the listed entities. It prompted at least one
compliance administrator to declare that, "[p]ress releases have no
legal authority. '298
OFAC appeared implicitly to recognize that some of its
blacklisting and blocking actions during this period may have been
overly aggressive. When new regulations were issued to reflect the
tightening of the initial sanctions on Yugoslavia in April of 1993
pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 820299 and
Executive Order No. 12,846, 300 OFAC stated that:
Section 1(a) of Executive Order 12846 expressly blocks property
subject to U.S. jurisdiction of many entities, both U.S. and foreign,
heretofore blocked pursuant to the working presumption of the
Office of Foreign Assets Controls ("FAC") that all entities
organized or located in the FRY (S&M), as well as entities owned
or controlled by them, are controlled directly or indirectly by the
Government of the FRY (S&M). Regulations, [31 C.F.R] §
585.311. See also, General Notice No. 1 of July 6, 1992, 57 FR
32051 (July 20, 1992).301
This revision to the Yugoslav regulations occurred in July, two
months after the tightening in the controls announced by the
President's Executive Order, and retroactively expanded the blocking
297. See 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460 (1994). This was also the first time addresses for the
blocked or controlled entities appeared in the Federal Register, and also the first time the
list of sanctioned vessels was published. This list also represents OFAC's first attempt at
responding to criticism regarding the multiplicity of blacklists which were developing, by
publishing a "comprehensive" blacklist covering all of the blacklists associated with the
then currently effective programs in one document. This was the only such attempt at
publishing a comprehensive blacklist outside of the regulations themselves. In 1996,
OFAC began publishing an annual consolidated master blacklist in the appendices to 31
C.F.R., Chapter V. See supra notes 193, 261-66 and accompanying text.
298. OFAC Augments List of Blocked Yugoslav Entities, EXPORT CONTROL NEws,
May 28, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2519304. The same compliance administrator is
reported as continuing to state, "you'd think that if OFAC was serious about getting U.S.
companies to comply, it would have rushed the list to the Federal register." Id.
But see United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993) which upheld
a conviction based, in part, on enforcement of regulations issued after acts occurred which
violated Executive Orders imposing sanctions on Iraq and Kuwait.
299. S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3200th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/820
(1993).
300. 58 Fed. Reg. 25,771 (1993).
301. 58 Fed. Reg. 35,828 (1993) (emphasis added).
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of the assets of blacklisted parties.
30°
Similar problems occurred as the sanctions expanded beyond
Serbia and Montenegro to include Bosnia. Pursuant to Executive
Order No. 12,934, 30 3 sanctions were imposed in October 1994 on the
Serbian controlled portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the situation in
the former Yugoslavia deteriorated. A blacklist of blocked "Bosnian
Serb Civilian and Military Authorities" was then released in April,
1995, along with an update to the main Yugoslav blacklist.3 4
However, once again, regulations detailing the expanded sanctions
302. See iL As initially promulgated in March 1993,31 C.F.R. § 585.201 read:
Prohibited transactions involving blocked property; transactions with respect to
securities.
(a) Except as authorized by regulations, orders, directives, rulings, instructions,
licenses, or otherwise, and notwithstanding the existence of any rights or
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract
entered into or any license or permit granted before 11:59 p.m. Eastern Daylight
Time ("EDT"), May 30, 1992, no property or interest in property of the
Government of the FRY (S&M), or that are held in the name of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia or the former Government of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, that are in the United States, that hereafter come within
the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control
of U.S. persons, including their overseas branches, may be transferred, paid,
exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in.
(b) Unless otherwise authorized by this part or by a specific license expressly
referring to this section, the transfer (including the transfer on the books of any
issuer or agent thereof), the endorsement or guaranty of signatures on, or any
other dealing in any security (or evidence thereof) registered or inscribed in the
name of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the former
Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and held within the
possession or control of a U.S. person is prohibited, irrespective of the fact that
at any time either at or subsequent to the effective date the registered or
inscribed owner thereof may have, or appears to have, assigned, transferred, or
otherwise disposed of any such security.
58 Fed. Reg. 13,199,13,202 (1993).
Subparagraph (b) was then modified in July, 1993, to read:
(b) Except as otherwise authorized, and notwithstanding the existence of any
rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any
contract entered into or any license or permit granted before 12:01 a.m. EDT,
April 26, 1993, no property or interest in property of any commercial, industrial,
or public utility undertakings or entities organized or located in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including, without limitation,
the property and all interests in property of entities (wherever organized or
located) owned or controlled by such undertakings or entities, that are in the
United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or
hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons,
including their overseas branches, may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn
or otherwise dealt in.
58 Fed. Reg. 35,828, 35,828-829 (1993).
303. 59 Fed. Reg. 54,117 (1994).
304. See 60 Fed. Reg. 19,448,19,450 (1995).
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were not issued until two months later, and were made retroactive to
the date of the Executive Order issued some eight months earlier.305
Moreover, the Yugoslavian sanctions program was not the only
one in which the associated blacklists were released before the
controls themselves were detailed in the regulations. OFAC initially
released its blacklist of "Banks Controlled by the Government of
Iran" as an Annex to a General License issued in 1995,306 and the
Specially Designated Terrorist List (SDT) was created and updated
twice3 7 prior to the creation of the Terrorist Sanctions Regulations in
February, 1996.308 More recently, the blacklisting of the Sudanese
SDNs3°9 also predated the issuance of the Sudanese Sanctions
Regulations in 1998.310
Additionally, OFAC is sometimes not entirely clear on precisely
who is, in fact, blacklisted.311 As noted previously, the list of "Banks
Controlled by the Government of Iran" was initially appended to an
unpublished General License which restricted the ability of U.S.
financial institutions to service or maintain Iranian accounts, or to
follow directions pertaining to those accounts given by the
"Government of Iran, entities owned or controlled by the
Government of Iran, and persons located in Iran. ''312 The restrictions
are equally applicable to branches or affiliates of the named
institutions located both inside or outside of Iran. While it was not
expressly stated as such at the time,313 presumably those subject to the
regulations were to disregard instructions provided by any of the
named institutions, as that would come within the scope of being an
"export of banking services" by those subject to the U.S. regulations,
in OFAC's view.314 Nor could parties obliged to follow the U.S.
305. See 60 Fed. Reg. 34,144 (1995).
306. See 60 Fed. Reg. 40,881,40,883 (1995).
307. See 60 Fed. Reg. 5,084; 41,152; 58,435 (1995) which followed the imposition of
sanctions upon terrorists and terrorist organizations which threaten the Middle East peace
process under Exec. Order 12,947,60 Fed. Reg. 5,079 (1995).
308. See 61 Fed. Reg. 3,805 (1996).
309. See 63 Fed. Reg. 29,608 (1998). This blacklist was issued on June 1, 1998 pursuant
to Executive Order Number 13,067 of November 3,1997,62 Fed. Reg. 59,989 (1997).
310. The regulations followed the creation of the Sudanese SDN list by a month. See 63
Fed. Reg. 35,809 (1998).
311. See supra notes 130-137 and accompanying text.
312. This General License was issued on May 9, 1995, but did not appear in the Federal
register until August 10, 1995. See General License No. 3, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,881, 40,883
(1995).
313. See id. Additional guidance has since been issued in amendments to the ITR. See
31 C.F.R. § 560.204-560.208 (1999).
314. See the entries for "Financial Dealings with Iran" and "Other Banking Services" in
United States Department of the Treasury, OFAC, Iran: What You Need to Know About
U.S. Economic Sanctions, http:lwww.ustres.gov/ofactlliran.pdf (visited May 11, 1998)(copy on file with Hastings Law Journal); 31 C.F.R. § 560.517 (1998).
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controls engage in any "new investments" in the named entities.
3 15
The amended regulations issued four months after the creation of this
blacklist did not clarify the nature of the controls any further.
316
Despite the fact that compliance with these requirements necessitates
the same sort of screening applicable to any other blacklist, this list of
Iranian Controlled Financial Institutions was not incorporated into
the Appendices to 31 C.F.R., Chapter V. However, this list of Iranian
controlled banks did appear appended to the version of the
consolidated master blacklist which appears on OFAC's website,
prior to being incorporated into a special Appendix to the ITR in
1999, just over four years after it was initially issued.317 This again
raises the question of the legal efficacy of material which is being
distributed via "unofficial" means, in this case electronically rather
than via a press release.
Another group which does not appear in the consolidated master
blacklist in the Appendices to Chapter V of 31 C.F.R. is the list of
"Designated Foreign Parties" who are subject to the recently imposed
sanctions for weapons proliferation activities. These "DFPs" do,
however, appear in a special Appendix to their own control
regulations in an apparent return to pre-1996 practices.
318
The proliferation of OFAC sanctions programs during the late
1980s and early 1990s, and the accompanying concern over the legal
effectiveness of these unpublished actions, prompted increased use of
the Federal Register and other means of distribution for OFAC's
blacklists and other materials. While OFAC published its
315. See supra note 314. There was an attempt to clarify the confusion over the precise
controls to be applied with Exec. Order No. 13,059 issued in August of 1997. See 62 Fed.
Reg. 44,531 (1997). However, no regulatory changes were made in the basic prohibitions
of the ITR as a result of this Order until April of 1999. See 64 Fed. Reg. 20,168,20,170-171
(1999) and 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.204; 560.206-560.208 (1999).
316. The ITR were amended to reflect the new controls on September 11, 1995,
codifying the twelve general licenses which had been issued in the interim. See 60 Fed.
Reg. 47,061, 47,062 (1995). Further "clarifying" amendments to the regulations would not
be forthcoming until four years later. See supra note 315.
317. See 31 C.F.R. § 560 app. (1999); Office of Foreign Assets Control, SDN List:
Alphabetical Master List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (visited
Oct. 22, 1999) <http:llwww.ustreas.gov/ofactllsdn.pdf> [hereinafter Web-based SDN
List] (copy on file with Hastings Law Journal). The list of Iranian banks appears at the
end of this list on OFAC's web-page which otherwise is aligned with 31 C.F.R. Chapter V,
Appendix A (1999), with the notation that:
The following banks are owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
Transactions with them are severely restricted. For a summary of prohibitions,
please see OFAC's brochure entitled Iran: What You Need to Know About U.S.
Economic Sanctions. For details please see the Iranian Transactions Regulations
at 31 C.F.R. Part 560.
Web-based SDN List, supra at 64.
318. See 31 C.F.R. § 539 app. 1 (1999).
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comprehensive blacklist in the Federal Register in 1994, and the
newer consolidated master blacklist appeared in the Federal Register
on two occasions in addition to appearing in the appendices to the
regulations, OFAC continues to rely largely on other distribution
means for much of its information. 319 In particular, OFAC now
places great emphasis on electronic distribution of its material 320 on
its own website321 and its fax-on-demand service;322 the Treasury
Department's Electronic Library;3 3 the Commerce Department's
Economic Bulletin Board,32 4 National Trade Data Bank,325 and fax-
on-demand service;326 the Custom's Service's Electronic Bulletin
Board;327 the Government Printing Office's Federal Bulletin Board
and GPO Access website;328 and a variety of other electronic
319. See supra notes 193, 267-283 and accompanying text.
320. This is an outgrowth of an effort begun in 1995, when OFAC issued its notice
concerning "Electronically-Available Information Sources on Economic Sanctions
Programs." See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,909 (1995). See also NEWCOMB, supra note 200, at 294-
300.
321. OFAC Home Page, (visited Oct. 22, 1999) http:lwww.ustreas.govlofacl. OFAC
uses its website to distribute copies of brochures providing guidance on compliance
obligations, summarizing its various sanctions programs, the master (SDN) blackslist, and
links to related material such as licensing guidelines and Federal Register notices. See also
NEWCOMB, supra note 200, at 295.
322. The fax-on-demand service provides access to both OFACs general and program
specific brochures, the master (SDN) blacklist, licensing guidelines, and Federal register
notices. See NEWCOMB, supra note 200, at 295.
323. The Treasury Department Electronic Library (TEL) is one of several electronic
bulletin boards maintained on the Fedworld bulletin board network provided by the
National Technical Information Service (NTIS). Like the website and fax-on-demand
service, TEL also included the OFAC brochures and master (SDN) blacklist along with
some related information. See idt at 296.
324. The Economic Bulletin Board (EEB) is maintained by the Commerce Department
as a subscription service, used primarily by exporters. OFAC publications are found within
the Global Business Opportunities (GLOBUS) area of the EEB. See id at 296-297.
325. The National Trade Data Bank is another subscription service available from the
Commerce Department which distributes a variety of trade related information, including
that provided by OFAC, monthly via a CD-ROM format. See id. at 297.
326. The Commerce Department fax-on-demand service, STAT-USA/FAX, also
includes the various OFAC brochures and master (SDN) blacklist. See id
327. The Customs Service's bulletin board is intended primarily for use by customs
brokers, and also includes the various OFAC brochures and master (SDN) blacklist. See
it at 298.
328. GPO's Federal Bulletin Board (FBB) is available both as a traditional dial-up
electronic bulletin board service, and via its own website, <http://fedbbs.access.gpo.govl>
(visited Oct. 24, 1999). The OFAC brochures, master (SDN) blacklist, Federal Register
notices, CFR sections and press releases are all available within their own section of the
FBB. OFAC also posts press releases and other materials to the FBB which are not
available on any of the other electronic sites, including its own website. See also
NEWCOMB, supra note 200, at 298.
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distribution systems geared to the financial community,329 including
the Federal Reserve Bank's Fedwire system
30
However, OFAC's reliance on electronic means of distribution
can also cause confusion when the same information does not
promptly appear in the Federal Register. For example, postings on
OFAC's website noted changes being made to the consolidated
master blacklist on nine different occasions in 1999, prior to the
annual update to its consolidated blacklist in the Appendices to 31
C.F.R., Chapter V,331 which affected 457 individual entries332 During
the same time period only four notices appeared in the Federal
Register concerning these changes, which failed to address 112 of
these entries altogether.3 33 OFAC nevertheless asserts that this
329. These include the electronic bulletin boards maintained by the International
Financial Services Association (formerly known as the U.S. Council on International
Banking), the International Banking Operations Association, and the New York Clearing
House Association. See also supra note 265; NEWCOMB, supra note 200, at 299-300.
330. The Fedwire system sends messages to 5,000 online depository institutions around
the country, but the messages are of limited length. Accordingly, OFAC tends to use this
service for major announcements. See NEWCOMB, supra note 200, at 300.
331. Although the annual volume of the C.F.R. which contains the OFAC regulations is
nominally dated July 1, it often ships much later. For example, the 1999 volume was
actually shipped on November 5, 1999. (Time stamped copy on file with Hastings Law
Journal).
332. Ninety-seven entries were changed on May 26, 1999, affecting the Angolan,
Cuban, Iranian, Iraqi, Sudanese and Narco-Trafficking program's blacklists; on May 28,
1999, five entries were added to the Yugoslav (Kosovo) blacklist; 135 changes were made
to the Narco-Trafficking blacklist on June 8, 1999; forty-two changes were made to the
Yugoslav (Kosovo) blacklist on June 17, 1999; forty-five changes were made to the Libyan,
Terrorist, and Yugoslav (Kosovo) blacklists on June 25, 1999; on July 6, 1999, seven
entries for the newly sanctioned Taliban were added; on August 18, 1999, fourteen entries
were added to the Taliban and Yugoslav (Kosovo) program blacklists; 101 changes were
made to the Narco-Trafficking, Terrorist, and Foreign Terrorist Organization blacklists on
October 12, 1999; and eleven changes were made to the Taliban and Kosovo blacklists on
October 22, 1999. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Changes to List of Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons Since January 1, 1999 (visited December 22,
1999) http://www.ustreas.gov/ofacttllsdnew.pdf [hereinafter OFAC, Changes 1999]
(reflecting changes through October 22,1999) (copy on file with Hastings Law Journal).
Interestingly, it actually took over a week for the last two Taliban entries to appear in
the Changes... Since January 1, 1999 document. The blacklisting of these Afghani
airlines was actually announced on another part of the OFAC web site, the What's New
webpage on August 10, 1999, with the notation that OFAC would "update the TXT and
PDF versions of the SDN list, the PDF version of the SDN Changes List, and the
delimited and fixed field [computer] files as soon as feasible." See Office of Foreign
Assets Control, What's New, August 10, 1999 (visited August 11, 1999)
http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/tlledit.txt (copy on file with Hastings Law Journal).
333. See 64 Fed. Reg. 34,984; 34,991; 35,575; 60,660 (1999). When compared to the
changes noted on OFAC's website, see supra note 332, these Federal Register notices fail
to pick up the changes made on May 26, 1999 to the list of Iranian controlled banks; the
changes to the Libyan blacklist made on June 25, 1999; or the July 6, 1999 addition of the
Taliban to the blacklist and its modification on October 22,1999.
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electronic form of notification is fully effective, as it prefaced its
website postings with the following statement:
The latest changes may appear here [on the website] prior to their
publication in the Federal Register, and it is intended that users rely
on changes indicated in this document that post-date the most recent
Federal Register publication with respect to a particular sanctions
program in the appendices to chapter V of Title 31, Code of
Federal Regulations. Such changes reflect official actions of
OFAC, and will be reflected as soon as practicable in the Federal
Register.... Users are advised to check the Federal Register and
this electronic publication routinely for additional names or other
changes to the listings.334
OFAC continued in the same document to explain the
relationship of its licensing actions to the blacklist in terms which,
when combined with the previous text, almost sound as if it is
establishing a "virtual radiator distribution system" on its website.335
Entities and individuals on the list are occasionally licensed
by OFAC to transact business with U.S. persons in
anticipation of removal from the list or because of foreign
policy considerations in unique circumstances. Licensing in
anticipation of official Federal Register publication of a
notice of removal based on the unblocking of an entity's or
individual's property is reflected in this [website]
publication by removal from the list... 3 36
Thus, those who rely upon the official Federal Register to ensure
that they are complying with the controls on dealings with the various
blacklisted parties would be checking their transactions against a
version of the blacklist which is both out of date and incomplete,
according to OFAC. The implications of this approach are
particularly striking when the omissions and delays reflected in recent
Federal Register notices are examined. For example, the names of
Slobodan Milosevic and the four other individuals indicted for war
crimes by the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, all of whom were added to the Yugoslav blacklist
on OFAC's website on May 28, 1999, did not appear in the Federal
Register until November 8, 1999, and 110 entries in the web-based
blacklist had yet to appear in either the federal Register or the
Appendices to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V, by the end of 1999.337 Similarly,
334. See OFAC, Changes 1999, supra note 331 (emphasis added).
335. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing OFAC's practice through
the early 1990's of distributing many of its materials by placing them on the radiator in the
entry vestibule of the Treasury Annex building).
336. See OFAC, Changes 1999, supra note 331.
337. Compare, OFAC, Changes 1999, supra note 331 with 64 Fed. Reg. 34,984, 34,991,
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the interpretative guidance explaining that the city of Kabul falls
within the sanctioned "territory of Afghanistan controlled by the
Taliban" is found only on OFAC's website, and not in any documents
published in the Federal Register.338
Irrespective of how notice is provided of OFAC's various
actions, from time to time errors or mistakes will occur, particularly in
managing the thousands of entries on the blacklists. For example,
OFAC once apparently blacklisted the Spanish tobacco monopoly,
Tabacalera, as a "specially designated national of Cuba" apparently
not realizing it was actually an arm of the Spanish Government.
339 It
was officially removed a little over a month later34° Historically,
OFAC provided little guidance on how to remedy errors or otherwise
challenge their decisions, and the limited procedural guidance which
was available provided focused primarily on how to obtain a license
for otherwise-proscribed dealings. Until the 1990s, there were no
common procedures for the various sanctions programs at all. As
each sanctions target was addressed with a stand-alone set of
regulations, the administrative procedures for that particular program
were published within each program's own set of regulations. Over
time, anomalies crept into the regulations and in 1993 OFAC
simultaneously revised the separate regulations for the Asian, Cuban,
Haitian, Iraqi, Libyan, and Yugoslav sanctions programs to
harmonize the registration and reporting requirements for those
holding "blocked" property.341 However, it was another four years
35,575, 60,660 (1999), and the Appendices to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V (1999).
338. A State Department determination was made, in consultation with the Treasury
Department, to modify the description of the "territory of Afghanistan controlled by the
Taliban" on July 22, 1999. A notice to this effect appears in Office of Foreign Assets
Control, An Overview of U.S. Sanctions Against the Taliban (in Afghanistan), September
1, 1999 (visited September, 2 1999) http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/tlltali.pdf (copy on file
with Hastings Law Journal). In the September 20, 1999, What's New file on OFAC's
website an additional notice was published stating, "[w]e also wish to alert the public to
the fact that the term "Territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban" used in Section
4(d) of Executive Order 13129 signed by the President on July 4, 1999... currently
includes the city of Kabul, Afghanistan and that fact is reflected in OFAC's literature."
Office of Foreign Assets Control, What's New, September 20, 1999 (visited September 21,
1999) http:lwww.ustreas.gov/ofactlledit.txt (copy on file with Hastings Law Journal).
The September 20, 1999 What's New file also illustrates a different, more helpful, use
of the OFAC website by publishing the text of the White House Press Secretary's "FACT
SHEET: Easing of Sanctions Against North Korea," thereby providing information
regarding the yet to be implemented loosening of the sanctions which did not appear in
the Federal Register. See id.
339. See 54 Fed. Reg. 49,258, 49,259 (1989).
340. See 55 Fed. Reg. 2,644,2,645 (1990). Another firm, Reemstma, also affiliated with
a NATO ally, West Germany, was similarly blacklisted and then removed at the same
time. See id; see also supra note 339.
341. See 58 Fed. Reg. 47,643 (1993).
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before OFAC actually consolidated the various programs'
information collection,342 registration,343 licensing,34 and annual
reporting requirements 345 into the Reporting and Procedures
Regulations (RPR), and removed the duplicative provisions from the
separate regulations maintained for each sanctions target.346
There is even less regulatory guidance regarding how to
challenge OFACs decision making process. The Asian and Cuban
controls were modified in 1994 to permit the imposition of civil
penalties if certain formal or informal administrative processes were
followed,347 but these processes were not fully detailed until 1998.3
The revisions to these two regulatory programs were prompted by an
amendment to the TWEA providing for civil penalties which was
passed in 1992, six years prior to the issuance of the amendments to
the FACR and CACR.349 These procedures require the issuance of a
pre-penalty notice before OFAC imposes a civil penalty or
forfeiture,350 and provide an opportunity to challenge their imposition
in administrative hearings.351 However, the Treasury Department has
yet to appoint an Administrative Law Judge ("AI") to conduct any
such hearings. While the absence of an AI does not deter OFAC
from issuing pre-penalty notices, and from attempting to negotiate
settlements with alleged violators, attempts to invoke the discovery
and hearing rights provided in the regulations apparently results in a
suspension of further proceedings until such time as an AU is
appointed.3 52
342. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.602; 501.603(b); 501.604(d); 501.605 (1999).
343. See id. §§ 501.603(a); 501.604(a); 501.605.
344. See id § 501.801.
345. Seeid. §501.603(b)(2).
346. See 62 Fed. Reg. 45,098 (1997). The RPR appear at 31 C.F.R. § 501 etseq. (1999).
Interestingly, the provisions of the RPR are also applicable to those sanctions programs
for which there may not be any separate regulations, which implicitly recognizes OFAC's
difficulty in issuing detailed implementing regulations in a timely fashion. See id. §
501.808. See also supra notes 200-233 and accompanying text.
347. See 59 Fed. Reg. 16,775; 31,142 (1994).
348. See 63 Fed. Reg. 10,321 (1998). Many of these provisions were first suggested in a
proposed rule which had been issued a year earlier, one of the few examples of OFAC not
employing the "foreign affairs" exception to the usual notice and comment process for
rulemaking. See 62 Fed. Reg. 6,896 (1997).
349. Prior to passage of the amendments contained in the Cuban Democracy Act, 22
U.S.C. 6000, section 16 of the TWEA only provided for criminal penalties in the event a
violation occurred. See Cuban Democracy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-284, div. A, tit. XVII,
§1710(c), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat. 2580) 1878 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6009).
350. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.702 (FACR), 515.702 (CACR) (1999).
351. See id. §§ 500.703 (FACR), 515.703 (CACR).
352. For example, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) reports that they are
representing a number of individuals who have received a "Requirement to Furnish
Information" regarding possible violations of the CACR resulting from travel to Cuba.
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No equivalents to these procedures have been established in the
regulations for the IEEPA-based sanctions programs, despite the
longstanding civil penalty authority granted by that statute.353 Most
of the IEEPA-based sanctions programs do require OFAC to issue a
pre-penalty notice and to permit a written response, but none of them
provide for an administrative hearing before an ALJ at which to
challenge OFAC's intent to impose a penalty. 354
There are, however, two new means of challenging particular
OFAC decisions embodied in the consolidated procedures of the
RPR. The RPR created a new, explicit procedure for "unblocking"
funds or assets blocked due to mistaken identity,355 and another
procedure for seeking reconsideration of blacklisting.35 6 In either
case, the gist of the procedure is simply to write a letter to OFAC
providing the details.357
As initially promulgated, the regulations permitted those who
sought an administrative reconsideration of their blacklisting to
review the factual basis and materials OFAC used for their
Out of roughly 80 such cases in which the respondents declined to answer OFAC's
information demands on First and Fifth Amendment grounds, 20 were followed by the
issuance of Pre-Penalty Notices. In each case, CCR submitted discovery requests and
demanded a hearing in accordance with 31 C.F.R. §515.703, which it followed with a
motion to dismiss when OFAC failed to participate in discovery or set a hearing. OFAC
wrote to CCR that the regulatory procedures and processes were "suspended" stating:
An administrative law judge has yet to be selected to preside over the civil
penalty administrative hearing process, which was added to the regulations on
March 3, 1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 10321). Thus, there is currently no arbiter to
respond to [CCR's] or OFAC's discovery-related requests and motions. OFAC
expects that an administrative law judge will be in place shortly. Until that time,
OFAC has suspended all discovery deadlines that follow receipt of hearing and
pre-hearing discovery requests, including the 20-day time limit from the filing of
a written response for [CCR] to serve interrogatories. Additionally, the time
limit for interrogatory responses are suspended, as well as all other discovery
deadlines.
With this letter, OFAC does not admit, deny, or in any other way respond to the
claims set forth in [CCR's letter], including [CCR's] due process claims. As
requested, OFAC will forward a copy of [CCR's] Motion [to Dismiss] and
Proposed Order to the appropriate administrative law judge as soon as s/he is in
place.
Letter from William B. Hoffman, Chief Counsel, (Foreign Assets Control) U.S.
Department of the Treasury, to Gabor Rona, Staff Attorney, Center for Constitutional
Rights 1-2 (Dec. 31,1998) (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
353. See 50 U.S.C. § 1705.
354. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.702-535.704 (IACR); 536.702-536.704 (NTSR); 537.702-
537.704 (BSR); 538.702-538.704 (SSR); 539.702-539.704 (WMDTCR); 550.702-550.704
(LSR); 560.702-560.704 (ITR); 575.702-575.704 (ISR); 585.702-585.704 (FRYSR); 586.702-
586.704 (KSR); 590.702-590.704 (USR); 597.702-597.704 (FTOSR) (1999).
355. See id. § 501.806.
356. See id. § 501.807.
357. See id. §§ 501.806(b)-(d); 501.807.
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designation, 358 although those materials could be redacted or withheld
if legitimately privileged.359 However, less than a year later, in
February 1999, OFAC withdrew the ability to obtain this material
without explanation or fanfare.36° Parties may still request that their
blacklisting be administratively reconsidered, but they no longer have
a regulatory right to review the factual basis for their initial
designation.361 They are left to argue that OFAC erroneously
blacklisted them, without knowing the basis of the initial decision to
do so.3 62 In essence, this returns the blacklisted party to the status quo
ante, prior to the adoption of the RPR, when an OFAC blacklisting
meant lengthy private meetings with OFAC to try and reverse or
mitigate the adverse effects of being caught up in one of its sanctions
programs through negotiation.
The RPR are even less useful in those instances where OFAC
seeks to employ its sanctions tools in advance of actually naming a
particular party to any of its blacklists. This reportedly occurred with
Salah Idris, the owner of the El Shifa manufacturing plant bombed in
the strikes against Osama bin Laden's terrorist network as a reaction
to the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in
August of 1998.363 Four days after the missile strike on the El Shifa
plant, the Treasury Department ordered the Bank of America to
freeze $24 million on deposit in Idris's accounts in the United
Kingdom, "pending investigation" into whether he should be named
as a Specially Designated Terrorist.364 Those accounts remained
frozen until early May, 1999, when they were unblocked in response
to a suit challenging Treasury's actions in the absence of any
blacklisting.3 65 Technically, neither the procedures established in the
358. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.807(a)-(b) (1998).
359. See id. § 501.807(c).
360. See 64 Fed. Reg. 5,614 (1999) (revising 31 C.F.R. § 501.807(a)-(b) (1998)). This
revision also deleted a provision (31 C.F.R. § 501.807(g)(1998)) which specifically stated
that the OFAC decisions on these reconsideration requests constituted "final agency
action" for purposes of judicial review.
361. See id-
362. These regulatory changes also roughly coincided with the filing of a lawsuit
challenging OFAC's grounds for issuing an asset blocking order without actually
blacklisting the named party. See infra notes 363-368 and accompanying text.
363. Although the U.S. Government alleges that the El Shifa facility was producing
precursors for chemical weapons, Idris asserts that it was merely a pharmaceutical plant.
See Vernon Loeb, A Dirty Business, WASH. POST, July 25, 1999, at Fl; Daniel Pearl, After
the Bombings, WALL ST. J., October 28, 1998, at Al.
364. See Loeb, supra note 362. While Osama bin Laden is blacklisted as a Specially
Designated Terrorist, neither Salah Idris nor the El Shifa manufacturing plant were
named in the OFAC blacklists. See Exec. Order 13,099, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,167 (1998); 31
C.F.R. ch. V app. A (1999).
365. The U.S. Government asserts that the blocking action was dropped rather than
risk disclosing the intelligence sources and methods upon which the action was predicated
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RPR for obtaining relief due to mistaken identity nor for actual
blacklisting are applicable to parties, such as Salah Idris, whose assets
are specifically and intentionally frozen or blocked by OFAC pending
a decision on whether or not they should be blacklisted.366 However,
neither do the Executive Orders imposing the terrorist program
sanctions, nor the regulations themselves, clearly contemplate and
empower OFAC to take such actions "pending" a blacklisting
decision.3 67 Rather, while presumably rare, this sort of de facto
blacklisting appears to be wholly outside the regulatory scheme, and
perhaps the ultimate example of the issues created by an agency
arguably more focused on "making a statement" or "taking action" in
support of various foreign policy objectives368 than with the effective
and practical implementation of its own programs.
U. The Legal Morass
Blacklisted individuals or entities such as IPT face a daunting
situation. Their property and accounts are often blocked where they
stand, and dealings with U.S. parties, and frequently their overseas
affiliates as well, are essentially cut off with little or no warning by
virtue of decisions made by a relatively small and obscure office
within the Treasury Department. As Melita Jaric discovered, U.S.
businesses can be blacklisted, and these restrictions can even extend
to a firm's employees. The practical consequence of being touched by
one of the OFAC economic sanctions programs may be the economic
equivalent of capital punishment. By virtue of the restrictions, the
blacklisted business may cease to exist as a viable entity.
Moreover, OFAC's actions appear characterized by a lack of
sensitivity or concern for the impact of its blacklisting decisions upon
third parties who may be caught up in some larger program aimed at
a particular foreign policy target or objective. Similarly, the interests
of those who are endeavoring to comply in good faith with the
complex requirements of the multitude of OFAC sanctions programs
also become subordinated to the larger political objective.
While in all regulatory control schemes "the devil is in the
detail," OFAC often appears surprisingly uninterested in those
details. It frequently evidences little interest in promptly defining the
in litigation. See Loeb, supra note 363; Milt Bearden, U.S. Should Admit Its Mistake in
Sudan Bombing, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1999, at A20; David S. Cloud, U.S. Unfreezes
Accounts in Suit on Sudan Bombing, WALL ST. J., May 4,1999, at A8.
366. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.806 (1999).
367. See Exec. Order 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5,077, 5,079 at §1 (1995); Exec. Order 13,099,
63 Fed. Reg. 45,167 (1998); 31 C.F.R. §§ 595.201; 595.301; 595.311 (1999); supra notes 173-
176,181-187 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
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precise scope of a given sanctions program, for lifting outdated
controls, or even in providing proper notice of its actions. It also
lacks detailed procedures for redressing mistakes or considering
challenges to its actions, and has even avoided appointing an ALJ to
comply with those procedures which Congress mandated it must
establish.
The historical accident of the relative obscurity in which OFAC
labored for so many years combines with the increased political utility
of economic sanctions in the post Cold War era to create a trade
control agency which exercises tremendous discretion with
unprecedented freedom from judicial or congressional oversight.
Indeed, the general approach utilized in administering its programs
starts from the assumption that all business should stop until OFAC
can be consulted and declares that it can proceed on a case by case
basis, but this begs the question of just what business transactions are
in fact affected and need to be stopped. This presents a variety of
serious issues which are not easily resolved without taking a broad
view of the problems.
A. Obstacles to Individual Challenges to OFAC Controls
(1) Practical Obstacles to Individual Challenges
Challenging OFAC's actions in any given case is difficult because
of both practical and legal obstacles. On a practical level, OFAC's
historically lackadaisical administrative practices, 369 combined with its
broad authority under TWEA and IEEPA370 and the deference
courts show to foreign policy measures,371 can intimidate those who
are subject to OFAC's controls. In order to challenge a particular
decision, the stakes would have to be sufficiently large to offset the
fear of upsetting future dealings with an agency vested with a
tremendous amount of authority and subject to relatively little
oversight. Accordingly, it often takes something like being placed on
the blacklist itself, which threatens the ongoing viability of a business,
before a party is inclined to initiate action against OFAC. Those who
are not themselves blacklisted but only subject to restrictions on their
dealings with other blacklisted parties may be unwilling to institute a
formal challenge to OFAC's authority or actions, even if the
restrictions affect a major customer, as their other business dealings
will likely continue. Moreover, most of the parties who do find
themselves blacklisted will be foreign individuals and entities, and
369. See supra notes 197-368 and accompanying text.
370. See infra notes 388-389 and accompanying text.
371. See infra notes 384-390 and accompanying text.
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therefore arguably less inclined to bring a challenge in the U.S. even
if they have the legal ability to do so. 372 Thus, it is primarily when
U.S. parties, such as IPT, are blacklisted that the harm is serious
enough that a challenge will be brought. This is most likely to occur
when a new sanctions program is created, or an existing sanctions
program is significantly expanded. There are admittedly, however,
relatively few such cases when compared to the thousands of foreign
individuals and entities who are themselves named in OFAC's
blacklists.
Additionally, OFAC's penchant for using unpublished general
licenses and notices to detail or amend its controls 373 contrary to the
rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),374 and its reliance upon numerous informal means of
distribution for making its materials available375 in contravention of
both the Federal Register Act3 76 and the APA,377 are the type of legal
deficiencies which are easily remedied when challenged. While part
of the legislative purpose behind passage of the APA 378 was to "avoid
372. The foreign parties' ability to bring suit is arguably more likely to be adversely
impacted by issues relating to standing, the "finality" of the agency's action, whether the
agency has "primary jurisdiction," exhaustion, and ripeness, than is the case with a
domestic party. See infra notes 427-431 and accompanying text.
Additionally, as stated in People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. United States Dep't of
State (upholding the designation of various groups as "foreign terrorist organizations"),
"[a] foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional
rights, under the due process clause or otherwise." 182 F.3d 17,22 (D.C. Cir. 1999). While
carefully noting that the narrow facts of that case involved neither the seizure of assets
within U.S. control nor the rights of U.S. parties who might wish to donate to the
designated organizations, the court continued to observe, "'[a]liens receive constitutional
protections [only] when they have come within the territory of the United States and
developed substantial connections with this country."' Id (quoting United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,271 (1990)) (alteration in original).
373. See supra notes 217-228 and accompanying text.
374. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). However, as noted previously, the applicability of the
advance notice and comment requirements may be arguable to the extent that OFAC may
legitimately assert the "foreign affairs" exception to this portion of the APA. See supra
note 228 and accompanying text. While this exception may remove agency rulemaking
from the APA requirements in appropriate cases, see, e.g., International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1994), it is not a talisman which exempts
all agency rulemaking. See, e.g., Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 746-47 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1176 (1996).
375. See supra notes 267-298, 319-330 and accompanying text.
376. The Federal Register Act requires that documents having "general applicability
and legal effect," including "every document or order which prescribes a penalty," are to
be published in the Register. See 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (1994). This requirement may only
be suspended in the event of an actual or threatened attack on the continental Unites
States. See id. § 1505(c).
377. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1994). This portion of the APA became the Freedom of
Information Act. Compare S. REP. No. 79-752, at 33 (1945) with 5 U.S.C. § 552.
378. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,701-706 (1994).
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the inherently arbitrary nature of unpublished ad hoc
determinations," 379 several cases brought before the courts have been
rendered moot, at least in part, by proper publication of the
appropriate provisions during the course of the litigation 80
Moreover, OFAC's failure to properly publish its rules and blacklists
would not provide a defense for a failure to comply by those who
have actual notice of their contents.381 This creates the anomalous
situation where those who take steps to try and comply with OFAC's
controls by striving to stay informed are placed at a disadvantage
relative to those who remain ignorant, whether by choice or
happenstance.382 Lastly, those who are trying to comply in good faith
with OFAC's requirements are also perhaps reluctant to complain
too much about the formalities of the APA and the Federal Register
Act, fearing that the result might be that the various "unofficial"
means of distribution OFAC has employed for its materials in recent
years will cease to be used, but without any compensating
improvement in the use of the Federal Register.3 83
379. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974). The creation of a "Federal Register,"
and the accompanying "publication" requirements, reflects a compromise between a
desire to have the public know what the law requires and providing for the effective
operation of the various government agencies. Accordingly, publication in the Register is
actually used as a basis for asserting that the public has "constructive notice" of the law.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
380. See, for example, Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1440
(9th Cir. 1996), in which one of several grounds for rejecting a vagueness challenge to
OFAC rules banning travel to Cuba were amendments to the regulations which were
issued after the complaint arose. See also Bergerco Canada v. OFAC, 129 F.3d 189, 195
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (issuance of an (unpublished) General License and its subsequent
incorporation into the ISR was sufficient to support denial of a pending license
application); Milena Ship Management Co. v. Newcomb, 995 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994), infra notes 423-426 and accompanying text. But see Zittman
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 446, 463-64 (1951), infra notes 405-407 and accompanying text
(declining to annul valid state attachments on the basis of a "General Ruling" issued
several months after the attachments, and an Order from the Alien Property Custodian
issued more than four years after the levy of the attachments); Saba v. U.S. Department of
the Treasury, C.A.No. 92-1812 (WBB), (D.D.C. November 18, 1994), infra notes 459-478
and accompanying text (holding that a subsequent change in policy could not retroactively
be applied to a license application).
381. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) which states: "Except to the extent that a person has actual
and timely notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to
resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal
Register and not so published." (emphasis added). See also United States v. Aarons, 310
F.2d 341, 348 (1962). The actual notice exception is, however, strictly construed. See
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d 451, 456 (4th Cir. 1977).
382. Of course, "ignorance" is often unavailing as a defense, even when a specific intent
is required for criminal liability, once the government decides that a prosecution is
appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Tooker, 957 F.2d 1209,1214,1218 (5th Cir. 1992).
383. No one who deals with OFAC would want to see a return to the days of the
"radiator distribution system." See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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(2) Legal Obstacles to Individual Challenges
Broad legal challenges to the Executive branch's authority to
impose or implement its economic sanctions programs typically fail
for a variety of reasons. Sanctions necessarily involve the application
of foreign policy and national security concerns intertwined with
political issues. Accordingly, challenges to the political judgments
underlying the various sanctions programs may well raise non-
justiciable "political questions" which are entirely outside of the
courts' competence, 384 such as those relating to the recognition
accorded to foreign governments or state succession.385 "The federal
courts," it is said, "cannot decide cases on the basis of political
theories that incorporate no statutory, constitutional or common-law
basis."38 6
Challenges that do raise justiciable questions may similarly fail
because of the great deference the courts afford to the Executive and
Legislative branches in the conduct of foreign policy. "Matters
relating to the conduct of foreign relations," the Supreme Court has
stated, "are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference. '3a87 Moreover, given the very broad grants provided by
Congress to the Executive branch in both TWEA 388 and IEEPA,389
384. Although it has long antecedents, the modem formulation of the "political
question doctrine" is found in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and rooted in the notion
that political matters were entrusted to "coordinate branches of government" under
separation of powers principles. See id. at 217. See also United States v. Munoz-Flores,
495 U.S. 385 (1990).
385. See, for example, To v. Bank of New York, Nos. 95-7755, 95-7877, 95-7879, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 6198 (2d Cir. April 1, 1996); To v. Rubin, No. 95-6068, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 39826 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 1995); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1994)
in which the court declined to rule on matters of state succession in a series of actions by
parties claiming ownership of blocked Vietnamese assets. See also United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
386. Can, 14 F.3d at 162.
387. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580,589 (1952)).
388. The pertinent provision in TWEA reads:
(b)(1) During the time of war, the President may, through any agency that he
may designate, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by
means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise-
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign exchange,
transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking
institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking
of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or
prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising
any right, power, or privilege with respect to, transactions involving, any
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property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest,
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States; and any property or interest of any foreign country or national
thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the President, in
such agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the President,
and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe such interest
or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt
with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States....
(4) The authority granted to the President by this section does not include the
authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly, the importation from any
country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or otherwise,
regardless of format or medium of transmission, of any information or
informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters,
phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks,
CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds....
50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1994). TWEA was initially passed as a wartime measure, see Act of
Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411, 414 (1917), which was then expanded to also apply
"during any other period of national emergency declared by the President. See Act of
Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, tit. I, § 2, 48 Stat. 1 (1933). Responding to a number of "stale"
declarations of emergencies, Congress (prospectively) limited TWEA to wartime use in
1977 with the passage of IEEPA, but "grandfathered" the then current sanctions programs
issued under its authority. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 note (Extension and Termination of
National Emergency Powers Under the Trading with the Enemy Act).
389. The pertinent provision in IEEPA reads:
(a)(1) At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title
[Presidential declaration of national emergency], the President may, under such
regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses or otherwise-
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit-
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any
banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments
involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or
prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising
any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest;
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.
(b) The authority granted to the President by this section does not include the
authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly-
(1) any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication,
which does not involve a transfer of anything of value;
(2) donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of
articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve
human suffering....
(3) the importation from any country, or the exportation to any country,
whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or medium of
transmission, of any information or informational materials, including but
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the President's authority to impose and implement sanctions is
"supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude
of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest
heavily upon any who might attack it.' '39° Virtually all of the cases
directly challenging the President's authority to impose sanctions391 or
to blacklist various parties392 have failed due to this combination of
deference and the concomitant heavy "burden of persuasion."
A variety of related challenges to specific OFAC regulations or
actions as being beyond the agency's statutory powers similarly failed.
These include, for example, cases addressing import restrictions on
publications and other materials from embargoed destinations as an
infringement of First Amendment rights;393 restrictions on charitable
not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records,
photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs,
artworks, and news wire feeds. ...
(4) any transactions ordinarily incident to travel to or from any country,
including importation of accompanied baggage for personal use,
maintenance within any country including payment of living expenses and
acquisition of goods or services for personal use, and arrangement or
facilitation of such travel including nonscheduled air, sea, or land voyages.
50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1994). Thus, the grant of authority provided by IEEPA is substantially
similar to that contained in TWEA, with the exception of TWEA's provisions for the
"vesting" of property, and certain communications, or humanitarian donations. See supra
note 388.
390. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952). In Justice
Jackson's classic formulation of the bases for executive authority, presidential power is at
its greatest when acting pursuant to an express or implied authorization from Congress
because he is then relying upon both his own authority and that of the Congress. In areas
of concurrent authority, but without actual congressional authorization, presidential
power is in an uncertain "zone of twilight." Finally, presidential authority is at its weakest
when the President acts in contravention of the "will" of Congress, and can only be
sustained if the Congress is disabled from acting on the subject at issue. See id. at 637-638.
The question of the President's "inherent" authority to impose sanctions under his foreign
affairs powers, Justice Jackson's last category, is rarely raised because each of the various
OFAC sanctions programs is also predicated on some legislative authorization such as
TWEA or IEEPA. See supra notes 388-389; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981).
391. See, e.g., Regan, 468 U.S. 222 (upholding authority to restrict travel to Cuba under
"grandfathering" provisions of TWEA); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (upholding
authority to suspend and settle international claims under both statutory grant and
Congressional acquiescence); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 U.S. 304
(1936) (upholding "plenary and exclusive" power of the President).
392. See, e.g., People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. United States Dep't of State, 182 F.3d
17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding the designation of various groups as "foreign terrorist
organizations"); Paradissiotis v. Rubin, 171 F.3d 983 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding authority
to define who is within the scope of sanctions); Nielsen v. Secretary of the Treasury, 424
F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (upholding blocking U.S. assets of Cuban corporation).
393. See, e.g, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(upholding regulatory licensing requirements on broadcasting sporting events from Cuba);
Veterans and Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 459 F.2d
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contributions to sanctioned entities as implicating the free exercise of
religion;394 the impact of sanctions as affecting access to the courts 395
and the execution of judicial processes;396 travel restrictions as
infringements of both the First and Fifth amendment rights;397 and the
act of blocking or freezing assets as a compensable "takings" of
property under the Fifth Amendment.398
676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 933 (1972) (upholding restrictions on import of
Chinese informational materials from North Vietnam); American Documentary Films,
Inc. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 344 F. Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (upholding denial of
import license for Cuban films following to refusal to answer questions regarding their
origin and supply); Teague v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 977, reh'g denied, 395 U.S. 930 (1969) (upholding ban on importing
informational materials from China, North Korea, & Vietnam). Each of these cases
upheld the "incidental" First Amendment restrictions which resulted from the Executive's
exercise of its foreign affairs powers. Much of the concern over possible limitations on the
freedom of speech in the various sanctions programs was alleviated by the 1988 "Berman
Amendments" which withdrew Presidential authority to regulate transfers of, inter alia,
books, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilm,
microfiche, tapes and other informational materials from TWEA, see 50 U.S.C. app. §
5(b)(4), and from IEEPA, see 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3).
394. See, e.g., Welch v. Kennedy, 319 F. Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1970) (upholding restrictions
on contributions to Canadian Friends Service Committee for relief work in Vietnam).
395. See, e.g., Comet Enters. v. Air-A-Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855 (4th Cir. 1997);
National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1990); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1984); American Airways Charters,
Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir 1984). Each of these cases held that the applicable
OFAC licensing provisions were not "jurisdictional," and the failure to obtain a license
had no impact on the federal courts' ability to consider the matters submitted to them for
resolution. See infra notes 440-449 and accompanying text.
396. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (upholding suspension of pending claims
pursuant to international settlement); Orvis v. Brownell, 345 U.S. 183 (1953) (holding that
attachment liens do not transfer property interest in funds held by Alien Property
Custodian); Cities Serv. Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952) (TWEA permits vesting of
debenture or bearer bonds in Alien Property Custodian even when the instruments are
outside of the U.S.); Zittman v. McGrath (Zittman II), 341 U.S. 471 (1951) (upholding
mandatory substitution of the Alien Property Custodian for bank holding property subject
to state liens); but see Zittman v. McGrath (Zittman I), 341 U.S. 446 (1951) (denying the
authority of Alien Property Custodian to retroactively void liens created under state law).
397. See, e.g., Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1996)(upholding Cuban travel restrictions under both First and Fifth Amendments); United
States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting vagueness challenge to
restrictions on travel to Iraq); Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding
restrictions on travel to Cuba to acquire informational materials covered by Berman
Amendment to TWEA); Regan, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (upholding restrictions on travel to
Cuba); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (holding that the liberty interest in international
travel not accorded the same stature as the fundamental interest in interstate travel);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding invalidation of passports for Cuban travel).
398. See, e.g., 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. United States 48 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See also, e.g., Tran Qui Than v.
Regan, 658 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982); Cheng Yih-Chung
v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 442 F.2d. 460 (2d Cir. 1971); Nielsen v. Secretary
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IPT, itself, lost its challenge to its own sudden blacklisting-a
challenge asserting that their blacklisting amounted to a "taking"
accomplished without proper due process-because of the breadth of
the underlying statutory grants and the deference given to the
Executive branch in dealing with sanctions.399 The court followed the
traditional rationale, that blocking or freezing orders only effect a
temporary deprivation of property, notwithstanding the consequences
they may cause in particular cases. When lifted, the property is
released into the custody of the owner,4°° and accordingly pre-
deprivation hearings are not required.401  Additionally, the
constitutionality of blocking or freezing orders was established in
Propper v. Clark:4°
The power [to issue Executive Orders] in peace and war
must be given generous scope to accomplish its purpose.
Through the Trading with the Enemy Act, in its various
forms, the nation sought to deprive enemies, actual or
potential of the opportunity to secure advantages to
themselves or to perpetuate wrongs against the Unites
States or its citizens through the use of assets that happened
to be in this country. To do so necessitated some
inconvenience to our citizens and others who, as here, are
of the Treasury, 424 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, 361 F.2d. 106 (2d Cir. 1966), cerL denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966). These cases build
upon the rationale of Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949), quoted infra note 403 and
accompanying text. See also United States v. Chemical Found. Inc., 272 U.S. 1 (1926)
(holding that there is no constitutional prohibition against confiscation without
compensation of property of the nationals of a hostile government). But cf E-Systems,
Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 271 (1983) (blocking property interest of U.S. national may
constitute a "taking"); Tagle v. Regan, 643 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing OFAC
refusal to partially unblock SDN decedent's assets for benefit of U.S. heirs); Real v.
Simon, 510 F.2d 557, reh'g denied, 514 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1975) (reversing OFAC refusal
to unblock SDN decedent's assets for benefit of U.S. heirs). See also infra notes 410-417
and accompanying text.
399. See IPT Co. v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, No. 92 Civ. 5542, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15807 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,1994).
400. This highlights a distinction between "vesting" title to property in the Government
or its taking actual possession, and simply "freezing" the assets in the hands of whomever
might have control over them at the time the blocking order takes effect. TWEA gives the
Government the power to seize possession or vest title in the Alien Property Custodian
during wartime, see 50 U.S.C. app. § 7 (1994), but IEEPA grants no equivalent "vesting"
authority during the exercise of "emergency" powers. But see, E-Systems, 2 Cl. Ct. 271 (a
"blocking" of assets which deprives U.S. national or corporation of all economic value
may constitute a "taking").
401. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-334 (1976). The sole exception to the
temporary deprivation rule involves the deprivation of welfare benefits. See Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (pre-deprivation hearing required because of importance
of benefits to survival of recipients awaiting a hearing). See also IPT, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15807, at *16-17.
402. 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
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not involved in any actions adverse to the nation's interest.
That fact, however, cannot lead us to narrow the broad
coverage of the Executive Order.4° 3
Accordingly, and noting the longstanding use of such Orders, the
court ruled against IPT and declared, "[t]he temporary freezing of
foreign-owned assets in this country falls within the constitutional
limits of the Fifth Amendment."404
Only rarely have the courts held that the Government exceeded
its legitimate sanctions authority. In a World War II era case,
Zittinan v. McGrath,4 5 the Supreme Court declined to permit the
Alien Property Custodian, the wartime predecessor to OFAC, to use
its authority under TWEA to nullify preexisting state attachments of
frozen German funds with a subsequently issued "General Ruling"
and Order, 406 but then permitted such actions in other cases.407
Thirty years later when similar issues arose regarding the President's
authority under IEEPA to nullify preexisting attachments andjudgments, suspend pending litigation, and order the transfer of
403. Id. at 481-482, quoted in IPT, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15807, at *13-14.
404. IPT, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15807, at *14.
405. 341 U.S. 446 (1951) (Zittman I).
406. While the issue was not expressly analyzed as a problem revolving around the
retroactive application of the Alien Property Custodian's General Ruling and Order, that
seem to be inherently a part of the decision. The Germans' accounts held in the U.S. bank
were frozen on June 14, 1941 pursuant to Exec. Order No. 8,785, 6 Fed. Reg. 2,897 (1941).
The President's Executive Order essentially prohibited all "transactions" or "transfers"
involving blocked funds, but it did not specifically address provisional measures such as
attachments. Based upon preexisting claims against the German debtors, Zittman and the
other petitioners obtained pre-judgment attachment warrants against the German's
accounts held at Chase National Bank in New York in late 1941, and eventually obtained a
default judgment in January of 1942 in state court. It was not until the issuance of the
Custodian's General Ruling No.12 on April 21, 1942, that the term "transfer," as used in
the Executive Order, was defined to include "the creation or transfer of any lien; the
issuance, docketing, filing, or the levy of or under any judgment, decree, attachment,
execution, or other judicial or administrative process or order, or the service of any
garnishment." 7 Fed. Reg. 2,991 (1942). The Alien Property Custodian later issued a
Vesting Order in October 1946, more than four years after the initial attachments, seeking
to substitute itself for the German debtors, and subsequently sought a declaratoryjudgment invalidating the state liens. See Zittman , 341 U.S. at 448-449.
407. See Orvis v. Brownell, 345 U.S. 183, 188 (1953) in which the court stated "the
question is not whether a lien, concededly valid because obtained prior to the freezing
order, may be 'annulled' by the Custodian, but rather whether the freezing order
prevented the subsequent acquisition, by attachment, of such a property interest as the
Custodian would have to recognize under [TWEA]. Because of the supremacy of the
Federal Government on matters within its competence, the freezing order.., prevented
the subsequent acquisition of a lien which would bind the Custodian." See also Zittman II,
341 U.S. at 473, where the court permitted the Alien Property Custodian to take
possession of frozen accounts held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
notwithstanding pending state attachments and liens, based in part upon the use of a
"turnover directive" as part of its Vesting Order, which was not used in Zittman L
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blocked assets to the Federal Reserve Bank for disposition in
accordance with decisions of the Iran-U.S. claims settlement process,
the Supreme Court readily upheld the Executive branch's actions in
Dames & Moore v. Regan.4°8
In another instance with equally mixed results, two Fifth Circuit
decisions held that OFAC exceeded its statutory authority with its
regulations and refusals to "unblock" Cuban nationals' property
following their death for the benefit of U.S. heirs, reasoning that
TWEA only authorizes measures "to prevent or prohibit
... transactions involving... property in which any [sanctioned]
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest. '' 4°9 Both Real v.
Simon410 and Tagle v. Regan41' declared that the "Cuban interest" in
blocked U.S. assets of a Cuban national terminated when the
individual died, and the property should accordingly be unblocked for
the benefit of the U.S. resident heirs.412 According to the Fifth
408. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). In doing so, the Court expressly rejected the notion that
Zitman I or Orvis would support the maintenance of "an attachment that is subject to a
revocable license and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to limit in
any way the actions the President may take under the [IEEPA] regarding the frozen
assets. An attachment so obtained is in every sense subordinate to the President's power
under IEEPA." Id. at 672-73, n. 5.
It should be noted however, that the Court did not base its decision solely upon the
powers granted by IEEPA, but also on Congressional "acquiescence" in historical
Presidential practices.
Finally, we re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision. We do not decide that
the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as against foreign
governmental entities.... But where, as here, the settlement of claims has been
determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy
dispute between our country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude
that Congress acquiesced in the President's action we are not prepared to say
that the President lacks the power to settle such claims.
Id. at 688.
409. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1)(B) (1994).
410. 510 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 510 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1975).
411. 643 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
412. In 1975 in Real the heirs of a Cuban national, who died intestate in Cuba,
successfully sued to require OFAC to unblock the decedent's U.S. securities account. The
surviving heirs consisted of former Cuban nationals who were either permanent resident
aliens or U.S. citizens at the time of suit, and there were no remaining claimants in Cuba.
Although OFAC policy was to "unblock" the assets of refugees and others who took up
residence outside Cuba, OFAC had refused to "unblock" the decedent's account based
upon it's position that the Cuban national decedent has an "interest" in the assets of the
estate for the purposes of the sanctions. See 510 F.2d at 558-559, 562, 564; 31 C.F.R.
515.327 (1974).
Six years later in Tagle the U.S. heirs of a Cuban national, who died intestate in Cuba,
successfully sued to require OFAC to unblock the their share of the decedent's U.S. bank
accounts. Unlike the situation in Real, in this case one of the three heirs remained a
citizen and resident of Cuba. At the urging of OFAC, the Tagle court also considered the
conflicting intervening decision rendered by the Second Circuit in Richardson v. Simon,
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Circuit, for OFAC to "determine that a deceased person retains an
interest in his estate.. .is arbitrary and without basis in either the
language or the purpose of the Trading with the Enemy Act. '413 The
Second Circuit disagreed in Richardson v. Simon,414 and declined to
follow the Fifth Circuit's reasoning largely on the basis of the
deference courts owe to the political branches of government. 415 Not
surprisingly, OFAC asserts that the two Fifth Circuit cases, which
bracketed Richardson, were incorrectly decided 416 and has declined to
make any alterations in the applicable regulation for nearly a quarter
century.417
Nevertheless, OFAC's implementation of the various sanctions
programs' provisions with its blacklisting, licensing, and civil
enforcement decisions are reviewable agency actions under the
Administrative Procedure Act, creating an avenue for more modest
challenges to the Executive branch's actions.418 Unlike some of the
560 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1977), appeal dismissed sub nom, Richardson v. Blumenthal, 435 U.S.
939 (1978), but reaffirmed its belief in the correctness of its earlier decision in Real, 643
F.2d at 1058-1059,1064-1067.
413. Tagle, 643 F.2d at 1064 (quoting Real, 510 F.2d at 564).
414. 560 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 939 (1978).
415. After reviewing the reasoning for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Real, and finding
its analysis of legislative pronouncements on TWEA unpersuasive, the Second Circuit
deferred to the political branches of government and quoted the following passage from
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,81 (1976):
Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign
powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the
light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are
frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the
Executive than to the Judiciary.
560 F.2d at 504. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's subsequent rejection of Richardson
in the Tagle decision, see supra note 412.
416. See Tagle, 643 F.2d at 1064, n. 9.
417. 31 C.F.R. 515.327 (1999), entitled "Blocked estate of a decedent," continues to
provide:
The term blocked estate of a decedent shall mean any decedent's estate in which a
designated national has an interest. A person shall be deemed to have an interest
in a decedent's estate if he:
(a) Was the decedent;
(b) Is a personal representative; or
(c) Is a creditor, heir, legatee, devisee, distributee, or beneficiary.
418. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13), 704 (1994). Subject matter jurisdiction is not conferred by
the APA itself, although it does waive sovereign immunity for purposes of a declaratoryjudgment or injunctive relief. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977). Ratherjurisdiction would need to be based upon some other statute such as the general federal
question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994); the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(1994); the Mandamus and Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994); or that providing
jurisdiction arising out of Acts regulating commerce, 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1994). Moreover,
if damages were sought for the agency's actions, as opposed to injunctive or declaratory
relief, the suit would need to be brought under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994),
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other major trade control statutes4 19 neither of the two principal
statutory foundations for OFAC sanctions, TWEA and IEEPA,
attempt to specifically preclude review under the APA. While both
these statutes are broadly worded, they are not so broad as to give
OFAC "unreviewable" discretion to act.420 Furthermore, while
particular challenges may raise non-justiciable political questions 421
judicial review of OFAC's administrative actions is not automatically
precluded simply because sanctions necessarily involve foreign policy
or political issues.422
where the Government consented to be sued for damages resulting from an
uncompensated "taking," or under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC §§ 1346, 2674
(1994). See also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
419. See, e.g., § 13(a) of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2412(a)
(1994). The EAA lapsed on August 20, 1994, and the Executive Branch's controls on
exports of U.S. origin goods and technology are currently maintained under the
President's authority under IEEPA pending the renewal or replacement of the Act.
During a prior similar lapse at least one court determined that the effect of the shift to
IEEPA as the statutory basis for the controls was to remove the § 13(a) preclusion of
judicial review. See Nuclear Pac. Inc. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, No. C84-49R,
1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16060, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 8, 1984).
See also the exemption from judicial review provided for "classification" decisions
concerning which items qualify as "defense articles" or "defense services" under the
International Traffic in Arms Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h) (1994).
420. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), narrowed the
"committed to agency discretion" exception to judicial review under the APA to "those
rare instances where... there is no law to apply." Id at 410. See also Abbott Labs v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). But see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1988), and
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), which suggest that the Court might
be more willing to find judicial review precluded as being committed to agency discretion
when dealing with matters of national security, at least with regard to the merits of a
particular decision as opposed to the procedures used to reach that decision.
421. See supra notes 384-385 and accompanying text.
422. The presence of a "political question," however, may severely circumscribe any
review which is available. For example, in People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v.
United States Dep't of State, Nos. 97-1646, 97-1670, 1999 WL 420471 (D.C. Cir., June 25,
1999), the designation of two groups as "foreign terrorist organizations" under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was challenged pursuant to the statute's
judicial review provision. No constitutional rights were at issue, as the groups were
entirely foreign based and with no substantial connection to the United States. However,
the statutory scheme required three separate findings prior to making such a designation,
that the group was a "foreign organization," that it was engaged in "terrorist activity," and
that its activities threatened U.S. "national security." The D.C. Circuit agreed with the
government that the determination that there was a "threat" to national security involved
a nonjusticiable political question, based upon Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), but was clearly uncomfortable with the effect that
had on its ability to carry out its review of the other elements of the designation in
accordance with Congress' statutory scheme. The court stated:
The statute before us is unique, procedurally and substantively. On the basis of
an "administrative record" the Secretary of State is to make "findings" that an
entity is a foreign organization engaging in terrorist activities that threaten the
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For example, in Milena Ship Management Company v.
Newcomb,423 a case which arose shortly after the Yugoslav sanctions
were imposed but prior to the issuance of the FRYSR, the court was
asked to rule on a Maltese plaintiff's application to "unblock"
Maltese flag vessels detained by the U.S. Customs Service because
they were "deemed" to be owned or managed by a blacklisted
entity.424 The District Court ultimately denied the application, but
national security of the United States.... This language... is commonplace...
But unlike the run-of-the-mill administrative proceeding, here there is no
adversary hearing, no presentation of what courts and agencies think of as
evidence, no advance notice to the entity affected by the Secretary's internal
deliberations. When the Secretary announces the designation, through
publication in the Federal Register, the organization's bank accounts in the
United States become subject to seizure and anyone who knowingly contributes
financial support to the named entity becomes subject to criminal
prosecution.... There is a provision for "judicial review" confined to the
material the Secretary assembled before publishing the designation.... Because
nothing in the legislation restricts the Secretary from acting on the basis of third
hand accounts, press stories, material on the Internet, or other hearsay regarding
the organization's activities, the administrative record may consist of little else.
If we are not competent to pass on the Secretary's national security finding under
§1189(a)(1)(c), and we interpret Waterman to hold that we are not, how can we
perform the function Congress assigned to us, which was to pass upon the validity
of the designation? For all we know the designation may be improper because
the Secretary's judgement that the organization threatens national security is
completely irrational, and devoid of any support. Or her finding about national
security may be exactly correct. We are forbidden from saying. That we cannot
pronounce on the question does not mean that we must assume the Secretary
was right. It means that we cannot make any assumption, one way or the other.
We reach no judgement whatsoever regarding whether the material before the
Secretary is or is not true. As we wrote earlier, the record consists entirely of
hearsay, none of it was ever subjected to adversary testing, and there was no
opportunity for counter-evidence by the organizations affected. As we see it, our
only function is to decide if the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough
information before her to come to the conclusion that the organizations were
foreign and engaged in terrorism. Her conclusion might be mistaken, but that
depends upon the quality of the information in the reports she received-
something we have no way of judging.
People's Mojahedin Organization, 1999 WL 420471, at *1,*4-*5.
423. Milena Ship Management Co. v. Newcomb, 804 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. La. 1992) affid
995 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994). Milena deals with sanctions
which are in part grounded on IEEPA. For a similar discussion in the case of TWEA
based sanctions on Vietnam, see Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
424. The Yugoslav sanctions were imposed on May 30, 1992, but the FRYSR were not
issued for another nine months, in March 1993. See supra notes 206, 208 and
accompanying text. OFAC released General Notice No. 1 blacklisting several hundred
individuals and firms located in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on July 20, 1992. See
supra notes 291-298 and accompanying text. The firm of Jugoslovanska Oceanska
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also noted that the mere "fact that judicial review of an OFAC
decision would somehow involve United States foreign policy is not
determinative," of whether the case presents a non-justiciable
political question.4z The Court stated:
... the plaintiffs here have not advanced a comprehensive
challenge to the President's strategy or authority regarding how this
nation and others confront the present Yugoslav problem. Plaintiffs
have not challenged the President's decision to declare a national
emergency. Nor have they questioned the validity of the executive
Orders imposing economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, including
the blocking of government controlled assets. If plaintiffs had asked
for court review of these types of executive decisions, it is arguable
that this Court ought not take review.... Plaintiffs have requested
judicial review of agency action, OFAC, taken pursuant to an
unchallenged executive order. Review of administrative decisions
is clearly a time-tested judicial function; in fact agency actions are
presumptively reviewable by federal courts.... OFAC's decision in
this case to block plaintiff's vessels does not so directly implicate
U.S. foreign policy that it is insulated from review. Judicial review
of administrative decisions implementing these orders does not
hamper the executive's conduct of foreign policy by injecting
unacceptable sweeping challenges to foreign policy choices....
Instead the quite limited "arbitrary and capricious" review
authorized by the act merely provides a mechanism to ensure
evenhanded application of administration policy.426
While questions regarding agency actions may be justiciable in
the courts, there are a number of other requirements that may limit
the availability of judicial review in any particular case, including
standing,427 ripeness,428 and exhaustion doctrines, 429 and the related
Plovidba (JOP) was included on that blacklist announcement, and JOP was alleged to be
the parent of the Maltese companies which nominally owned and managed the detained
vessels. See Milena, 804 F. Supp. at 848.
425. Milena, 804 F.Supp at 848-849. But see Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984),
rehearing denied, 469 U.S. 912 (1984); Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361
F.2d 106 (2d. Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
426. Id. at 849-850. See also Cernuda v. Heavy, 720 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989);
Behring Int'l Inc. v. Miller, 504 F. Supp. 552 (D.NJ. 1980); Tagle v. Regan, 643 F.2d 1058
(5th Cir. 1981); Real v. Simon, 510 F.2d. 557 (5th Cir. 1975), reh'g denied, 579 F.2d 738
(5th Cir. 1975); but cf. Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 961 F. Supp. 498
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Beacon Prod. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191 (D.Mass. 1986), affd,
814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
427. "Standing" to assert a claim generally depends upon injury in fact, a causal
connection to the injury, and redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
(1992). For cases under the APA the injury complained of must also fall within the "zone
of interests" sought to be protected under the statute which is at issue. See Air Courier
Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 517, 523-43
(1991); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1987); Association of Data
Processing Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970).
428. "Ripeness" refers to whether or not the claim is sufficiently mature and developed
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concept of "final agency action."430 Assuming these requirements are
met in an appropriate case, under the APA the courts may set aside
agency actions, findings, or conclusions which are:
-- contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
-in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or
short of statutory right;
-or arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.431
These judicial powers are, however, tempered by the deference
courts traditionally give to the agency's expertise, particularly when
the agency is interpreting its own statutes, policies, or rules. 432 This
deference is also reflected in the APA's direction to the courts to give
due consideration to the "whole administrative record,"433 and in the
provisions affecting the standard of review to be employed.434 A de
novo review of agency action is very seldom called for,435 and it is
so as to be amenable to judicial resolution, and whether withholding review would result
in a substantial hardship upon the claimant. See Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 186
(1967). See also Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir.
1996).
429. While similar to "ripeness" in that the intent of this doctrine is to try and resolve
all matters within an agency whenever possible, "exhaustion" focuses more upon the
availability of further processes or avenues of appeal which might be available within the
agency. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144-46 (1992); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v.
FTC, 814 F.2d 731,735 (D.C. 1987).
430. The APA states that only "final" agency actions are reviewable. See 5 U.S.C. § 703
(1994). A particular action is deemed to be sufficiently "final" and reviewable if it is
stated as such by statute. If a particular type of action is not expressly declared to be
reviewable, it must be analyzed under the exhaustion and ripeness doctrines to see if
judicial review would be appropriate. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S.
232 (1980). However, the Courts may not use these doctrines to impose more onerous
"finality" requirements than those which may be declared in the applicable statute. See
Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 145-47 (1993).
431. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994). The courts also have the ability to overturn agency
actions which are unsupported by the evidence, and even to compel the agency to act
when its refusal to do so is unreasonably delayed or withheld. See id. at § 706(1).
432. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 513 (1994); Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984); Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). See also Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d
695 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that OFAC's interpretation of its "own regulations receives
an even greater degree of deference than the Chevron standard, and must prevail unless
plainly inconsistent with the regulation." Id. at 702.
433. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). See also Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488
(1951).
434. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)-(F). While not explicitly stated as such in the APA, the
courts are most free to substitute their judgment for that of an agency when dealing with
questions of "law," and most reluctant to do so when dealing with questions of "fact." See
e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314
U.S. 402 (1941).
435. Typically, for de novo review to be available, it must be specified in a statute. See,
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much more likely that courts will look to see if "substantial evidence"
supports the agency's actions. 436 However, the residual standard of
review under the APA, and the one most likely to be applied when
examining OFAC's actions, is the limited "arbitrary and capricious"
standard referred to in the Milena case.437 While one might argue that
the courts could take judicial notice of the long history of
administrative problems associated with the various sanctions and
conclude that OFAC's general administration of those programs is
"arbitrary and capricious," 438 few challengers have actually met this
burden and succeeded in overturning OFAC's actions in a particular
case or controversy. 439
One example is the 1984 case of American Airways Charters Inc.
v. Regan, involving OFAC's attempt to impose a requirement upon a
Florida corporation to apply for and obtain a license approval prior to
retaining legal counsel to challenge its designation as a specially
designated national of Cuba.440  OFAC communicated this
requirement to AAC orally, and then in a follow-up letter, but did not
specifically include such a requirement in its regulations.44' The Court
struck down OFAC's extraordinary claim of the authority to approve
the hiring of counsel, but not the requirement to obtain a license prior
to making any payments to the counsel of AAC's choice. It stated
that the "administrative authority asserted in this case has never been
e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1994). Alternatively, de novo review may also be available if
an adjudicatory action is being challenged and the agency's fact finding procedures are
inadequate, or when a proceeding to enforce a non-adjudicatory action is involved. See
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415. In practice it is rare for a court to substitute its judgment
for that of an agency. It is much more likely that a court would consider the same sorts of
agency deficiencies as falling under the 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) rubric of not being "in
accordance with law" and simply remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
See also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729,744 (1985).
436. The substantial evidence standard of review traditionally applies to formal
adjudicatory hearings or formal rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
437. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). In practice, the "substantial evidence" and "arbitrary
and capricious" standards approximate one another, further evidencing the court's great
reluctance to overturn an administrative determination or finding unless there is no
rational basis for the agency's actions. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Board of Governors of Federal Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
438. See supra notes 198-368 and accompanying text.
439. "Arbitrary and capricious" agency actions may also constitute a denial of
substantive due process. Accordingly, most of the broad constitutional challenges to the
various programs have also included allegations that the agency has acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner. See cases cited supra notes 384-426 and accompanying text.
440. 746 F.2d 865, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
441. See iL at 868-869. OFAC asserted that its approval was required because
contracting for legal services necessarily involved a transfer of AAC's assets or property.
See id at 871.
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asserted on any prior occasion," 442 that it was entirely "novel... [and
a]... newly minted claim of authority to preview, and then permit or
restrain, a designated national's choice of counsel," which was
unsupported by the underlying statute, TWEA. 4 3 The Court
continued:
Even in the absence of a marked constitutional dimension to the
problem, sensible construction of the [TWEA] would not
encompass OFAC's current, unprecedented, reading of highly
general clauses. The agency, we believe, has gone beyond mere
interpretation. It has effectively legislated in an area in which our
tradition indicates the lawmakers themselves - Congress - should
speak with a clear voice in advance of administrative action...[W]e
find the case against OFAC's position overwhelming. As OFAC
would have it, once an entity, although incorporated in the United
States has been administratively designated a foreign national, and
therefore placed under government control regarding commercial
matters, the designated corporation can be subjected to the
decision of a government office, bounded by no standards that have
been presented to us, even as to the very question whether the
corporation can meaningfully challenge the designation through
counsel. We reject that bold view. Instead, we construe the Act and
regulations thereunder "in a manner that not only upholds their
constitutionality but also steers clear of uncertainty on that
score."
444
Interestingly, one result of this focus on statutory and regulatory
interpretation in the American Airways decision is that OFAC has
now issued regulations under most of its JEEPA based programs445
requiring that a license be obtained before any payments are made
for legal services provided in connection with dealings with
blacklisted parties or sanctioned destinations,446 but simultaneously
authorizing the provision of broad categories of legal services to
sanctioned parties.447 In effect, OFAC is reasserting its authority to
442. Id. at 867.
443. Id. at 872.
444. Id. at 873-874 (citing Kelsey v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 701,708 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
445. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 536. 506 (NTSR); 538.505 (SSR); 550.517 (LSR); 560.525 (ITR);
585.517 (FRYSR); 586.509 (KSR); 595.506 (TSR); and 597.505 (FTSOR) (1999). The
process of OFAC's reasserting authority over the provision of "legal services" actually
began in 1992, eight years after the American Airways decision, with the issuance of a
regulatory prohibition on the "export of services" to Haiti under the HTR, although the
regulations did not then define how "services" could be "exported." See 31 C.F.R. 580.206
(1992).
446. These provisions generally depend upon legal representation being considered as a
"service" and, as was done with the HTR (see supra note 445) the presence of a regulatory
prohibition on the "exportation of services" without OFAC approval. See 31 C.F.R. §§
536. 406 (NTSR); 538.406 (SSR); 550.202, 550.422 (LSR); 560.204, 560.410 (ITR); 585.205,
585.416 (FRYSR); 586.406 (KSR); 595.201,595.406 (TSR) (1999).
447. The "General License" authorization for the provision of legal services in the
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regulate the formation of the attorney-client relationship while
minimizing the chances of a direct challenge to its position by
authorizing the most common types of legal services. In doing so, it is
establishing a record of administrative practice and policy on the
"export" of legal services, and remedying at least one of the major
deficiencies identified in the American Airways case, the then
"unprecedented" nature of its claim of authority to regulate the
formation of an attorney-client relationship.448 Accordingly, the
Yugoslav sanctions (FRYSR) is typical, and provides:
(a) The provision to the Government of the FRY (S&M), or to a person in the
FRY(S&M), of the legal services set forth in paragraph (b) of this section is
authorized, provided that all receipt of payment therefor must be specifically
licensed. The provision of any other legal services as interpreted in §585.416
requires the issuance of a specific license.
(b) Specific licenses are issued, on a case-by-case basis, authorizing receipt, from
unblocked sources, of payment of professional fees and reimbursement of
incurred expenses for the following legal services by U.S. persons to the
Government of the FRY (S&M), or to a person in the FRY (S&M):
(1) Provision of legal advice and counseling to the Government of the FRY
(S&M), or to a person in the FRY (S&M) on the requirements of and
compliance with the laws of any jurisdiction within the United States,
provided that such advice and counseling is not provided to facilitate
transactions in violation of subpart B of this part;
(2) Representation of the Government of the FRY (S&M), or of a person in
the FRY (S&M) when named as a defendant in or otherwise made a party to
domestic U.S. legal, arbitration, or administrative proceedings;
(3) Initiation of domestic U.S. legal, arbitration, or administrative
proceedings in defense of property interests subject to U.S. jurisdiction of
the Government of the FRY (S&M) that were in existence prior to May 20,
1992, or of a person in the FRY (S&M);
(4) Representation of the Government of the FRY (S&M), or of a person in
the FRY (S&M) before any federal agency with respect to the imposition,
administration, or enforcement of U.S. sanctions against the FRY (S&M);
and
(5) Provision of legal services in any other context in which prevailing U.S.
law requires access to legal counsel at public expense.
(c) Enforcement of any domestic lien, judgment, arbitral award, decree, or other
order through execution, garnishment or other judicial process purporting to
transfer or otherwise alter or affect a property interest of the Government of the
FRY (S&M) is prohibited unless specifically licensed in accordance with §
585.202(e).
Id. at § 585.517.
448. OFAC is also implicitly re-imposing the requirement that it approve the mere
formation of an attorney-client relationship in those situations which fall outside the five
broad categories typically found in the general license authorization. See, e.g., id.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that these recent claims of authority to regulate the
mere formation of an attorney-client relationship go far beyond what was asserted in the
AAC case, which only involved an attempt to regulate the blacklisted party's choice of
legal counsel. Read literally, however, the current regulations would also require OFAC's
approval for U.S. lawyers to represent third parties who might be (legitimately)
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courts may yet be asked to address the "constitutional dimension" of
the counsel selection problem if OFAC refuses a specific license
application to retain counsel or decides to withdraws the broad
authorizations contained in its regulatory general licenses regarding
the provision of legal services.449
In a 1988 case, Veterans Peace Convoy, Inc. v. Schultz, a U.S.
District Court in Texas used an approach similar to that employed in
American Airways when it held that OFAC's interpretation of the
"humanitarian aid" limitation on its IEEPA based sanctions on
Nicaragua was overly narrow.450 The organizers of the Peace Convoy
challenged the detention of some of their vehicles at the Texas border
as they attempted to drive aid supplies to Nicaragua 451 as being
negotiating or dealing with blacklisted entities. As stated in the FRYSR Subpart D
"Interpretations" regarding the "Exportation of Services; performance of service
contracts; legal services":
(b) The prohibitions contained in §§ 585.201 and 585.209 apply to services
performed by U.S. persons, wherever located:
(2) With respect to property interests of the Government of the FRY (S&M)
[which includes, by definition, blacklisted parties, see 31 C.F.R. § 585.311
(d)(1998)]; or
(3) In support of an industrial or other commercial or governmental project
in the FRY (S&M).
(c) Example: U.S. persons may not, without specific authorization from the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, represent an individual or entity with respect
to contract negotiations, contract performance, commercial arbitration, or other
business dealings with the Government of the FRY(S&M). See § 585.517 on
licensing policy with regard to the provision of legal services.
Id. at § 585.416(b).
The referenced "general license" for legal services does not pre-authorize, however,
any representation of third parties in their dealings with blacklisted entities or the
Government of the FRY. See supra note 447.
449. At least one challenge has already been brought against these new legal services
provisions, in the context of the FRYSR. In Beobanbka D.D. Belgrade v. United States,
Nos. 95 Civ. 5138 (KB), 95 Civ. 5771 (HB), 1997 WL 23812, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22,
1997), the Court upheld the licensing scheme embodied in 31 C.F.R. § 585.517, in a case
where OFAC licensed the respective plaintiffs retention of counsel, but required that they
not be paid from blocked funds. However, the plaintiffs only challenged the basis for
OFAC's decision regarding the source of the funds to be used for payment, and did not
pursue any constitutional claims of right to counsel in civil proceedings or the impact of
OFAC's decision on their effective access to the courts.
In another case, a defendant in a civil suit successfully convinced the trial court that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the Iranian plaintiff's failure to obtain
OFAC's approval of its counsel, but this position was reversed on appeal. OFAC
submitted an amicus brief asserting that it "never interpreted its regulation to strip federal
courts to hear civil suits brought by foreign corporations." See Comet Enters Ltd. v. Air-
A-Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855,859 (4th Cir. 1997).
450. 722 F. Supp. 1425,1429-32 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
451. U.S. Customs authorities turned back the Convoy's initial attempts to leave the
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contrary to IEEPA's "humanitarian exemption" which reads:
(b) The authority granted to the President by this section does not
include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly,
(2) donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to
relieve human suffering .... 452
OFAC asserted that a license was required to export the vehicles to
Nicaragua, as they were outside the scope of the "articles" described
in the exemption. 453 The Court found the statutory language
ambiguous, and OFAC's processes inappropriate:
The [Government] Defendants... have asserted that... the
exemption "might encompass for example, blankets, tents,
stretchers, rescue equipment, or other items in the event of a
natural disaster."... What constitutes "rescue equipment"? Why
would such equipment be inherently like food, clothing, and
medicine? How would it qualitatively differ from a pickup truck,
bus, or van? What other "items" would come within the exemption
in the event of a natural disaster? What constitutes a "natural
disaster," and who makes that determination? Defendant's implicit
response to these questions is essentially "ask us and we will tell
you." This is the gist of 31 C.F.R. §540.540, which states:
"Applications for specific licenses to export goods to
Nicaragua for humanitarian, educational, or religious purposes
will be considered on a case-by-case basis."
Defendants describe this provision as an "administrative remedy,"
whereby anyone seeking to donate articles to Nicaragua can "ask
for an interpretation or apply for a license from [OFAC]." The
difficulty with this approach is that it contravenes the statutory
scheme. IEEPA does not create a scheme whereby all persons
seeking to donate articles to a blocked country must obtain advance
approval from [OFAC] on a case by case basis. On the contrary,
IEEPA provides that the Executive may not regulate qualifying
humanitarian donations "directly or indirectly." This restriction
would be effectively nullified by a scheme which would require all
potential donors to seek a license in order to ascertain which
articles come within the statutory exemption. 454
Moreover, as OFAC's case-by-case decisions were rendered
under an unpublished interpretation that only those articles which
were intended to be "used solely to relieve human suffering" qualified
for the exemption, as opposed to those which could reasonably be
United States, and detained three pickup trucks, a 1985 Nissan, a 1980 Toyota, and a 1979
Chevrolet, and a 1982 Chevrolet van. The vehicles were subsequently released and the
Convoy did proceed to Nicaragua. See id. at 1427
452. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2) (1994).
453. See Veteran's Peace Convoy, 722 F. Supp. at 1430.
454. Id. at 1430.
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expected to serve that purpose,455 the Court declined to defer to the
agency. It stated:
[t]he Court cannot defer to the agency's interpretation when there
is no consistent, published interpretation of §1702(b)(2). Moreover,
no interpretation by [OFAC] can frustrate the clearly expressed
intent of Congress .... The Court must reject an agency's statutory
interpretations "that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or
that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement. '456
However, the Veterans Peace Convoy Court also carefully limited its
decision by emphasizing that it was merely interpreting a statutory
provision regarding uncompensated humanitarian donations, which
Congress was free to change.457 Moreover, it noted that the statute
itself allows the President to eliminate the exemption entirely, if it
impairs his policies in particular emergencies, a power which was not
exercised in the case of Nicaraguan sanctions.458
More recently, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia ruled in an unpublished 1994 decision, Saba v. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, that OFAC abused its discretion by
denying a license application on the basis of a change in policy which
had not been promulgated nor announced in accordance with the
APA and the Federal Register Act.459 Mohammad Ali Saba sought a
license to import Iranian origin rugs from Germany where they had
been stored since before the Iranian sanctions were imposed.46° The
ITR included a specific provision which authorized such imports upon
submission of "documentary proof" that the carpets were outside of
Iran when the sanctions became effective, 461 with which Saba
455. Id at 1431-32 (noting that OFAC's interpretation was at odds with the legislative
history of the exemption).
456. Id at 1431.
457. Id at 1432.
458. See id and 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2) (1994).
459. See Saba v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, C.A. No. 92-1812 (WBB), slip op.
at 17 (D.D.C. November 18,1994).
460. Id, slip op. at 3-4.
461. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.504 (1987), which read:
(a) Specific licenses may be issued authorizing the importation of non-fungible
goods of Iranian origin, such as carpets..., provided the applicant submits
satisfactory documentary proof that the goods are located outside of Iran prior to
the effective date and that no payment or other benefit has accrued or will accrue
to Iran after the effective date (October 29,1987)...
(c) The type of documentation that would constitute satisfactory proof... may
vary depending upon the facts of a particular case. However, independent
corroborating documentary evidence issued and certified by a disinterested party
will be required. This might include contracts, insurance documents, shipping
documents, warehouse receipts, and appropriate customs documents,
accompanied by a certification of an insurance agent, warehouse agent, or other
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complied.462 However, OFAC denied Saba's license application,
declaring that the "documentary proof" submitted was insufficient463
on the basis of new and stricter requirements which would not appear
in the Federal Register for another month.464
appropriate person, identifying with particularity the goods sought to be
imported and attesting that the goods were located outside Iran at a time prior to
the effective date. In general, affidavits, statements, and other documents
prepared by the applicant or another interested party will not, by themselves,
constitute satisfactory proof.
EXAMPLE: A Persian carpet stored in a warehouse in Europe since January
1986, and purchased by a U.S. resident in November 1987, may be licensed for
importation into the United States if the importer provides, for example, (1) a
warehouse receipt dated prior to the effective date, and a certification from the
warehouse that the carpet sought to be imported is the same carpet that was in
storage, identifying such characteristics as predominant colors and design by
description or photograph; and (2) insurance documents dated prior to the
effective date and containing sufficient information to identify the specific carpet
insured in a location outside Iran.
462. Saba's application for a license included the original 1986 sales contract and bank
records showing the dates of payment; petitions filed with Iranian customs for the initial
export of the rugs to Germany in early 1987 which described each carpet by pattern, color,
size, condition, and value; bills of lading for the timely shipment of the rugs to Germany;
and German customs clearance forms showing the receipt of the rugs in Germany by
February 1987. See Saba, C.A. No. 92-1812 (WBB) (D.D.C. November 18, 1994), slip op.
at 3-4.
463. See hi, slip op. at 4-5. The court also noted that OFAC had similarly denied other
applicant's licenses once it decided to change its policy, and frankly noted in those denials
that "this Office may have previously granted import licenses pursuant to §560.504 of the
[Iranian Transactions] Regulations based upon documentation substantially similar to that
submitted in [the denied license] application." I& at 14 n. 7.
464. See 56 Fed. Reg. 61,373 (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 569A09) (1991), which
promulgated a new "interpretation" of the documentary evidence necessary to take
advantage of the licensing authorization provided in § 560.504.
OFAC's concern was apparently prompted by one of its officials visiting Germany
and concluding that the requirements of § 560.504 regarding description of the qualifying
goods did not provide sufficient protection against the possible fraudulent substitution of
other goods (Le., post-embargo Iranian rugs) which did not qualify for the license.
Accordingly, Saba was informed of the new, stricter documentary requirements in a letter
denying his license application in November 1991, in terms which mirrored what was
published as §560.409 on December 3,1991. See Saba, C.A. No. 92-1812 (WBB) (D.D.C.
November 18,1994), slip op. at 4-5. That provision read:
(a) Section 560.504 states that specific licenses will be issued to import non-
fungible goods of Iranian origin, including carpets, upon submission of
documentary proof that the goods were located outside of Iran prior to the
effective date and that no financial benefit will accrue to Iran after the effective
date. Section 560.504(c) identifies documents that may serve to satisfy the
requirements of this section. Documents submitted must specifically identify the
particular item to be imported.
(b) Because of the similarity of carpets of commercial grade, commercial
documents which contain only a generic description of a carpet, such as size and
style or region of manufacture (e.g., 2.05m. x 1.05m., Tabriz) generally will be
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The court rejected OFAC's argument, "that courts should only
review agency departures from existing regulations and procedures to
determine whether these deviations lack a 'rational basis'. '465 The
court stated that,
[t]his argument.. .conflates two distinct agency obligations. While
agencies surely cannot act without a "rational basis" for doing so,
they also must adhere to their own rules until they have properly
changed them. These two requirements create different inquiries
for judicial review, and the Plaintiff here primarily challenges the
consistency of OFAC's conduct rather than its reasonableness.466
In holding for Saba, the court declared that,
[although Congress has generally given the administrative agencies
wide latitude in carrying out their statutory mandates, no agency
has the authority to act with unfettered discretion. Indeed one of
the most venerable principles in the field of administrative law
requires agencies to abide by the rules, regulations, and procedures
they have adopted even when those policies limit the discretion
more strictly than does a statutory scheme.467
Applying the new stricter policy to Saba prior to its publication,
the court went on to note, also violated the provisions of the Freedom
of Information Act which require agencies to provide guidance to the
public by publishing "substantive rules of general applicability" and
"statements of general policy or general applicability" in the Federal
Register.468 Accordingly, Saba should not be "adversely affected" by
insufficient to satisfy the documentary requirement. Documents intended to
prove that a particular carpet has been located outside of Iran since the effective
date must identify the carpet and its location... with sufficient particularity to
eliminate the possibility of substitution by another carpet that would not be
eligible for importation. Accordingly, transportation documents, invoices,
inventory lists, or warehouse receipts that provide only general descriptions will
not be considered to provide sufficient assurance that a particular carpet has
been located outside Iran since the effective date to justify issuance of a specific
license for importation.
31 C.F.R. § 560A09 (1992). Both § 560.409 and § 560.504 were removed from the
regulations in September of 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 47,061 (1995).
465. See Saba, C.A. No. 92-1812 (WBB), slip op. at 8, n. 3.
466. Id The court also rejected OFAC's argument that "its role in assisting the
President in regulating international trade, protecting national security, and executing
foreign policy mitigates against placing restrictions on its exercise of discretion," stating
that the agency's ability to implement the President's Executive Orders was not at issue.
Rather the court declared that the issue was OFAC's obligation to "abide by its own
regulations and policies even when developing the nation's foreign policy." Id., slip op. at
10, n. 4.
467. Id, slip op. at 7.
46& Mt, slip op. at 14-15 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D)). The FOIA is actually part of
the APA. For a detailed discussion of what might be considered rules of "general
applicability and legal effect," see Randy S. Springer, Gatekeeping and the Federal
Register: An Analysis of the Publication Requirement of Section 552(a)(1)(D) of the
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a policy which was not properly published.469 Publication in the
Federal Register, "thus further formalizes the principle discussed
above, ensuring that agencies announce to the public how they will
exercise their discretion before they actually begin doing so."470 "In a
manner of speaking," the court concluded, "OFAC simply pulled the
rug out from under the Plaintiff and his legitimate expectations of
consistent treatment. OFAC's denial of the Plaintiff's request for an
application therefore was 'arbitrary, capricious an abuse of discretion
or otherwise not in accordance with the law' within the meaning of
[the A.PA]." 471
In contrast to Saba, in Feizy Import & Export Co v. U.S.-
another unpublished decision arising out of virtually the same facts-
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied
relief and found no abuse of discretion nor any arbitrary and
capricious actions by the agency.472 "The court finds no inconsistency
between the regulations and OFAC's interpretation of them."473 The
Saba court distinguished the Texas decision on the grounds that Feizy
challenged the rational basis for OFAC's interpretation, and not the
timing of its application. 474 Feizy claimed that the new "documentary
proof" requirements were excessive and so strict as to be impossible
to meet, thereby foreclosing all imports of pre-embargo Iranian
carpets.475 The concern over the ease with which an embargoed rug
may be substituted for one exported from Iran prior to the imposition
of sanctions was not manifestly irrational, however.476 Moreover, both
courts recognized that OFAC clearly has the power under the
President's Executive Orders to ban all imports from Iran.477 Thus,
merely tightening the documentary proof requirements to address a
Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 535-38 (1989). Similar
requirements are found in the Federal Register Act, see 44 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994).
469. "[A] person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely
affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal register and not so published
absent actual and timely notice." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994). The court held that Saba
did not have actual notice of the revised policy at the time it submitted its license
application to OFAC. See Saba, C.A. No. 92-1812 (WBB), slip op. at 15-17.
470. Id, slip op. at 15.
471. Id, slip op. at 14.
472. See Feizy Import and Export Co. v. United States, C.A. No. 3:92-CV-0506-D, slip
op. (N.D. Tex., June 4, 1992). Like the plaintiff in Saba, Feizy sought a license to import
Iranian rugs from Germany in November 1991, which was denied just prior to the Federal
Register announcement of OFAC's new "interpretation" regarding the documentary
proof necessary to meet the requirements of 31 C.F.R. §560.504. See Feizy, C.A. No 3:92-
CV-0506-D., slip op. at 1.
473. Id, slip op. at 7.
474. See Saba, C.A. No. 92-1812 (WBB), slip op. at 8, n. 3.
475. See Feizy, C.A. No. 3:92-CV-0506-D, slip op. at 5.
476. See id.
477. See id at 6; Saba, C.A. No. 92-1812 (WBB), slip op. at 5-6.
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legitimate concern is not in and of itself an "arbitrary and capricious"
act. Rather, it was the Saba court's concern for the timing and
manner of the change that accounts for the differing result.478 Of
course, the Saba court's concern is also easily resolved with the
proper publication of the new policy or regulation.
These decisions demonstrate that judicial processes are ill suited
to broad challenges to the problems arising with the proliferation of
OFAC's sanctions programs. Broadly-worded enabling statutes,
deferential doctrines, and even the basic "cases and controversies"
requirement, all generally preclude major changes in the sanctions
programs being brought about through litigation. Comparing the
Supreme Court's decisions in Regan v. Wald479 or Dames & Moore480
with the earlier Orvis481 or the Zitman cases,482 one would hardly
suspect that three decades, and major changes in the nature, scope,
and use of economic sanctions, had passed between them. Even
greater changes, and a host of contentious issues occasioned by those
changes, are at issue when the entire post-war development of the use
of sanctions is considered. Moreover, in those rare instances when an
individual challenge can be successfully brought against the arbitrary
and capricious actions which have characterized OFAC's
administration of its sanctions programs, the ultimate effects may beminimal.483 Accordingly, for longer term solutions it is necessary to
look outside of the courts, to the legislature.
B. Legislative Measures
With the growth in the use of economic sanctions in recent years,
there has been increasing concern regarding the general effectiveness
of these programs in achieving their stated aims, and their collateral
impact upon U.S. industry and the U.S. industrial base. 4 The
primary focus of this concern has been on the use of unilateral, as
opposed to multilateral, sanctions. 485 One result has been a call for
478. See id. at 8 n.3; see also supra note 465-466 and accompanying text.
479. See supra notes 387,391,397,425 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 391,295,408 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 407-408 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 396, 405, 407-408 and accompanying text.
483. See supra notes 439-478 and accompanying text.
484. See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, The Domestic Costs of Sanctions on Foreign
Commerce (last modified Mar. 1999) http:llwww.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=
1133&sequence=0&from=1; DIANNE E. RENNACK & ROBERT D. SHUEY, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS TO ACHIEVE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS: DISCUSSION AND GUIDE TO
CURRENT LAW, Report 97-949F, Congressional Research Service, (June 5, 1998);
National Association of Manufacturers, A Catalog of New U.S. Unilateral Economic
Sanctions for Foreign Policy Purposes, 1993-1996, (1997); SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED,
supra note 65.
485. See id.; see also Raj Bhala, Mrs WATU and International Trade Sanctions, 33 INT'L
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new legislation directing the manner and nature of any new sanctions
imposed in the future.486 Accordingly, in early 1997 the Enhancement
of Trade Security, and Human Rights through Sanctions Reform Act
(SRA)8 7 was introduced, but this initial bill was tabled after hearings
were held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and it failed
to pass in the 105' Congress. However, it was reintroduced in the
106' Congress in March of 1999.4m
The SRA is notable in its attempt to provide a long term
framework for the Executive Branch's use of sanctions, rather than
seeking to impose or influence sanctions aimed at a particular target,
as was the case with over thirty bills in the 105th Congress489 and
fourteen other bills in the current Congress.490 As currently drafted,
the SRA:
-applies only to unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S., not
those imposed as part of a multilateral control regime;
491
-has a set of guidelines and requirements which seek to provide
for advance notice,492 a series of reports and consultations on the
possible impact of the sanctions, 493 and public comment,494 in advance
of imposing any new unilateral sanctions;
-but permits, however, a Presidential waiver of the notice
requirements in the event assets will be frozen or blocked, and also
permits the reports and consultations to follow rather than precede
the imposition of sanctions if in the "national interest; 495
-suggests that any sanctions which are imposed be narrowly
LAWYER 1, 1-4 (1999); ERNEST H. PREEG, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FEELING GOOD WITH SANCTIONS (April, 1999).
486. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. COLLINS & GABRIELLE D. BOWDOIN, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, BEYOND UNILATERAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: BETTER ALTERNATIVES FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, (March 1999);
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, ALTERING U.S. SANCTIONS
POLICY: FINAL REPORT OF THE CSIS PROJECT ON UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
(February 1999).
487. S. 1413,105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2708, 105th Cong. (1997).
488. S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999). A similar measure, the
Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, was introduced by Senator Christopher J. Dodd,
one of the cosponsors of the original bill, on May 27, 1999. See S. 1161, 106th Cong.
(1999).
489. See USA*ENGAGE, Federal Sanctions Watch List for the 105th Congress, (last
modified Sept. 28,1999) http://usaengage.orglnews/fedwatch.html.
490. See USA*ENGAGE, Federal Sanctions Watch, 106th Congress, (May 17, 1999)
http://usaengage.orglnews/fedwatch99.html.
491. See S. 757,106th Congress § 4(1) (1999); H.R. 1244,106th Cong. §4(1) (1999).
492. The notice requirement applies to both legislatively imposed sanctions and those
imposed by the Executive branch. See id. at §§ 6(a), 7(a)(1)(A).
493. See id. at §§ 6(d); 7(b), (e), (f), (g).
494. See id. at §§ 6(a); 7(c).
495. See id at § 7 (a)(1)(B),(h)
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drawn,496 respect the sanctity of preexisting contracts (except when
freezing assets or blacklisting specific parties), 497 prohibits the use of
unilateral sanctions in connection with food or medicine,498 and
establishes a (renewable) two year maximum time period for the
sanctions. 499 Even though the SRA would leave existing unilateral
sanctions largely unaffected 500 and is completely inapplicable to
multilateral sanctions, the bill is opposed by the current
Administration.501
The Congressional approach to the SRA evidences a level of
deference to the Executive branch and a reluctance to become
involved with the details of the administering agency's activities,
which is in marked contrast to the approach to dealing with
commodity-based export controls under the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (EAA).5 2 Unlike the relatively terse, but broad, grant of
authority to the President in IEEPA, 50 3 and the analogous provisions
of the TWEA,504 the EAA seeks to simultaneously promote50 5 and
496. See id. at § 5 (5).
497. See id. at §§ 5 (3), 7(d)(1)(B).
498. See id. at §§ 5 (5)(B), 7(d)(1)(E).
499. See id. at §§ 5 (2), 7(d)(1)(C).
500. See id. at § 7 (a)(2).
501. See Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and
Agricultural Affairs), available at http://www.usaengage.org/eizenstat.html; see also Press
Release, Lugar Statement on Sanctions Reform, (visited Oct. 18, 1999),
http://usaengage.org/news/99lugarstatement1.html.
502. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1994). The EAA has lapsed, and the export controls which
it authorized are temporarily being continued under the President's authority under
IEEPA pending new legislation. Senator Gramm introduced a bill to reauthorize the
EAA in late 1999, see infra notes 521-525 and accompanying text, entitled the Export
Administration Act of 1999 (EAA-99), S. 1712, 106th Cong. (1999), the bill was favorably
reported by the Senate Committee on Balancing, Housing, and Urban Affairs on October
8, 1999. See S. Rep. No. 106-180 (1999).
503. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1994). IEEPA essentially provides for the exercise of virtually
the same range of powers, in peacetime, as TWEA permits during wartime. It differs from
TWEA in requiring that the President declare a specific "national emergency" with regard
to a specific threat, see id. at § 1701(a), and consult with Congress, see id. at § 1703, before
the powers the statute grants may be exercised. Beyond these procedural differences,
IEEPA also differs from TWEA substantively in that IEEPA does not provide the
President with the authority to "vest" or expropriate property, regulate domestic
transactions, regulate gold/silver coins or bullion, nor does it grant the power to seize
records. Compare id. at § 1702(a) with 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (1994).
504. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1994). Since the passage of IEEPA in 1977, the powers
granted to the President under TWEA are confined to wartime use, with the exception of
the then preexisting Asian and Cuban sanctions programs. See id at § 5 note, (Pub. L. No.
95-223 § 101 (b)).
505. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401(1)-(2) (1994). See also EAA-99, supra note 502, at §§
104,401- 402.
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control5°6 exports. Perhaps it is the tension between these dual
purposes behind the EAA, a tension absent from the sanctions laws,
which prompts Congress to extensively detail both the nature5°7 and
operation5°8 of the export controls system.
The EAA grants the President wide authority to regulate export
trade for national security,509 foreign policy,510 and short supply51'
purposes, which are substantively not unlike the broad grants in
IEEPA and TWEA. More significantly, however, the EAA
accompanies these grants of authority with numerous other
provisions describing the control system in tremendous detail. The
EAA contains elaborate provisions establishing precisely what may
be controlled,512 what may not be controlled,513 who in the
government and among the public must be involved in formulating
the controls,514 when relief from the controls in the event of
506. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401(3)-(5) (1994). See also EAA-99, supra note 502, at §§
101,201(b), 301(b).
507. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404-2406 (1994). See also EAA-99, supra note 502, at §§
101,201(a), 301(a), 701.
508. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2407-2409 (1994). See also EAA-99, supra note 502, at §§
101-904.
509. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a) (1994). See also EAA-99, supra note 502, at § 201.
510. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a) (1994). See also EAA-99, supra note 502, at § 301.
511. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(a) (1994).
512. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c) for national security controls [governing the
formulation of the Commerce Control List], (d) [governing the formulation of the
Militarily Critical Technologies list]; § 2405(b) for foreign policy controls [criteria for
foreign policy based controls], (j) [detailing controls on countries which support
terrorism], (1) [governing controls on missile related technology], (m) [governing controls
related to chemical & biological weapons], (n) [governing controls related to crime control
instruments], (o) [governing the formulation of the Commerce Control List], (p)
[governing controls on spare parts]; § 2406(d) for short supply controls [governing controls
on domestic crude oil], (e) [governing controls on refined petroleum products], (f)
[governing controls on other petroleum products], (g) [governing controls on agricultural
commodities], (i) [governing controls on unprocessed red cedar], and (k) [governing
controls on oil exports for the military]. See also EAA-99, supra note 502, at §§ 101, 202-
214,302-310.
513. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f) for limits on national security controls [exceptions to
controls based upon "foreign availability"], (g) [indexing mechanisms for revising control
levels], (m) [establishing de minimis content levels for controlling foreign produced
goods], (q) [excluding agricultural products]; § 2405(g) for limits on foreign policy
controls[excluding certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies], (h) [exceptions to
controls based upon "foreign availability"], (i) [excluding controls based upon treaty
obligations]; § 2406(g) for limits on short supply controls [excluding agricultural products].
See also EAA-99, supra note 502, at §§ 104,401-403.
514. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(f) [general policy on notice to public and consultation
with business]; §2404(h) [establishment of "technical advisory committees"], (k)
[negotiations with other countries on national security controls]; § 2405(c) [consultations
with industry on foreign policy controls], (d) [consultations with other countries on foreign
policy controls]; §2409 (d), (e), (g) [consultations with other governmental agencies on
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"hardship" is appropriate, 515 how licenses are to be handled and
decided,5 16 the times within which actions must be taken by the
administering agency,517  the administrative procedures to be
employed,518 and the avenue for appeals and extent of judicial
review. 519 The national security and foreign policy concerns addressed
in the EAA and the export control system are no less compelling than
those at issue when dealing with economic sanctions programs, and
indeed the two sets of controls have become increasingly intertwined
in recent years.520 Accordingly, the example of the EAA suggests that
licenses]; § 2412(b) [public participation in rulemaking]; § 2413 [annual reporting to
Congress]. See also EAA-99, supra note 502, at §§ 103, 105, 214, 302, 304, 307, 310, 601,
701,901.
515. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2408. See also EAA-99, supra note 502, at § 501.
516. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(b) [initial screening of licenses], (d) [referral of license
application to other agencies], (e) [actions on license applications by other agencies], (f)
[action on license applications by Commerce Department], (f)(3) [inform applicant of
"intent to deny" a license, grounds for the proposed decision, steps possible to avoid
denial, and appeal procedures], (g) [special procedures for licenses considered by Defense
Department], (m) [procedures for licenses requiring multilateral review]. See also EAA-
99, supra note 502, at § 501.
517. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(b) [10 days for initial screening], (c) [60 days for final
decision on "ordinary" license applications], (d) [referrals to other agencies to occur
within 20 days], (e) [other agencies to respond within 20 days of referral], (f) [license
applicant has 30 days to respond to any issues (including proposed denial), Commerce
Department decision rendered within 60 days of receipt of other agencies' and applicant's
response(s)], (g) [Defense Department given 20 days to recommend disapproval of
national security exports; President given 20 days to consider this recommendation], (h)
[40 days provided for multilateral review], (j) [applicant given right to seek mandamus 20
days after petitioning Commerce regarding a failure to meet any of the proscribed
deadlines], (1) [Commerce Department to decide "classification requests" within 10 days],
(n) [reports to Congress on license applications required to include detailed information
on timeliness of licensing actions and decisions]. See also EAA-99, supra note 502, at §§
501-502.
518. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412. See also supra notes 432-439; EAA-99, supra note 502,
at §§ 501-502.
519. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 24090) [appealing denial of license application]; § 2410(c)
[administrative sanctions and civil penalties], (e)-(f) [refunds and actions to recover
penalties], (g) [forfeiture provisions and procedures]; § 2410(a) [procedures for
multilateral control violations]; § 2410(b) [procedures for missile proliferation control
violations]; § 2410(c) [procedures for chemicallbiological weapons proliferation controls];
§2412(c) [procedures for civil penalties and sanctions], (d) [procedures for "temporary
denial orders"], (e) [administrative appeals form license denials]. See also EAA-99, supra
note 502, at § 502.
520. In fact the export control system has also imported many of the "tools" and
approaches used by OFAC into the export control system. This is particularly true in the
case of blacklisting, where the Commerce and State Department blacklists were used
primarily, if not exclusively, for parties who were being sanctioned for violating U.S.
export controls. Now, following the OFAC model, new blacklists have been created which
are employed solely to influence the behavior of foreign parties, behavior which while
contrary to U.S. policy objectives, may be entirely legal and encouraged in the jurisdiction
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Congress need not be so deferential to the Executive Branch in the
SRA.
However, in marked contrast to TWEA and IEEPA, the EAA
does contain an expiration date to help ensure that Congress
periodically debates the appropriateness of its policies and these
detailed directions as to how the Executive branch should conduct its
trade control processes.521 Accordingly, the EAA lapses if Congress
does not provide for its timely reauthorization. This has happened on
five occasions, most recently in 1994.522 During these periods, the
detailed regulatory mechanisms enabled and created under the EAA
are temporarily continued in place and unaltered based upon the
President's authority under IEEPA.523 Senator Gramm of Texas
where it occurs. See Fitzgerald supra note 27, at 28-35.
521. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (1994).
522. Originally the EAA expired on September 30, 1983. That date was extended to
October 14, 1983 by Pub. L. No. 98-108, when the Act lapsed. New legislation was passed
in December, 1983, which set an expiration date of February 29, 1984, see Pub. L. No. 98-
207. Then Pub. L. No. 98-222 extended that date to March 30, 1984, when the EAA again
lapsed. In July 1985, the Act was again reauthorized, by Pub. L. No. 99-64 with a new
expiration date of September 30, 1989. The Act was then extended until September 30,
1990 by Pub. L. No. 100-418. It lapsed for a third time in 1990 until it was reauthorized in
September, 1993, with Pub. L. No. 103-10, which established an expiration date of June 30,
1994. It lapsed for a fourth time before being briefly extended to August 20, 1994 by Pub.
L. No. 103-277 on July 5, 1994. Since the EAA last expired in August of 1994, the
Commerce Department's trade controls have continued to be maintained under the
President's authority under IEEPA. See also infra note 523.
523. The President has continued to maintain the export control system developed
under the EAA, by invoking his emergency powers under IEEPA, each time it has lapsed.
For the most recent instance, the period since August 20, 1994, see Exec. Order No.
12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (1994) (Continuation of Export Control Regulations); Notice:
Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,767
(1995); Notice: Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 61
Fed. Reg. 42,527 (1996); Notice: Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control
Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,629 (1997); Notice: Continuation of Emergency Regarding
Export Control Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,121 (1998); Notice: Continuation of
Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 44,101 (1999). For the
period of June 30-July 5, 1994, see Exec. Order No. 12,923, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,551 (1994)
(Continuation of Export Control Regulations). For the period September 30, 1990-
September 30,1993, see Exec. Order No. 12,730, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,373 (1990) (Continuation
of Export Control Regulations); Notice: Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export
Control Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,385 (1991); Notice: Continuation of Emergency
Regarding Export Control Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 44,649 (1992); Exec. Order No.
12,867, Termination of Emergency Authority for Certain Export Controls, 58 Fed. Reg.
1,993 (1993). For the period March 30, 1984-July 12, 1985, see Exec. Order No. 12,470, 49
Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1984) (Continuation of Export Control Regulations); Notice:
Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 12,513
(1985); Exec. Order No. 12,525, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,757 (1985) (Termination of Emergency
Authority for Certain Export Controls). For the period October 14-December 20, 1983,
see Exec. Order No. 12,444, Continuation of Export Control Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg.
48,215 (1983); Exec. Order No. 12,451, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,563 (1983) (Continuation of Export
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intended to introduce legislation in the latter half of 1999 to
reauthorize and update the lapsed EAA.5 24
The ability to substitute one legislative predicate for another, one
broad and deferential and the other arguably equally broad but with
much more detailed direction, lends credence to notion that Congress
need not defer quite so much to the Executive branch. Congress
could well exercise more oversight over the administration of the
OFAC sanctions programs, just as it has done with the other trade
control offices in other Departments. The SRA would provide a
ready vehicle for it to do so.525
Recommendations and Conclusion
Seven years have passed since Melita Jaric's employees were
surprised by the delivery of OFAC's "temporary" blocking orders as
they returned from lunch. Although few of the people working in the
nearby businesses can remember why it happened, IPT's warehouse
office outside of Philadelphia remains closed. Neither the trucks on
Bristol Road nor the freight cars traveling on the Reading Railroad
behind the industrial park now carry any of the grinding machines
and other tools IPT distributed for nearly a quarter century.
Occasionally, Laslo Kovac makes the twenty minute drive from his
home in neighboring Southhampton to check on the old office. A
serviceman, he is the last of IPT's former employees to remain in the
area. However, there is little to do beyond oiling the small remaining
inventory of machines, and his visits are becoming more infrequent
over the years.526 IPT's New York office on Fifth Avenue is gone,
and the state has a lien pending for non-payment of taxes. 27 But for
the name on the door in Warminster, the IPT Company has ceased to
Control Regulations).
524. See S. 1712, 106th Cong. (1999). See also supra note 502.
525. Alternatively, these issues could be addressed in the new EAA if the scope of the
bill were expanded, for example, to consolidate all the various provisions affecting the
government's trade control agencies.
526. Following the service of the blocking orders, OFAC licensed the delivery of a
number of machines in IPT's inventory to KBC Tools in Michigan, because they had
purchased the machines from IPT prior to the date its assets were blocked. Payments
received after the effective date of the orders, however, were required to be deposited into
blocked bank accounts. OFAC also licensed certain activities regarding the servicing of
machinery and the access and maintenance of the premises. Most of these provisions were
revoked or suspended following the issuance of Executive Order Number 12,846. See
OFAC Licenses Nos. Y-0058 (July 23, 1992) and Y-0096 (July 31, 1992); Exhibit Nos. 5-6
(August 3, 1992) Declaration of R. Richard Newcomb (copies on file with Hastings Law
Journal). See IPT Company v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, No. 92-Civ. 5542
(JFK), 1992 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12796 (S.D.N.Y., August 24,1992).
527. See IPT Company, Judgment Docket, 6/2/1995, Index No. E009541867, available in
LEXIS JGT Library, ALLIGT file.
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exist.
The blacklisting of individuals or companies, such as occurred
with IPT, is a powerful tool with dramatic impact for those who are
directly or indirectly affected. As is the case with the sanctions
themselves, it is a tool with many important applications augmenting
and broadening the reach of the Government's economic sanctions
programs and its foreign policy. The power and impact of these tools
highlights the importance of ensuring that they are applied properly
and consistently, in a manner maximizing their utility and promotes
the widest possible compliance with their requirements. Historically,
however, procedural defects have plagued virtually all of the OFAC
sanctions programs.
OFAC's origins and substantial responsibilities, combined with
its historical isolation when compared to other trade control agencies,
results in a tendency to take an adversarial approach to those it
encounters while carrying out its mission, rather than one which
emphasizes cooperation with the individuals and companies who must
implement its dictates within the world trading system. Its small size,
and the increasing demands for its services by policymakers seeking
to "take action" on complex and diverse political issues, has
exacerbated this tendency and produced a record replete with
procedural deficiencies, ad hoc or selective application of its
requirements, and a lack of concern for proper notice and distribution
of the details of its controls. Thus, there is a certain resonance in
Melita Jaric's emotional plea to treat those who become ensnared in
sanctions with the same care as if it were their human rights, rather
than just property rights, at issue. This plea has increasing appeal the
further removed the particular blacklisted party is from a direct
presence or involvement in the primary target of the sanctions.
Nevertheless, as Ms. Jaric also discovered, individual lawsuits
challenging OFAC's actions are both difficult and unlikely to produce
a change in approach. Procedural irregularities are often remediable
during the course of an administrative or judicial challenge, leading to
inconclusive results for those seeking a long term change in agency
practices. Moreover, the adversarial context is not one which is well
suited to having the agency appreciate the merit of a challenger's
complaints with the process. Additionally, there are sound reasons for
the various deferential doctrines and other obstacles which limit
judicial review of agency actions which should not, and cannot, be
easily overcome.
However, Congress is well-positioned to consider OFAC's
administrative record from a broader perspective than that presented
in any individual administrative appeal or judicial action. In addition
to providing new guidance on the use of unilateral economic
sanctions, Congress could expand the SRA to address many of the
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procedural issues which affect OFAC operations and programs in a
manner not unlike the specific direction it provides for the Bureau of
Export Administration's operations in the EAA. It can mandate, for
example, that preexisting notice and comment requirements of the
APA and Federal Register Act be followed. OFAC's desire to
respond quickly when establishing new sanctions or adjusting existing
controls to accommodate shifts in policy certainly does not preclude
the use of "interim final" rules, and the subsequent consideration of
comments from the trading community and public, prior to issuing
"final" rules. Additionally, a harmonized or master menu of possible
sanctions measures which could be selectively invoked for particular
targets would greatly simplify and streamline the existing regulatory
scheme, which is unnecessarily complex because of its dependence
upon ostensibly separate sets of regulations for each sanctions target.
Congress can and should play a greater role in defining that menu of
possible sanctions measures, establishing the substantive
administrative review procedures to be applied, and ensuring that its
directions are carried out in practice by the Executive branch.528
With particular regard to blacklisting, Congress should prescribe
the proper procedural and factual prerequisites for naming a party to
the OFAC blacklists, the requirements for making that information
available to the concerned party, and for appealing or challenging a
blacklisting action. Congress should also clarify that the blacklisting
tool should ordinarily focus on parties of concern located outside,
rather than within, the sanctioned target destination or territory.
Additionally, blacklisting should be used sparingly and only for those
parties whose blacklisting is essential to meeting the policy objectives
of the sanctions. With literally thousands of names appearing in the
current blacklists, it is virtually impossible to administer without a
fairly sophisticated computer-driven screening process. Moreover, a
compliance staff is also required, as no computer program can fully
deal with all the subtle nuances of the various regulatory
requirements. While financial institutions and larger companies can
afford these measures, full and effective compliance with the
obligations imposed by these complex requirements is beyond the
capability of many others. Simply asserting that when in doubt one
528. In providing for review of agency actions, under the traditional "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of the APA or whatever other standard is selected, care must be
exercised to be sufficiently specific as to what may be reviewed in order to avoid
inadvertently making judicial review logically dependent upon nonjusticiable political
questions, as occurred with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,. See 8
U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(c). See People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States
Dep't of State, Nos. 97-1646, 97-1670, 1999 WL 420471 (D.C. Cir., June 25, 1999); supra
note 422 and accompanying text.
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should "ask for an interpretation or apply for a license," 529 begs the
question and is manifestly impractical in the age of the global
economy. Accordingly, and again in a manner similar to that done
with the commodity oriented export control system, Congress should
establish a de minimis level below which the sanctions would not
apply, a level that matches the historical lack of enforcement of these
controls for minor or incidental dealings outside of a sanctioned
target destination.5 30 This action, along with establishing appropriate
limits on blacklisting parties who may have only indirect connection
or involvement with a particular sanctioned target, would greatly
contribute towards the creation of a more manageable blacklist.
When combined with greater Congressional direction regarding the
nature and process for imposing economic sanctions, these steps
would help the OFAC sanctions to become more clear, more
consistent, and more effectively implemented, and therefore better
suited to promoting the long-term aims and policy objectives
underlying the Government's various economic sanctions programs.
529. See supra note 454 and accompanying text.
530. OFAC took the first tentative steps in this direction in April, 1999, when the ITR
were amended to exclude from their coverage U.S. contributions to third country exports
to Iran which contain "insubstantial" amounts of U.S. goods or technology. See 64 Fed.
Reg. 20,168 (1999) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §560.511). The method OFAC uses to determine
what is "insubstantial" borrows heavily from the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR) provisions which exempt foreign items with de minimis U.S. content from control.
However, the OFAC approach is less stringent in calculating the U.S. content than are the
EAR provisions. Compare 31 C.F.R. § 560.111 with 15 C.F.R. § 734.4 (1998).
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